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FLAWED THINKING
I. INTRODUCTION
"EverIv decision you make is a mistake. "
-Edward Dahlberg, US novelist and critic
As negotiators' on a constant basis,2 we typically aspire to reach
thoughtful, rational agreements.3 Of course, what constitutes a "rational"
I The term "negotiate" is used in a broad sense to mean the act of communicating
formally or informally to reach agreements. Most commentators in the field define the
term similarly. See, e.g., ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN xvii (Bruce Patton ed., 2d ed. 1991) ("[Negotiation] is
back-and-forth communication designed to reach an agreement when you and the other
side have some interests that are shared and others that are opposed."); GAVIN KENNEDY,
KENNEDY ON NEGOTIATION 9 (1998) ("Negotiation is a process by which we search for
terms to obtain what we want from somebody who wants something from us."); DAVID
A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR: BARGAINING FOR
COOPERATION AND COMPETITIVE GAINS 11 (1986) ("[Negotiation is] a process of
potentially opportunistic interaction by which two or more parties, with some apparent
conflict, seek to do better through jointly decided action than they could otherwise.");
ROY J. LEWICKI ET AL., NEGOTIATION: READINGS, EXERCISES & CASES ix (4th ed. 2003)
("Negotiation is a process by which we attempt to influence others to help us achieve our
needs, which at the same time taking their needs into account."); GERALD I. NIERENBERG,
THE ART OF NEGOTIATING 8 (1981) ("Whenever people exchange ideas with the intention
of changing relationships, whenever they confer for agreement, they are negotiating.");
G. RICHARD SHELL, BARGAINING FOR ADVANTAGE: NEGOTIATION STRATEGIES FOR
REASONABLE PEOPLE 6 (1999) ("A negotiation is an interactive communication process
that may take place whenever we want something from someone else or another person
wants something from us."); LEIGH L. THOMPSON, THE MIND AND HEART OF THE
NEGOTIATOR 2 (2d ed. 2001) ("[Negotiation is a] decision-making process by which two
or more people agree how to allocate scarce resources.").
2 Virtually all commentators note the frequency and ubiquity of negotiation. See,
e.g., MICHAEL C. DONALDSON & MIMI DONALDSON, NEGOTIATING FOR DUMMIES 1 ("You
negotiate all day long, not just on the job but in every situation you encounter-with your
boss or your employees, with your vendors or your clients, with your spouse or your kids,
even with the serviceperson who comes to your house but doesn't repair that refrigerator
after all."); FISHER & URY, supra note 1, at xvii ("Everyone negotiates something every
day. Like Moliere's Monsieur Jourdain, who was delighted to learn that he had been
speaking prose all his life, people negotiate even when they don't think of themselves as
doing so."); LEWICKI ET AL., supra note 1, at ix ("People negotiate every day."); ROY J.
LEWICKI ET AL., THINK BEFORE YOU SPEAK: THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO STRATEGIC
NEGOTIATION 1 (1996) ("[M]any of us negotiate more than once in every waking hour,
but we do not recognize the majority of these 'negotiations' as such."); SHELL, supra note
1, at 6 ("All of us negotiate many times a day."); WILLIAM URY, GETTING PAST No:
NEGOTIATING YOUR WAY FROM CONFRONTATION TO COOPERATION 3 (1991) ("We all
negotiate every day.").
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agreement is not always obvious,4 but, for most people, it means, at a
minimum, that they have maximized the possibilities for reaching their
goals. 5  Unfortunately, if recent studies are to be believed, people often
3 One does so on the assumption that rational approaches, i.e., those based on
reason, generally carry greater benefit than those of an irrational nature. Of course, that
will not always be the case. Sometimes irrational approaches may produce superior
outcomes-for example, where one's temper loss induces an opponent to make
concessions that he or she ordinarily would not do. See ALAN N. SCHOONMAKER,
NEGOTIATE TO WIN: GAINING THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EDGE 138 (1989) (citing what he calls
the "Madman's Advantage," which produces favorable results because one convinces an
opponent that one will not stop pushing for his or her position whatever the cost). This
approach works because irrational parties appear indifferent to the possibility of
retaliation or revenge that might deter others. Id.
4 See, e.g., Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and
Settlement: A New Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REv. 77, 78 n.4 (1997)
(arguing that "[t]here is no single definition of what constitutes 'rational'
decisionmaking"). Korobkin & Guthrie offer a set of principles for rational decision-
making:
(1) Ordering of Alternatives: rational individuals can compare alternatives and
decide either they prefer one to another or are indifferent between the two; (2)
Dominance: they should never prefer a decision that yields outcomes equivalent to
or worse than an alternative on every dimension; (3) Cancellation: in choosing
between two options, outcomes that will be the same under either choice should not
affect the choice; (4) Transitivity: if choice A is preferred to choice B, and choice B
is preferred to choice C, choice A is preferred to choice C; (5) Continuity: a gamble
between a good outcome and bad outcome should be preferred over a certain
intermediate outcome if the likelihood of the bad outcome is sufficiently low; and
(6) Invariance: the way in which two options are presented should not affect the
decisionmaker's choice between them.
Id. (emphasis added); see also SCoTT PLous, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND
DECISION MAKING 81-82 (1993) (describing a set of principles for rational
decisionmaking).
5 Maximizing one's utility seems to be the key to "rational" decisionmaking. See,
e.g., John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 279, 283-84
(1973) (describing the classical economics model of rational decisionmaking as actors
making choices in order to maximize utility); see also Jonathan R. Cohen, Reasoning
Along Different Lines: Some Varied Roles of Rationality in Negotiation and Conflict
Resolution, 3 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 111, 111 (1998) (noting that the term "rational " is
defined similarly to that in economics: "[E]ach person is presumed to act so as to make
himself or herself as well off as possible. Often this model goes by the label of utility
maximization."). Professors Carroll, Bazerman, and Maury add that negotiation research
focuses on the rationality of outcomes and process. See John S. Carroll et al., Negotiator
Cognitions: A Descriptive Approach to Negotiators' Understanding of Their Opponents,
41 ORG. BEHAV. & HuM. DECISION PROCESSES 352, 353 (1988). They define a "rational
outcome" as one where there "is a zone of agreement that both parties prefer over
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negotiate irrationally 6 rather than as calm, deliberate, utility maximizers. 7 To
say that negotiators do not bargain rationally is not to suggest that they do so
reaching impasse, and the agreement will be such that there is not alternative joint
resolution available that would be preferable to both parties." Id. A "rational process" to
them is one where the parties have been "utility maximizers." Id.
6 See, e.g., Philip E. Tetlock, Cognitive Biases and Organizational Correctives: Do
Both Disease and Cure Depend on the Politics of the Beholder?, 45 ADMiN. Sci. Q. 293,
293 (2000). Professor Tetlock summarizes current studies as follows:
Experimental research on judgment and choice casts us, human beings, in a
less-than-flattering light. We fall prey, it has been claimed, to a wide assortment of
errors and biases. We are too quick to draw conclusions about others, too slow to
change our minds, excessively confident in our predictions, and prone to give too
much weight to irrelevant cues (such as sunk costs) and too little weight to relevant
ones (such as opportunity costs). Although this grim portrait has been qualified by
the recent proliferation of dual-process models of judgment and choice
that... bestow on people some limited capacity to decide how to decide the
dominant emphasis in the last quarter century of experimental work has clearly been
on judgmental shortcomings.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Robert Prentice, Enron: A Brief Behavioral Autopsy, 40
AM. Bus. LAW L.J. 417, 422-23 (2003). Prentice argues that the
foundational assumption that people make decisions as if they are homo economicus
("Chicago Man") is indisputably wrong .... The essential notion is that rather than
act as Chicago Man theoretically does, most people make many decisions that are
affected by various heuristics (mental short-cuts) and biases (mental tunnels) that
lead them to results that are often less than optimal.
Id; see also Cass R. Sunstein et al., Predictably Incoherent Judgments, 54 STAN. L. REV.
1153, 1163 (2002).
It is now well-known that people are not in fact perfectly rational. They are
better described.., as boundedly rational. Because of the limitations in their ability
to process information, boundedly rational agents are ... locally coherent-
achieving consistency over small regions of the space of possible events and
outcomes, but not between more remote regions.
Sunstein, supra, at 1163. But see Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics' Perfect
Rationality Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics' Equal
Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67, 73-74 (2002) (objecting both to the model of rationality
and the model of irrationality-"[w]hereas law and economics assumes too much
rationality on the part of legal actors as an empirical matter, behavioral law and
economics errs by assuming too much irrationality").
7 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics
and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1130 (1974) (describing decisionmaking biases). Professors
Tversky and Kahnerman are credited with having the seminal article on bias in
decisionmaking. See also Linda Babcock et al., Biased Judgments of Fairness in
Bargaining, 85 AM. ECON. REv. 1337, 1337 (1995) (noting that "empirical evidence
suggests that impasses and inefficient settlements are common in the legal system and in
contract negotiations"); Max H. Bazerman et al., The Human Mind as a Barrier to Wiser
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Environmental Agreements, 42 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 1277, 1277-78 (1999) (arguing
that "one viable explanation for many sub-optimal environmental or economic
negotiations is a set of common and systematic mistakes that most humans make in the
negotiation process") (citation omitted); Richard Birke & Craig R. Fox, Psychological
Principles in Negotiating Civil Settlements, 4 HARv. NEGOT. L. REv. 1, 1-2 (1999).
Although lawyers, like most professionals, typically believe that consistent,
reasoned, objective, and rational decisionmaking characterizes their negotiations, an
abundance of evidence suggests that this belief is misplaced. Research in the past
few decades has documented pervasive psychological biases in the judgment and
decisionmaking of a wide array of professionals and laypersons.
Burke & Fox, supra, at 1-2; see also Carroll et al., supra note 5, at 353 (noting the
existence of a "large body of behavioral decision research showing that individuals
deviate from the economic model of rationality in systematic and predictable ways ....
[and that] substantial evidence exists to demonstrate that these judgmental deficiencies
affect expert negotiators as well as naive subjects") (citations omitted); Christine Jolls et
al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1471, 1471 (1998)
(noting that "empirical evidence gives much reason to doubt [the assumptions of
rationality in neoclassical economics]"); Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 4, at 79 (stating
that the model of rational decisionmaking is "undermined by a growing body of empirical
evidence demonstrating that litigants often make decisions in ways that depart from [this
model]"); Roderick M. Kramer et al., Self-Enhancement Biases and Negotiator
Judgment: Effects of Self-Esteem and Mood, 56 ORG. BEHAv. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 110, 111 (1993) (noting that both field studies and laboratory experiments
have demonstrated that "negotiators are prone to a variety of judgmental biases that can
adversely affect the process and outcome of their negotiations"); Robin L. Pinkley et al.,
"Fixed Pie" a la Mode: Information Availability, Information Processing, and the
Negotiation of Suboptimal Agreements, 62 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES
101, 101 (1995) (stating that research demonstrates that "negotiators consistently settle
for suboptimal agreements" because of negotiators' biases); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski,
Heuristics and Biases in the Courts: Ignorance or Adaptation, 79 OR. L. REV. 61, 61
(2000) (detailing studies indicating that the brain uses shortcuts to deal with complex
decisionmaking and that "[r]eliance on these shortcuts, however, leaves people
susceptible to all manner of illusions: visual, mnemonic, and judgmental"); Cass R.
Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175, 1175 (1997).
In the last two decades, social scientists have learned a great deal about how
people actually make decisions. Much of this work calls for qualifications of rational
choice models. Those models are often wrong in the simple sense that they yield
inaccurate predictions. Cognitive errors and motivational distortions may press
behavior far from the anticipated directions: normative accounts of rational choice
should not be confused with descriptive accounts.
Sunstein, supra, at 1175; see also Leigh Thompson & Peter Kim, How the Quality of
Third Parties' Settlement Solutions is Affected by the Relationship Between Negotiators,
6 J. OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: EXPERIMENTAL 3 (2000) ("It is well established that
people bring biases to the negotiating table."); Roger Lowenstein, Exuberance is
Rational, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 11, 2001, at 68-69 (describing the emerging view
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arbitrarily or randomly. To the contrary, the errors that people make are often
quite predictable, reflecting what appear to be certain "hard-wired" mental
predispositions. 8
Examples abound of behavior that seems difficult to justify on purely
rational grounds:
* Studies show that most people will go across town to save $10 on a
clock radio but not to save $10 on a large-screen TV despite the
precise same economic "gain." 9 Similarly, people will "leave a tip in
a restaurant far from home, that they will never visit again, for a
waiter they will never again see, for service already and irrevocably
rendered."10
" People over-weigh the present compared to the future. "For example,
they often prefer to receive $100 today than $110 in a week, but, in
odd reverse, opt for $110 in eleven weeks over $100 in ten weeks. '""I
* From 1980 to the mid-1990s, seizing on what has been described as
the "Chivas Regal" phenomenon, most elite private colleges and
universities tripled tuition costs. These increases did not reflect
increased operating costs or demand-or any other rational
economic need. They reflected the schools' realization that they
could take advantage of the fact that most parents equated
"expensive" with "excellent.' 12
among economists that most people "are prone to error, irrationality and emotion, and
they act in ways not always consistent with maximizing their own financial well being").
8 These predispositions are often called "heuristics." For a discussion of how
evolution has "hard-wired" humans, see infra notes 23-31 and accompanying text.
9 See Lowenstein, supra note 7, at 68 (citing this and other research on irrational
economic behavior by University of Chicago Professor Richard Thaler, including the
observation that people who will mow their own lawns to save $10 will generally refuse
to cut a neighbor's lawn for the same amount).
10 Owen D. Jones, Time-Shifted Rationality and the Law of Law's Leverage:
Behavioral Economics Meets Behavioral Biology, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1141, 1148 (2001).
"1 Id.
12 See Karen Heller & Lily Eng, Steep Rise in Tuition is Price of Prestige, DENVER
POST, Apr. 20, 1996, at A-2 1, available at LEXIS, News Library, DPost File (decrying
the fact that "all the basic laws of economics are out of whack"). They report that the
"explanation for the jump in prices has largely been a change in attitude. Educators came
to realize that families equated the quality of a college education with cost: the more
expensive, the better." Id. Professor Robert Cialdini describes the same phenomenon with
respect to a friend who mistakenly doubled the price of slow-moving jewelry at her store
(instead of halving it) only to discover that the jewelry sold out completely and quickly.
See ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSUASION 1-2, 5 (1984)
(describing the phenomenon as "expensive = good").
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* In 1985, Ethiopia lay in financial ruins as a result of years of
drought, deprivation, and civil war. Nonetheless, disregarding its
infinitely greater needs at home, the Ethiopian Red Cross contributed
$5,000 to Mexico after a major earthquake in Mexico, reciprocating
Mexico's financial assistance fifty years before when Ethiopia faced
an invasion by the Italian Army. 13
" Conventional economic theory holds that companies should cut
workers' pay during recessions. Yet, they rarely do, preferring to lay
workers off instead, a generally more costly and traumatic
approach. 14
* In December 2000, Tom Hicks, owner of the Texas Rangers, bid
$250 million to sign free-agent player Alex Rodriguez-roughly
$100 million more than the second highest bid. The figure
represented more than the cost of the entire franchise and the stadium
in which the team plays. One commentator described this purchase
as "the winner's curse," noting that "whoever wins an auction
generally pays more for what he's won than it's actually worth."' 5
These and other examples, while seemingly unrelated, share a common
theme. They all illustrate the surprisingly large extent to which humans
analyze situations according to deep-inborn impulses outside the boundaries
of classical rationality models.
Why do people stray so far from the classic models of rationality? First,
and not surprisingly, we all face limits on our capabilities imposed by
13 This seemingly irrational response, which initially baffled Professor Cialdini,
cleared up when he investigated the matter. His conclusion: "The need to reciprocate had
transcended great cultural differences, long distances, acute famine, and immediate self-
interest. Quite simply, a half century later, against all countervailing forces, obligation
triumphed." See CIALDINI, supra note 12, at 21 (describing numerous other examples of
reciprocity where it "was so strong that it simply overwhelmed the influence" of almost
all other social forces).
14See generally TRUMAN F. BEWLEY, WHY WAGES DON'T FALL DURING A
RECESSION (1999). See also Cass R. Sunstein, The Human Variables, NEW REPUBLIC,
Aug. 7, 2000, at 39, available at LEXIS, News Library, NewRpb File (reviewing
Bewley's book, and describing other, similar behavior that classical economists would
describe as non-rational, e.g., people tip in restaurants that they will never visit again,
people comply with laws that are not enforced, or people contribute to public television
even though they never receive a bill for watching).
15 The "winner's curse" is not always an example of individual irrationality. To the
contrary, "[t]he paradox of the winner's curse, in fact, is that it comes into play even
when all the bidders in an auction are rational." James Surowiecki, The Agony of Victory
and the Thrill of Defeat, NEW YORKER, Jan. 8, 2001, at 31. For a discussion of the
"winner's curse," see infra notes 250-54, and accompanying text.
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shortfalls in intelligence, data, energy, memory, perceptions, patience, and
time that prevent full processing of critical information. 16 Second, and less
well-recognized, people typically rely on mental "rules of thumb," often
called "heuristics," in reading situations and making decisions that, while
generally quite useful, 17 can sometimes produce sub-optimal approaches and
decisions. 18
More and more data has accumulated in the past 25-plus years on how
substantially heuristics and other biases interfere with proper negotiation
decisionmaking. 19 In fact, anyone who seriously aspires to be a successful
negotiator must understand and deal effectively with his or her non-rational
impulses and error-prone tendencies. 20 Unfortunately, costly negotiation
16 See, e.g., STEPHEN P. ROBBINS, ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 139 (9th ed. 2000)
("In order to avoid information overload, decision makers rely on heuristics or
judgmental shortcuts in decision making."); Jolls et al., supra note 7, at 1477 (noting the
"obvious fact that human cognitive abilities are not infinite. We have limited
computational skills and seriously flawed memories."). Professor Max Bazerman notes
that these limitations mean that decisionmakers necessarily satisfice. That is, "they
simply search until they find a solution that meets a certain acceptable level of
performance." MAX BAZERMAN, JUDGMENT IN MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING 4-5 (4th
ed. 1998) (noting, for example, that, because "managers make hundreds of decisions
daily, the systematic and time-consuming demands of rational decision making are
simply not viable").
17 BAZERMAN, supra note 16, at 6 (noting that "economists would argue that
individuals use heuristics because the benefit that they obtain through the time savings of
the heuristic outweighs the costs of any potential reduction in the quality of the
decision"); see also infra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
19 See, e.g., Max H. Bazerman et al., Negotiation, 51 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 279, 282
(2000) (describing the history of negotiation research and noting that "behavioral
decision research" (BDR) grew substantially in the 1980s and 1990s). According to the
authors, "[t]he core argument of much of BDR is that people rely on simplifying
strategies, or cognitive heuristics. Although these heuristics are typically useful shortcuts,
they also lead to predictable mistakes." Id. (citations omitted).
20 As the research has grown, different disciplines increasingly have focused on
cognitive biases in decision making-from game theorists, see, for example, THOMAS C.
SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 16 (1960) (discussing game theory as it applies
to rational decisionmaking), to social psychologists, see generally Tversky & Kahneman,
supra note 7, to economists, see, for example, Lowenstein, supra note 7, at 68 (describing
the growth in research of decisionmaking bias in economics), to marketers, see, for
example, CIALDINI, supra note 12, at 7 (describing how marketers use stereotypes to
classify things according to a few features and respond mindlessly), and lawyers, see, for
example, Sunstein et al., supra note 6, at 1163.
Professor Gregory Mitchell has lodged a strong dissent to the new theories of flawed
decisionmaking based on cognitive error. See Mitchell, supra note 6, at 69 (arguing that
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blunders triggered by poor decisionmaking approaches abound, leading, in
some cases, to calls for legal intervention to protect vulnerable citizens. 21 As
an all-too-human teacher concerned about helping students and professionals
(and myself) avoid these psychological traps, I propose to analyze the
general dynamic of decisionmaking (and negotiation) bias, to review the
ever-growing list of identified biases, and to offer a number of suggestions
for avoiding or minimizing the impact of these biases on negotiators. 22
II. HEURISTICS AND RELATED BIASES: A PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. Evolutionary Origins
Decision heuristics and negotiation biases are so deeply ingrained 23 that
they undoubtedly have an evolutionary basis.24 In this respect, they are like
those who believe that cognitive illusions lead to predictable nonrational behaviors
assume too much irrationality). Mitchell's dissent, in turn, has led to a heated rejoinder
from Professor Jeffrey Rachlinski, who argues that Mitchell has attacked a straw man.
See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A New Social Scientific Assessment of Law and Human
Behavior: The Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 1165,
1167 n.18 (2003). Rachlinski argues that Mitchell's article
refutes the claim that context or incentives do not affect the magnitude of the
cognitive phenomena that psychologists have observed. Inasmuch as no one has ever
advocated such a position, however, it is hard to see the value of such a refutation.
Mischaracterizing a line of scholarship and then attacking that mischaracterization is
a cheap academic stunt that in no way undermines the value of the new scholarship
applying cognitive psychology to law.
Id.
21 See, e.g., Rachlinski, supra note 20, at 1166 (noting that "[n]umerous calls for
restraints on the marketplace, rules governing political campaigning, and restrictions on
contract formation draw support from psychological evidence that individuals cannot
make good choices").
22 1 wish to focus on solutions to the challenge of negotiation biases a bit more than
some other authors. While much has been written on the existence of bias, too little has
been done about suggesting ways of dealing with the problem. See Thompson & Kim,
supra note 7, at 11 (noting that their review of the empirical literature on bias in
negotiation leads them to the conclusion that "[n]egotiation research is empirically based
and descriptively rich, but often suffers from lack of formal prescriptive methods").
23 See, e.g., Nigel Nicholson, How Hardwired Is Human Behavior?, 76 HARv. Bus.
REv., July-Aug. 1998, at 135, 135-36 (noting the need to understand evolutionary
psychology because it provides a "new and provocative way to think about human
nature"). Professor Bazerman says that heuristics are "embedded in the way the human
mind works." See Max H. Bazerman & James J. Gillespie, Betting on the Future: The
Virtues of Contingent Contracts, 77 HARV. Bus. REv., Sept.-Oct. 1999, at 155, 157.
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emotions which appear to arise from survival needs 25-carrying both
positive26 and negative 27 implications. The survival benefits of decision
heuristics seem fairly obvious. To pick an example, no doubt, repeated
throughout history: If one sees another person die after being bitten by a
poisonous snake, one quickly and vividly learns to hesitate when picking up
snakes, especially any that bear a close resemblance to the one that killed the
neighbor. Needless to say, having the ability to absorb lessons such as this
quickly carries substantial life-saving benefits-reacting immediately at the
sight of a dangerous reptile substantially increases one's survival odds.
Social psychologists describe this strong reaction as an example of the
"availability" heuristic.28 That is, rather than treat each new encounter with a
24 Robert Wright argues that the way humans reason, feel, and make decisions stems
from evolution's broad imprint:
The thousands and thousands of genes that influence human behavior-genes that
build the brain and govern neurotransmitters and other hormones, thus defining our
"mental organs"--are here for a reason. And the reason is that they goaded our
ancestors into getting their genes into the next generation. If the theory of natural
selection is correct, then essentially everything about the human mind should be
intelligible in these terms. The basic ways we feel about each other... and say to
each other, are with us today by virtue of the past contributions to genetic fitness.
ROBERT WRIGHT, THE MORAL ANIMAL: THE NEW SCIENCE OF EVOLUTIONARY
PSYCHOLOGY 28 (1994); see also STEVE JONES, DARWIN'S GHOST: THE ORIGIN OF THE
SPECIES UPDATED 145 (2000) ("Can habits or instincts, intricate and flexible as they may
be, follow the same evolutionary rules as color, shape or size? That might seem unlikely,
for behavior is often learned or comes from a simple reflex. In the end, though, every
action of every animal is a product of genes...."); GEORGE C. WILLIAMS, THE PONY
FISH'S GLOW 162 (1997) (noting that evolution explains the development of human
thought and decision patterns, and that "[r]easoning, to be favored by [natural] selection,
must lead to useful conclusions that help us survive and reproduce. It need not lead to
formally correct solutions to logical problems."); Jones, supra note 10, at 1143 ("[A]ll
theories of behavior are ultimately theories about the human brain. And we now know
that the form and function of the human brain. . . have been significantly influenced by
powerful, omnipresent, evolutionary processes, including natural and sexual selection,
whose important roles in influencing human behavior remain unappreciated.").
25 See Robert S. Adler et al., Emotions in Negotiation: How to Manage Fear and
Anger, 14 NEGOT. J. 161, 163-65 (1998) (noting the evolutionary basis of emotions).
26 Id. (stating that emotions such as fear trigger life-saving escape mechanisms;
anger motivates us to retaliate when we are attacked or to attack when our interests are
threatened).
27 Id. at 168 (noting that fear can reduce one to paralysis and anger can flash white
hot at inappropriate moments, leading to regrettable actions).
28 See BAZERMAN, supra note 16, at 6-7 (the availability heuristic means that "[a]n
event that evokes emotions and is vivid, easily imagined, and specific will be more
'available' from memory than will an event that is unemotional in nature, bland, difficult
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snake as a unique event, humans instinctively rely on the immediate, vivid
image that arises in their minds to guide their reaction to the serpent.29 One's
reaction may also be based on past observations or on stories related by other
members of one's group. Of course, as with most heuristics, it sometimes
leads us astray. A starving person encountering a brightly colored, non-
poisonous snake might mistake it for a lethal variety and unnecessarily flee
the scene, thus losing an opportunity for a meal.30 Most of the heuristics of
concern to negotiators carry much less emotional impact than the snake
example, but they all seem fundamentally to reside deep within human
instincts.31
B. Benefits of Heuristics
Although much of the discussion within this article focuses on the way
that heuristics lead us astray, one must remember that, most of the time, they
play a positive role in our lives.32 For example, heuristics that predispose
people to sense danger even when little risk may actually exist are clearly
survival oriented and much preferred over those that operate in the opposite
to imagine, or vague"); see also infra notes 57-58 and accompanying text (discussion of
availability heuristic).
29 When it comes to ancient dangers like snakes, heights, lightning, and fire, humans
may be particularly predisposed by evolution to acquire fears, sometimes leading to
phobias. See Martin E.P. Seligman, On the Generality of the Laws of Learning, 77
PSYCHOL. REV. 406, 414-16 (1970); see also Martin E.P. Seligman, Phobias and
Preparedness, 2 BEHAV. THERAPY 307 (1971).
30 See WRIGHT, supra note 24, at 263 (noting that evolution can sometimes employ
deception as when "harmless snakes have evolved the coloration of poisonous snakes,
gaining undeserved respect").
31 One might argue that a person's reaction to a poisonous snake produces more of
an emotional than a cognitive reaction. Clearly, it presents both, with the dividing line
between the two not always clear. See, e.g., ROBBINS, supra note 16, at 110 (arguing that
"[p]eople use emotions as well as rational and intuitive processes in making decisions.
Failure to incorporate emotions into a study of decision processes will result in an
incomplete (and often inaccurate) view of the process.").
32 See, e.g., BAZERMAN, supra note 16, at 6 (noting the usefulness of heuristics);
Jolls et al., supra note 7, at 1477 (noting that "heuristics are useful on average (which
explains how they become adopted) ...."); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The "New" Law and
Psychology: A Reply to Critics, Skeptics, and Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV.
739, 753 (2000) (noting the general usefulness of heuristics and arguing that, in the legal
context, "many of the [decision heuristics] are quite adaptive. If these phenomena are
mental shortcuts that serve people well, or even enhance their well-being, then crafting
legal rules that induce people to avoid them could do more harm than good.").
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direction.33 This seems particularly so where the precise degree of risk is
uncertain and prudence poses no great risk. Of course, not all "prudent"
measures pose less risk. For example, one who drives across country to avoid
the risks of air travel clearly places himself or herself in greater danger by
driving rather than flying.34 The extensive fear that Americans felt about
flying after the terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center and Pentagon
on September 11, 2001, obscured the fact that most people who died in that
tragic incident did so while working in their offices, not while sitting in a
plane. Yet, it seems fair to say that, in the aftermath, few people suffered the
same anxiety about sitting at their desks as they did about flying.
Perhaps the most accurate view of heuristics is that, most of the time,
they provide substantial advantage to humans even though they occasionally
lead us into error.35 For example, the "availability" heuristic, which directs
us to follow the most immediately workable alternative, undoubtedly reflects
33 Moreover, although it seems indisputable that heuristics can mislead, one need
always to examine criticisms based on heuristics as critically as one examines the
heuristics themselves. This seems particularly important in policy debates. For example,
those who would premise government policies on the fact that people invariably err
because they fall prey to well-known heuristics need to do more than simply establish the
existence of the heuristic. They need to demonstrate that the heuristic applies, that it leads
to error, and that their prescriptions would be superior to current practices. See infra notes
271-73 and accompanying text.
34 See, e.g., ROBBINS, supra note 16, at 139 (noting that, "if flying on a commercial
airline was as dangerous as driving, the equivalent of two 747s filled to capacity would
have to crash every week, killing all aboard, to match the risk of being killed in a car
accident").
35 As Cialdini notes, we need heuristics simply to live as human beings:
You and I exist in an extraordinarily complicated stimulus environment, easily the
most rapidly moving and complex that has ever existed on this planet. To deal with
it, we need shortcuts. We can't be expected to recognize and analyze all the aspects
in each person, event, and situation we encounter in even one day. We haven't the
time, energy, or capacity for it .... Sometimes the behavior that unrolls will not be
appropriate for the situation, because not even the best stereotypes and trigger
features work every time. But we accept their imperfection, since there is really no
other choice. Without them, we would stand frozen--cataloging, appraising, and
calibrating-as the time for action sped by and away.
CIALDINI, supra note 12, at 7. The wisdom of seeking consistently good results rather
than occasional best results has been explicitly adopted by researchers in artificial
intelligence. Through an approach known as "heuristic programming," they develop
programs that usually produce a good result, but not always the best result. See, e.g.,
Heuristic Programming, Webopedia, at
http://webopedia.internet.com/TERM/H/heuristic-programming.html (last modified Apr.
12, 1997) (last visited Feb. 10, 2005).
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the fact that life-and-death evolutionary demands rewarded speedy
decisionmaking more than perfect judgment.
Because of life's complexities, evolution may have hard-wired us in
ways that predispose us to make non-rational decisions under certain
circumstances. Non-rational approaches, however, can sometimes carry
benefits. For example, a number of studies demonstrate that people seem
predisposed to approach negotiations with an unreasonably optimistic
attitude. 36 Yet, as Professor Rachlinski notes, optimism often carries
significant benefits in the business world37 even though it may interfere with
an accurate assessment of some situations. 38
C. When Good Heuristics Go Bad
Exactly how do we become so misled by heuristics? Perhaps the best
answer is that heuristics provide good general guidance, but sometimes fall
short in reading specific situations, drawing lines, or recognizing
exceptions. 39 For example, the genetic programming that properly alerts us to
be on guard around strangers-who, after all, might bear us ill will-may
unreasonably lead us to mistrust negotiation partners whom we do not know
36 See, e.g., BAZERMAN, supra note 16, at 32; Birke & Fox, supra note 7, at 16
(noting that negotiators often carry "'positive illusions' . . . which include unrealistic
optimism, exaggerated perceptions of personal control, and inflated positive views of the
self"); Bernard Roshco, Investor Illiteracy, AM. PROSPECT, Mar.-Apr. 1999, at 70,
available at LEXIS, News Library, AmPros File (noting the irrational expectations of
investors during the bull market of the 1990s); see also infra notes 160-73 and
accompanying text.
37 See Rachlinski, supra note 32, at 759-60 (arguing that over-optimism "leads
people to undertake the kind of risky, high-yield ventures that a company must endure in
order to be successful. In fact, an excess of optimism may be an essential characteristic of
a successful businessperson.").
38 But see infra note 159 and accompanying text (citing Professor Bazerman's
critique of this illusory optimism, arguing that it often leads to unintended and negative
consequences).
39 Professor Rachlinski looks at the array of biases associated with heuristics and
finds three observations about human judgment that he suggests can explain the majority
of errors in judgment and decisionmaking:
(1) people rely on attention and memory as if both are limitless and infallible,
even though they are neither; (2) the brain makes many automatic inferences outside
of the range of conscious thought; and (3) people rely on fixed reference points to
evaluate choices, paying more attention to changes in the status quo than to absolute
values.
See Rachlinski, supra note 32, at 740.
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well, even when they present us with perfectly reasonable proposals. 40
Similarly, the predisposition that we carry of "fight or flight" in moments of
extreme stress often operates even though neither response may be
appropriate. 4 1 This should come as no surprise if one reflects on the fact that
our decisionmaking capabilities evolved many years ago and have not
changed appreciably in millennia.4 2
Given evolution's role, Professor Owen Jones argues that it is misleading
to characterize the occasional sub-optimal performance of our brains as
"defective" or irrational. What occurs instead is that we behave exactly as
evolution designed us and that the original design has served us well.
My argument here is that the traditional approach to bounded rationality and
decision-making is, in many cases, both descriptively wrong and materially
misleading. It is descriptively wrong in the same way that it would be
wrong to say that a Porsche Boxster is "defective" when it fails to climb
logs and ford streams off road, or that a moth's brain is "defective" when
the moth flies into an artificial light source. It is materially misleading
because to the extent that irrationalities are considered to be the result of
defects, rather than design features, their specific content is assumed to be,
though patterned ex post, unpredictable, unsystematized, and random ex
ante-rather than predictable, interrelated, and content-specific.
The consequence of this... is that we not only should allow for, but
should indeed expect, that there will be times when a perfectly functioning
brain-functioning precisely as it was designed to function-will incline us
toward behavior that, viewed only in the present tense and measured only
by outcomes in current environments, will appear to be substantively
irrational. This is simply because the brain was designed to process
information in ways tending to yield behaviors that were substantively
40 Thus, one might feel that he or she is negotiating fairly and sincerely, but
unreasonably insist that one's opponent is bargaining aggressively and competitively. In
many cases, we are improperly externalizing our fears rather than accurately assessing
the situation. See infra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
41 See Adler et al., supra note 25, at 163-65.
42 See WILLIAMS, supra note 24, at 148 (observing that "[h]uman nature is now very
much what it was in the Stone Age, which lasted more than a hundred times as long as
recorded history. Current human nature is designed for Stone Age life."); see also
WRIGHT, supra note 24, at 191 (noting that the evolutionary design that produced human
nature "was done in a social environment quite different from the current environment.
We live in cities and suburbs and watch TV and drink beer, all the while being pushed
and pulled by feelings designed to propagate our genes in a small hunter-gatherer
population.").
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rational in different environments than the ones in which we now find
ourselves. 4
3
D. Classifying Negotiation Biases
One of the great challenges of scholarly analysis is classifying the
particular phenomenon being studied. Classification is inherently judgmental,
since there are numerous ways of organizing information.44  Yet,
classifications are critical in helping us sort through large amounts of data.
One of the major concerns of those who study cognitive bias is the difficulty
of organizing what appears to be an almost infinite array of decision errors
into a coherent body of knowledge.45 To date, no one has developed a
taxonomy to which social science researchers universally subscribe. 46 Most
researchers identify several categories, which may include multiple sub-
groups within the categories. 47 In most instances, researchers draw a
43 Jones, supra note 10, at 1171-72.
44 Aristotle, for example, grouped humans and birds together since both walk on two
feet. See Gary Olsen, Classifications, at
http://www.bact.wisc.edu/MicrotextBook/ClassAndPhylo/classify.html (last visited Nov.
11,2004).
45 See Rachlinski, supra note 32, at 748-49. In addressing what he refers to as
"behavioral decision theory," or "BDT," which includes decision bias as a fundamental
part of the theory, Professor Rachlinski describes the problem of applying BDT to legal
analysis:
BDT's seemingly endless list of cognitive heuristics and biases presents
a... [serious] problem for the application of BDT to law. The prospect of an
unlimited number of phenomena that require innumerable constraints or caveats on
legal analysis surely deters some legal scholars from incorporating BDT into their
analyses. Even worse, if BDT has no limiting principles, then legal scholars can use
some part of BDT to support almost any assertion about human behavior. A
methodology that creates hidden psychological trump cards that scholars can play to
contradict any assertion about human behavior cannot satisfy any legal scholar.
Id.
46 While there is no universal taxonomy, virtually all researchers begin with the
heuristics identified by Tversky and Kahneman: availability, representativeness, and
anchoring and adjustment. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 7, at 1124-30.
47 For example, Bazerman identifies three heuristics (availability,
representativeness, and anchoring and adjustment) associated with thirteen biases, but
also identifies other biases created by "self-serving motivations." See BAZERMAN, supra
note 16, at 11-40, 88-104. Robbins identifies two categories of heuristics (availability
and representativeness), but also includes a separate bias (escalation of commitment). See
ROBBINS, supra note 16, at 139-40. Sunstein draws a distinction between "factual" errors
and "probability related 'tastes."' See Sunstein et al., supra note 6, at 1153-57. Linda
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distinction between the concepts of heuristic and bias. Heuristics are mental
"rules of thumb," which are generally useful decision tools that, if
misapplied, produce biased decisionmaking. Biases are mental errors that
skew reasoning and typically produce sub-optimal outcomes.
I propose to address the various heuristics and biases in a way that makes
the most sense to those interested in negotiation bias.48 The relevance of
heuristics and decision biases to negotiation is generally obvious-anything
that clouds one's judgment or leads one astray in making a decision can
undermine negotiation effectiveness. In fact, because negotiation settings
often involve stressful interactions and quick judgments, they are more likely
to trigger biased decisionmaking than other social interactions.
To organize the analysis, I propose to divide biases into those that result
from illogical or poor thinking (cognitive biases) and those that result from
egocentric thinking (egocentric biases). Stating the distinction in a simplified
way, the former errors result from failing to reason logically, while the latter
result from excessive self-absorption that clouds good judgment.49 Of course,
it is no solace to any of us that we commit both kinds of errors from time to
time.
Beyond these two categories, however, lies a third that defies easy
categorization. In it, I have placed a variety of miscellaneous negotiation
biases that do not easily fit into either of the categories just named. In some
cases, they relate to neither category; in others, they seem to fit within both,
but with no logical basis for choosing between the two. 50
Heath and R. Scott Tindale identify four specific heuristics (representativeness;
availability; anchoring and adjustment; and counterfactual thinking and the simulation
heuristic) and one general bias category (other heuristics and biases). See Linda Heath &
R. Scott Tindale, Heuristics and Biases in Applied Settings: An Introduction, in
APPLICATIONS OF HEURISTICS AND BIASES TO SOCIAL ISSUES 1, 1-11 (Linda Heath et al.
eds., 1994) [hereinafter APPLICATIONS OF HEURISTICS].
48 1 say this realizing that sometimes there is not a significant difference between a
general decision bias and one that relates specifically to negotiation.
49 To oversimplify, one who is stupid, but emotionally stable, is more likely to
commit a cognitive error, while one who is smart, but emotionally self-absorbed, is more
likely to commit an egocentric error.
50 See infra notes 184-254 and accompanying text. Because of the somewhat vague
parameters of decision biases, I make no claim to have created a superior classification.
What I have done is to offer a reasonably workable approach, realizing that various
researchers might take issue both with my categories and with my decisions of placement
within categories.
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III. COGNITIVE BIASES ASSOCIATED WITH HEURISTICS
As noted, decisionmaking and negotiating would be substantially easier
if humans always thought clearly, logically, and intelligently. This, however,
is not the case. In many instances, despite careful research and thoughtful
planning, humans fall into thought "traps" that result in negative outcomes.
Unfortunately, it is difficult at times to learn from our mistakes, because they
seem to stem from patterns deeply imbedded in our brains. It is critical, if we
are to avoid these pitfalls, to understand how they arise and how they
operate. In particular, it is vital to understand how heuristics function and
how they can lead us astray.
A. Availability Heuristic
The availability heuristic, first described by Amos Tversky and Daniel
Kahneman, 51 organizes and retrieves human memories as a guide to future
action.52 People use the availability heuristic whenever they take action or
reach conclusions about the world based on how easily they can recall or
imagine instances of what they are thinking about. This heuristic guarantees
that events that are more vividly and emotionally implanted in our minds will
leap to our consciousness when we face a decision.53 As stated previously,
the survival benefit of the availability heuristic seems clear.54 If we are
confronted with dangers similar to those previously encountered, the ability
to recognize and react to them quickly is valuable. Of course, in the modem
world, we use availability more broadly than just as a life-saving mechanism.
51 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging
Frequency and Probability, 5 COG. PSYCHOL. 207, 208-31 (1973).
52 See also Heath & Tindale, in APPLICATIONS OF HEURISTICS, supra note 47, at 5
("The availability heuristic involves people's tendencies to judge the probability of some
event by their ability to recall similar events."); Steven Schwartz, Heuristics and Biases
in Medical Judgment and Decision Making, in id. at 45, 50 (noting that availability "is a
generally accepted rule of thumb because events that are easy to recall are also usually
more likely .... [G]enerations of doctors have been told 'When you hear hoofbeats,
think of horses, not zebras."'); Jolls et al., supra note 7, at 1518 (noting that people's
"judgments about probabilities will often be affected by how 'available' other instances
of the harm in question are, that is, on how easily such instances come to mind");
Sunstein, supra note 14, at 44 (describing the availability heuristic as the calculation "by
which we judge the probability of an event by asking whether an incident of its
occurrence readily comes to mind").
53 See, e.g., BAZERMAN, supra note 16, at 6-7.
54 See supra notes 23-31 and accompanying text.
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Every day, decisions rely on this heuristic as well. If we had to process all
potentially relevant information each time we drove our cars or took a walk,
we would be frozen in indecision while we processed our voluminous
memory databanks. The availability heuristic simplifies the analysis by
serving up the most easily retrieved recollection-some resulting from
traumatic experiences-as guides for action. For example, if we remember
numerous potholes that threaten our tires or recall massive traffic jams that
delay our commute, we very well might act to avoid a particular route on our
way to work. In the negotiation context, if we remember how dissatisfied we
were in our last negotiation when our first offer was immediately accepted,
strongly suggesting that the offer was too low, we might quietly determine to
make our first offer more aggressive next time. 55
The availability heuristic operates virtually every time we invoke
memory to make a decision. Its ubiquity, alas, does not guarantee its
infallibility. To the contrary, the vividness of a recollection may be skewed
by an aberrational personal experience or by sensational media coverage of a
rare event, leading one to take extraordinary care in addressing a minor risk
or, where no such vivid imprint exists, adopting an unnecessarily casual
approach to a serious risk.56
In a strict sense, one should not describe the errors associated with the
availability heuristic as always irrational (although sometimes they are);
rather, they may miss the mark through "GIGO" (garbage in, garbage out)
reasoning. Poor information implanted can result in poor information
retrieved. 57
55 Professor Thompson refers to situations in which one's opening offer is
immediately accepted as the "winner's curse" because one realizes that he or she could
have done better with a more aggressive offer. See THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 10.
56 The implications of the availability heuristic for policymakers are substantial. In
some cases, they may be prodded to regulate insignificant risks, and in others they may
face apathy in promoting public health measures. See, e.g., Jolls et al., supra note 7, at
1519. According to the authors:
The availability heuristic can lead to under-as well as over-regulation.
People sometimes (although not always) underestimate the likelihood of low-
probability or low-salience events because these threats simply do not make it onto
people's "radar screens"; many health and environmental risks (such as the health
threats from poor diet and exercise) may fit this description with some parts of the
population. But when a particular threat, even an unlikely one, becomes available, as
when, for example, asbestos is discovered in schools, then regulation will be
demanded.
Id.
57 Jolls et al. argue that the availability heuristic does not operate irrationally-it
simply processes available information, which may be inaccurate. Id. at 1518 (arguing
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One should be particularly alert to the availability heuristic as a confound
in negotiation. An opponent who refuses to consider a truly generous offer
may do so because he or she has had a bad memory triggered that creates
unreasonably negative feelings towards the offer. Things as trivial as using a
particular facial expression or phrasing words in a particular way might
remind an opponent of a previous bad experience in such a way that he or she
refuses to bargain further to reach a deal.58
1. Biased Reasoning
In recent years, numerous researchers have pointed out the biased
reasoning that can result from the misapplication of the availability heuristic.
For example, they have reported that this heuristic has resulted in the
"pollutant of the month" syndrome, where regulation is driven by recent and
memorable instances of harm, 59 in overestimates by genetic counselors of the
likelihood of genetic abnormalities, 60 in overestimates of disease frequency
by doctors depending on whether they had recently treated a similar case (or
had read about it in a recent medical journal), 61 in public opposition to sterile
drug needle exchanges based on the mistaken assumption that such programs
do not reduce the incidence of AIDS,62 and many other biased judgments. 63
2. Recall Errors
One of the specific biases associated with' the availability heuristic
pertains to ease of recall. That is, the easier something is to recall, the more
likely that people will include it in their decisionmaking. This often makes
sense, but does not when the event involved is vivid, but rare. For example,
when asked whether motor vehicle accidents or stomach cancer cause more
that "[r]eliance on how 'available' instances of the event in question are is a form of
judgment error, but the error is fully rational-in the sense of reflecting optimizing
behavior-for people with limited information").
58 To cite a personal experience, the author had a colleague who terminated a
negotiation because the representative from the other side kept touching her shoulder
during the session, reminding her of a sexual assault that she had suffered a decade ago.
59 See Sunstein, supra note 7, at 1188.
60 See generally Shoshana Shiloh, Heuristics and Biases in Health Decision Making,
in APPLICATIONS OF HEURISTICS, supra note 47, at 13.
61 See Schwartz, supra note 52, at 50-51.
62 See Robyn M. Dawes, AIDS, Sterile Needles, and Ethnocentrism, in
APPLICATIONS OF HEURISTICS, supra note 47, at 31, 31-35.
63 See generally APPLICATIONS OF HEURISTICS, supra note 47.
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deaths per year, most respondents reply motor vehicles. Yet, stomach cancer
kills at roughly twice the rate of motor vehicle accidents.64 What skews most
people's thinking in this case is that the media constantly report motor
vehicle accidents and deaths, but rarely do so for stomach cancer.65
Consequently, automobile fatalities will be much more vivid in the public's
mind and, therefore, much more likely to be recalled when estimating
frequency of occurrence.
On the other hand, many citizens dismissed the risk of AIDS when they
thought of it as only a disease of gay men. When Magic Johnson, a popular
heterosexual sports figure, contracted the disease, however, popular attitudes
changed dramatically. 66 Whether the change in attitudes accurately reflected
the risk of AIDS is, of course, an empirical one and not easily answered.67
For a variety of reasons, the media tends to highlight the risks of the disease
and to minimize coverage of any good news about infection rates.68
64 See BAZERMAN, supra note 16, at 14.
65 This is not surprising, given the media's predisposition to focus on dramatic
stories that often do not reflect common occurrences. See David Noack, Press Criticizes
Itself, 132 EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Apr. 10, 1999, at 14, 14 (reporting a Pew Research
Center survey of 552 top executives, mid-level editors and producers, and working
reporters from national and local news operations, showing that, as a whole, they believe
there is too much sensationalism in the media).
66 See, e.g., Jay Mathews, Surge in AIDS Tests Drying Up Budgets; Increase
Attributed to Magic Johnson, WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 1991, at A3 (reporting that "[a]
nationwide surge of requests for the AIDS virus test since basketball star Earvin 'Magic'
Johnson revealed that he tested positive has so drained federal AIDS funds that officials
at many clinics say they will have no money to test people after January").
67 See Joel Schwartz & David Murray, AIDS and the Media, 125 PUB. INT. 57, 57
(1996). Schwartz and Murray claim that:
A twofold lesson lbout science and the media emerges from a reading of the
scientific and popular literature about AIDS: It's not just that the media can, at
times, misinform us about what science says; it's also that science often speaks in an
extremely qualified and hesitant manner. Not only is the AIDS epidemic
extraordinarily difficult to measure, but measurements have often been reported in
misleading ways. Thus the media have not conveyed the whole truth about AIDS.
But it may not be possible to arrive at that whole truth.
Id.
68 Id. at 61-62 (noting that the media have generally ignored dropping AIDS
infection rates in the United States perhaps "because it was thought indecorous to appear
to foster complacency regarding a disease expected to kill all its victims"; and observing
that "a familiar song from World War II urged Americans to 'accentuate the positive,
eliminate the negative'; ... our most influential news organs have often done just the
opposite").
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One clear lesson from the Magic Johnson story is that celebrities often
command extensive media and public attention, greatly increasing the ease of
recall of incidents in which they are involved, but also the potential for
significant overestimation about the risk of specific tragedies. For example,
when celebrities Michael Kennedy and Sonny Bono died in similar ski
accidents within a week of each other, many people, based only on these two
reports, concluded that skiing was an extremely dangerous sport.69
3. "False Consensus" Effect
Another bias associated with the availability heuristic is the so-called
"false consensus" effect. As Professor Leigh Thompson explains, this effect
"refers to the fact that most people think that others agree with them more
than is actually warranted."' 70 For example, smokers estimate that a much
higher percentage of the population smokes than do nonsmokers. 71 Similarly,
this exaggerated notion of strong social agreement carries over into attitudes
regarding drugs, abortion, seatbelt use, and politics.72 In many cases, these
attitudes reflect only that one associates with those who share common
views; in others, they only reflect that one notices those who agree with him
or her and ignore those who disagree.
B. Representativeness Heuristic
Another one of the three heuristics originally identified by Tversky and
Kahneman is representativeness. 73 This heuristic applies when people make
judgments about persons or events based on the similarities that they have
with previous persons or events in their experience. 74 That is, if a person or
thing appears similar to members of a known category, we assume that they
belong in that category (and that the category is homogeneous). The benefits
69 See ROBBINS, supra note 16, at 124 (noting that, "[a]lthough the two incidents
were totally unrelated, their proximity in time led many to perceive the risk from skiing
in a new light").
70 See THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 170. This effect also arises from people's
egocentrism. See infra notes 115-83 and accompanying text.
71 See THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 170.
72 Id.
73 See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 7, at 1124-27.
74 See Heath & Tindale, supra note 47, at 2-3 (defiming this heuristic as arising
when one "judges the probability of an uncertain event by the degree to which it (1) is
similar in essential properties to its parent population, or (2) reflects the salient features
of the process by which it is generated").
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of this characteristic are obvious--quite similar to availability.
Representativeness provides a classification scheme that enables rapid
reactions to outside stimuli that can be life-saving. When our ancestors
encountered a human stranger or a never-before-seen animal; they needed an
instant "friend or foe" judgment. Representativeness provided a quick, albeit
not always reliable, response. If the potential threat resembled a known
danger, one reacted with caution. Similarly, if the new person resembled a
friendly neighbor, or the animal looked like a non-threatening pet, one
refrained from attacks or flight.
1. Stereotypes and Illusory Correlations
Perhaps the most common example of the representativeness heuristic is
stereotypes. 75 Virtually every group, whether ethnic 76 or professional, 77
produces an image in the public's mind of the type of personality they project
and the kind of behavior in which they engage. Stephen Walker and V.
Lonnie Lawson, for example, point to a decidedly unscientific poll78 that,
notwithstanding its lack of rigor, seems to capture the public's image of
librarians, i.e., that they are quiet, stem, single, stuffy, and wear glasses.79
Stereotypes, of course, do not spring from sterile soil. Typically, there is an
element of truth or insight in the stereotype. 80 The problem arises when
people automatically assign specific traits or behavior to individuals based on
stereotypes about groups. Although the stereotype may provide helpful
presumptive information, one always needs to focus on the specifics of
75 See THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 170 (noting that "the more a person looks like the
stereotype of a group member, the more we are inclined to stereotype them as belonging
to that group").
76 See generally DEVON A. MIHESUAH, AMERICAN INDIANS: STEREOTYPES AND
REALITIES (1979) (identifying and challenging a variety of stereotypes held about Native
Americans).
77 See, e.g., Stephen Walker & V. Lonnie Lawson, The Librarian Stereotype and the
Movies, 1 MC J.: J. ACAD. MEDIA LIBRARIANSHIP 16 (1993), at
http://wings.buffalo.edu/publications/mcjml/vlnl/image.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2005)
(discussing the various stereotypes about librarians portrayed in the movies).
78 Id. Specifically, they cite a poll of 100 people by the television show "Family
Feud."
79 Id.
80 See, e.g., THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 170 (noting that stereotypes "often have a
basis in reality").
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individual instances if one is to draw meaningful conclusions about any
given person or thing.81
Negotiators, in particular, need to-focus on the benefits and drawbacks of
the representativeness heuristic when they bargain with someone from a
different culture82 or of a different gender.83 To ignore obvious differences
could prove fatal to a high-stakes negotiation, but to leap to an automatic
reliance on broad stereotypes could prove equally troublesome. In fact,
flexibility is the key to avoiding this potential trap. 84
One of the best explanations for the persistence of stereotypes in the
absence of data supporting those beliefs is the so-called "illusory correlation"
81 Malice is not necessarily the basis of stereotypes. As Cialdini notes, the culprits
more often are limited time, energy and capacity, which undermine our ability to process
information. "Instead, we must very often use our stereotypes, our rules of thumb to
classify things according to a few key features and then to respond mindlessly when one
or another of these trigger features is present." CIALDINI, supra note 12, at 7.
8 2 See, e.g., NANCY J. ADLER, INTERNATIONAL DIMENsIONs OF ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAVIOR 208 (4th ed. 2002) ("Do Russians bargain with the same expectations and
approaches as Arabs? No. Are Arab negotiating styles similar to those of Americans?
Again, no. Russians, Arabs, and Americans negotiate in notably different ways."); see
also Mitchell, supra note 6, at 148 (noting that the effect of culture on things such as
cognition and reasoning "counsels against the assumption that cognitive processes
revealed exclusively through studies of Anglo-American subjects will necessarily be
operative in other cultural groups as well").
83 Professor Deborah Tarmen, a linguist, has written extensively on the differences
in the way men and women manage, talk, and negotiate. In discussing how individuals
negotiate authority for themselves, for example, she states:
Individuals in positions of authority are judged by how they enact [authority for
themselves.] This poses a particular challenge for women. The ways women are
expected to talk-and many (not all) women do talk-are at odds with images of
authority. Women are expected to hedge their beliefs as opinions, to seek opinions
and advice from others, to be "polite" in their requests. If a woman talks this way,
she is seen as lacking in authority. But if she talks with certainty, makes bold
statements of fact rather than hedged statements of opinion, interrupts others, goes
on at length, and speaks in a declamatory and aggressive manner, she will be
disliked.
DEBORAH TANNEN, TALKING FROM 9 TO 5, at 170 (1994).
84 See ADLER, supra note 82, at 246. As Professor Nancy Adler advises with respect
to international negotiations:
During [negotiation] discussions, negotiators should assume differences exist in
negotiating styles until similarity is proven. Negotiators can more easily move from
an expectation of difference to an acceptance of similarity than can they recoup their
losses from mistakes incurred in acting as if negotiators from other cultures bargain
just like you do when in fact they do not.
Id.
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effect. According to research on this effect, people tend to remember facts
that fit in with their ideas about groups and to ignore evidence that
contradicts their ideas.85 This operates in a particularly strong way when the
information is vivid, in either a good sense or a bad one. Thus, studies show
that people overestimate the number of times they read about timid
accountants, wealthy doctors, and talkative salespeople because of their
preconceived notions about these professions. 86
2. "Base Rate" Fallacy
The representativeness heuristic can generate bias in calculating
probabilities. Given the frequency with which negotiators rely on
probabilities in making points in bargaining sessions, one can see the
potential for harm in misreading them. For example, no matter how highly
experts in the field rate a specific automobile, a single bad report from a
friend or neighbor can sour us on purchasing the car.87 Researchers describe
such an approach, i.e., basing a decision on the anecdote of one person to the
exclusion of a large body of otherwise valid data, as the "base rate fallacy. ' '88
A "base rate" is the frequency with which something occurs in the general
population. When one extrapolates from one or two data points, ignoring
broader and more valid data, one commits this fallacy.89 The media have a
well-known proclivity in this direction, especially during slow news cycles.
For example, during the summer of 2001, stories of unprovoked shark attacks
proliferated in the news despite their extremely low rate of occurrence, no
85 See, e.g., Loren J. Chapmen, Illusory Correlation in Observational Report, 6 J.
VERB. LEARN. & VERB. BEHAV. 151, 151-55 (1967); David L. Hamilton & Robert K.
Gifford, Illusory Correlation in Interpersonal Perception: A Cognitive Basis of
Stereotypic Judgments, 12 J. EXPERIMENT. SOC. PSYCHOL. 392, 393-406 (1976).
86 See Hamilton & Gifford, supra note 85, at 393, 399-400.
87 See THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 170-71,
88 Id.; see also BAZERMAN, supra note 16, at 19-20; Heath & Tindale, supra note
47, at 3.
89 Of course, there is a difference between ignoring base rate data and discounting
such data. Professor Koehler points to recent studies indicating that groups such as juries
often do look at base rate data, but accord it less weight than others might for specific
normative reasons. See Jonathan J. Koehler, The Base Rate Fallacy Reconsidered-
Descriptive, Normative and Methodological Challenges, 19 BEHAv. & BRAIN ScI. 1, 1-3,
13-14 (1996).
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doubt leading to excessive caution among the nation's vacationing
beachgoers. 90
3. "Halo" and Contrast Effects
Two psychological effects of an ostensibly opposing nature illustrate the
reach of the representativeness heuristic. The so-called "halo" effect operates
when we extrapolate specific positive (or negative) features to people (or
things) based on our general impressions of them. 91 For example, study after
study confirms that observers rate physically attractive people positively on
numerous dimensions, such as trustworthiness or intelligence, even in the
absence of meaningful confirming data. 92
Advertisers often use the halo effect to promote sales. One of the most
effective ways of doing this is for a company to sponsor an event viewed as
promoting a worthy cause. Potential customers will then attribute the good
image of the event to the sponsor and be more inclined to trust the company
and to purchase its products or services. 93
One particular hazard of the halo effect for negotiators is that it operates
most forcefully when we enter into settings where we have limited
experience or knowledge, in effect providing false assurance where data is
lacking.94 This can easily lead to premature judgments about the
trustworthiness and reliability, or lack thereof, of one's negotiation opponent.
The flip side of the halo effect is what social scientists refer to as the
"contrast" effect. Where the halo effect leads to attitudes consistent with our
90 See, e.g., David S. Fallis & Christina A. Samuels, Boy, 10, Dies After Shark
Attack in Virginia Beach, WASH. POST, Sept. 3, 2001, at Al (noting that, despite news of
a young swimmer being killed by a shark attack, the odds of a shark attack in mid-
Atlantic waters are "extremely rare"); John Allen Paulos, How To Find a Trend When
None Exists, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2001, at A15 (stating that the "actual chances of a
shark attack are tiny. August being a perennially slow news month, news reports [of
shark attacks] proliferate without any substantive competitors, and they make the world
seem much scarier than it is.").
91 See, e.g., ROBBINS, supra note 16, at 127 (noting that the halo effect operates
when "we draw a general impression about an individual on the basis of a single
characteristic, such as intelligence, sociability, or appearance").
92 See, e.g., CIALDINI, supra note 12, at 171-72 ("A halo effect occurs when one
positive characteristic of a person dominates the way that person is viewed by others.
And the evidence is now clear that physical attractiveness is often such a characteristic.").
93 See, e.g., Janis Mara, The Halo Effect, 41 ADWEEK, May 22, 2000, at 88, 90, 92
(describing numerous instances of "good by association" promotional campaigns).
94 See ROBBINS, supra note 16, at 128.
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general impressions, the contrast effect leads to exaggerated notions of
differences based on recent impressions we have of people or experiences.
That is, we tend to see people or things as more different than they actually
are if we encounter differences close in time or vividness.95 For example, if
we lift a light object before lifting a heavy object, we will estimate the
second object to be heavier than we would have had we lifted it without first
lifting the light object. 96 In a similar experiment, subjects who placed one
hand in hot water and the other in cold water were then instructed to place
both hands in a bucket of lukewarm water. Strangely, the subjects reported
that the hand that had been in cold water suddenly felt as though it had been
placed in hot water and vice-versa. 97
Unfortunately, the contrast effect can be used to great advantage by sales
agents and negotiation opponents. Consider that retailers invariably seek to
peddle expensive items first and then move the customers to lesser items
(often overpriced) as part of a sales pitch. The marketers know that, rather
than showing reluctance to make additional purchases after spending a huge
sum on the first item, customers will often be more willing to make
additional purchases because the next items, even expensive ones, will seem
cheap compared to the first purchase. 98 This same psychology obviously
operates in many bargaining situations.
4. Gambler's Fallacy
Another bias associated with the representativeness heuristic is the so-
called "gambler's fallacy." Very simply, this bias occurs when a person
assumes that what occurs on average will take place next or immediately, or
that which occurs in the long term will be "corrected" in the short term. The
simplest illustration is tossing a coin. If one takes an evenly balanced coin
and flips it many times, one can reliably predict that it will land on heads
roughly half the time and tails half the time. Yet, one who predicts that a coin
that landed on heads the last five times will land on tails the next time
because tails is "due" commits the gambler's fallacy. In fact, the previous
95 See, e.g., id. (noting that "[o]ur reaction to one person is influenced by other
persons we have recently encountered"); Brett A. Boyle et al., Points of Reference and
Individual Differences as Sources of Bias in Ethical Judgments, 17 J. Bus. ETHICS 517,
518 (1998) (The contrast effect "occurs when prior evaluations accentuate perceived
differences between current and previous stimuli.").
96 See CIALDINI, supra note 12, at 11- 12.
9 7 Id. at 12.
98 Id. at 13.
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tosses have no relevance at all to the sixth toss. The odds remain 50/50.99
The only relevance of the previous tosses would be that one could reasonably
conclude that it would be unlikely that flipping the coin another five times
would yield another five straight heads. 100
5. Regression to the Mean
A final example of the representativeness heuristic is regression to the
mean. This is a statistical phenomenon that occurs when one takes a non-
random sample from a population and attempts to replicate it. For example,
assume that a high school student takes the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT)
and achieves a score of 750 on the quantitative part of the test. What are the
odds that he or she will repeat this score or score higher on the exam?
Although making a specific prediction about an individual student requires
specialized knowledge, one can predict that most students who repeat the
SAT will receive a lower score. The reason is that most students score in the
middle of the range of possible scores and the more one exceeds the average,
the more likely it is that one will tend to return to an average performance.
1° 1
C. Anchoring Heuristic
A third heuristic identified by Kahneman and Tversky is "anchoring."' 10
2
This heuristic draws upon the availability heuristic. When people are
presented with a possible answer and then given an opportunity to reach their
99 See THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 171.
100 This would not be due to the past number of coin flips, but rather the low odds of
such an outcome.
101 See, e.g., BAZERMAN, supra note 16, at 23, 25. Noting that Kahneman and
Tversky suggest that the representativeness heuristic explains the counterintuitive nature
of the concept of regression to the mean, Bazerman writes:
Many effects regress to the mean. Brilliant students frequently have less
successful siblings. Short parents tend to have taller children. Great rookies have
mediocre second years (the "sophomore jinx"). Firms that have outstanding profits
one year tend to have lesser performances the next year. In each case, individuals are
often surprised when made aware of these predictable patterns of regression to the
mean.
Id. at 25.
102 See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 7, at 1128 (referring to the phenomenon as
"anchoring and adjustment"); see also BAZERMAN, supra note 16, at 27-30; THOMPSON,
supra note 1, at 171; Bazerman et al., supra note 7, at 1288; Ann Bostrom, Risk
Perceptions: "Experts" vs. "Lay People", 8 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 101, 107
(1997); Heath & Tindale, supra note 47, at 6-7.
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own answer, their answer tends to be close to the answer they were
previously shown-irrespective of any relevance of the initial answer. In a
famous experiment by Tversky and Kahneman, subjects were asked to give
an estimate of the percentage of African countries in the United Nations
(UN). Before making their estimates, subjects watched as experimenters spun
a giant wheel which they believed generated random numbers between 1 and
100 (actually the wheel was rigged to stop at 10 half of the time and 65 half
of the time). After they saw the "random" number, subjects were asked if
they thought the actual percentage of African Countries was higher or lower.
They were then asked to give their own estimate. Interestingly, subjects who
saw the number 10 estimated the percentage of African nations in the UN to
be 25%, on average, and subjects who saw the number 65 estimated it to be
45%. Even though they thought the numbers were random and had nothing to
do with the question, subjects were evidently still influenced by seeing the
numbers. As Tversky and Kahneman observed, the subjects "anchored" their
estimates to the provided numbers. 103 Providing a number through the
spinning wheel made it available, 10 4 thus estimates tended to cluster around
it.
Negotiators particularly need to know about and appreciate the anchoring
phenomenon. When negotiators bargain about the price of an item, they need
to be wary of first offers advanced by their opponents 105 who may use these
offers to "anchor" the negotiation around their number, thus subtly limiting
the range of bargaining. 10 6 Anchoring operates especially well when there
103 See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 7, at 1128.
104 Id. Thus, the reference to the availability heuristic.
105 Of course, there is a tremendous downside potential to making first offers,
leading most negotiation experts to advise against doing so. See, e.g., CHARLES B.
CRAVER, EFFECTIVE LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT 57 (2d ed. 1993) (noting that
"most negotiators prefer to have [their adversaries] articulate their opening positions
first"); ROGER DAWSON, SECRETS OF POWER NEGOTIATING 57 (2d ed. 1995) (describing
pricing techniques under a "Higher Authority Gambit"); SCHOONMAKER, supra note 3, at
74 (advising negotiators to "[t]ry to get [the other side] to make the first offer"); SHELL,
supra note 1, at 157, 159 (noting that, while he disagrees, "many experts say you should
never open"). Those who make the first offer, the experts argue, too often make
themselves vulnerable by demonstrating ignorance, by making offers meant to be rejected
that instead are immediately accepted, by seeking unduly modest agreements, or,
conversely, by demanding insultingly large amounts.
106 See, e.g., SHELL, supra note 1, at 159 (noting that the negotiator who makes the
first offer has the chance "to set the zone of realistic expectations for the deal"); David B.
Falk, The Art of Contract Negotiation, 3 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 1, 22-23 (1992) (stating that
first offers set the market); Peter Robinson, Contending With Wolves in Sheep's Clothing:
A Cautiously Cooperative Approach to Mediation Advocacy, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 963,
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
are few market indicators 10 7 to help establish an appropriate price or where
one has little relevant experience or knowledge. 108 Unfortunately, even when
one brings considerable experience to the table, he or she can still fall prey to
anchoring. 109
Anchoring occurs not just with numbers. Negotiators also need to worry
generally about "impression management" from their opponents. Research
suggests that "parties typically establish the entire tone of a negotiation
through the first array of moves and gestures."' 10 Thus, the first impression
that one projects in a negotiation"' 1 will often carry through the entire
bargaining sequence. 112 Psychology professor Solomon Asch describes this
980 n.100 (1998) (stating that "[t]here are times when a negotiator seizes a strategic
advantage by making the first opening offer").
107 For example, a person offering to sell a one-of-a-kind dress formerly owned by a
celebrity might lead with a very high figure, knowing that there may be few reference or
comparison points to consult in valuing the dress. Further, its value to a fan of the
celebrity is likely to be emotionally, rather than financially, based.
108 See Birke & Fox, supra note 7, at 10 (noting that "[p]eople are especially
susceptible to anchoring bias when they have little relevant experience or knowledge");
Gregory B. Northcraft & Margaret Neale, Experts, Amateurs, and Real Estate: An
Anchoring-and-Adjustment Perspective on Property Pricing Decisions, 39 ORG. BEHAV.
& HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 84 (1987) (also noting susceptibility to the anchoring bias).
109 See BAZERMAN, supra note 16, at 29 (noting that "even experts are susceptible to
the anchoring bias"); Birke & Fox, supra note 7, at 10 (citing studies that demonstrate
that "expertise alone fails to provide protection from [anchoring bias]"); Northcraft &
Neale, supra note 108, at 94-96 (also noting that expertise alone does not provide
protection from anchoring bias).
110 See Robert S. Adler & Elliot M. Silverstein, When David Meets Goliath: Dealing
with Power Differentials in Negotiations, 5 HARv. NEGOT. L. REv. 1, 81 and citations
listed therein (2000); see also JEFFREY Z. RUBIN & BERT R. BROWN, THE SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY OF BARGAINING AND NEGOTIATION 262-63 (1975) (noting that, during the
early moments of a negotiation, the moves and gestures of the bargainers "convey
information about each party's initial preferences, intentions, and perceptions, and are
instrumental in shaping the psychological climate that will prevail throughout the
bargaining relationship").
111 See BAZERMAN, supra note 16, at 29 (stating, with respect to the anchoring
effect, that "[w]e have all fallen victim to the first-impression syndrome when meeting
someone for the first time. We often place so much emphasis on first impressions that we
do not adjust our opinion appropriately at a later date."); see also Adler & Silverstein,
supra note 110, at 81 (noting that "first impressions matter").
112 In fact, research suggests that, even when one's first impression is proven to be
incorrect, he or she will continue to believe it. This so-called "perseverance effect" is
quite difficult to change. See, e.g., THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 172 (noting that, "[i]f you
or your negotiation opponent has an erroneous belief about the other, even when it is
proven wrong, the belief may still prevail").
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as the "primacy effect," and it means that negotiators involved in high stakes
deals need to be concerned from the very start of a negotiation about how
they come across to the other side." l3 At a minimum, negotiators need to
present an image of strength and confidence. This does not necessarily mean
that one needs to attack or display hostility. It does mean, however, that one
should present an image indicating that one is prepared for all eventualities
and that one is able to cope with the pressures of bargaining. 114
IV. EGOCENTRIC BIAS
For quite understandable reasons, people focus on matters that concern
themselves, often to the exclusion of others. As with other human traits, this
can be explained, at least in part, by evolution. Without a healthy devotion to
one's self-interest, one is unlikely to survive for long. 115 Sometimes,
unfortunately, our built-in absorption with ourselves produces a world view
that is biased because it neglects the reality outside of ourselves."16 When
that occurs, we find ourselves misled about others' motives, thoughts, and
plans. Our drive to pursue our own agendas leads us to view those who stand
as obstacles as uncaring or evil. This is especially so in negotiations, which
113 See S.E. Asch, Forming Impressions on Personality, 41 J. ABNORMAL & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 258, 258-59, 271-72 (1946) (one of the first researchers of the primacy effect
citing research that those traits of a person that observers first learned about influenced
their ratings of the person more than traits they learned about later); see also WYNAND
PIENAAR & MANIE SPOELSTRA, NEGOTIATION: THEORIES, STRATEGIES & SKILLS 52-53
(1991) (citing studies on how the primacy effect, i.e., the "effect of first impression,"
critically affects later interactions).
114 See Adler & Silverstein, supra note 110, at 82.
115 Of course, devotion to one's own interests exclusively would mean that no one
would ever worry about or sacrifice for others such as family, friends, or community,
something we know not to be the case. Evolution has hard-wired us to be both selfish and
selfless. See JAMES Q. WILSON, THE MORAL SENSE 23, 41 (1993) (noting that "the most
powerful human disposition is self-preservation"). Wilson also insists that,
[i]f Darwin and his followers are right, and I think they are, the moral sense
[i.e., to be selfless] must have had adaptive value; if it did not, natural selection
would have worked against people who had such useless traits as sympathy, self-
control, or a desire for fairness and in favor of those with the opposite tendencies
(such as a capacity for ruthless predation, or a preference for immediate
gratification, or a disinclination to share).
Id. at 23.
116 Egocentrism does not necessarily result from people's view that they are better
than others. It more likely results from the fact that we have more information about
ourselves and our needs than those of others.
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present a high potential for conflict, high anxiety, and tension. The focus in
this section is on egocentric biases and how they skew our thinking about the
world-and how we negotiate.
A. Confirmation Traps and Self-Fulfilling Prophecies
When one tests a hypothesis, especially one that he or she wishes to be
true, there is a natural instinct to look for evidence that supports it and to
ignore that which contradicts it. 117 This bias arises from the extraordinary
ability that humans have to see logical connections in the world rather than to
view life's events as a series of random bits of data. One applauds, for
example, when the famous fictional detective Sherlock Holmes sees the
connection between a dog's failure to bark and the theft of an expensive race
horse. 118 This talent for seeing obscure connections serves Holmes and
humanity well most of the time. Yet, the very control of events and life that
we enjoy because of our connection-drawing skills sometimes entices us to
reach unsupported conclusions justified more by our egocentric focus than by
objective evidence.
Numerous false beliefs can flourish, often causing great misery, when
only confirming evidence is sought. For example, agriculture in the Soviet
Union suffered for decades from the insistence of its chief agriculture
official, Trofim Lysenko, that wheat and other crops could be conditioned to
acquire resistance to cold when, in fact, the crops carried no such genetic
117 As songwriter Paul Simon describes it, "a man hears what he wants to hear and
disregards the rest." Paul Simon & Art Garfunkel, The Boxer, on BRIDGE OVER
TROUBLED WATER (Columbia Records 1969), re-released on SIMON AND GARFUNKEL'S
GREATEST HITS (Columbia Records 1972). World-renowned astronomer Carl Sagan
refers to this as this as "observational selection." See CARL SAGAN, THE DEMON-
HAUNTED WORLD: SCIENCE AS A CANDLE IN THE DARK 213-14 (1996) (describing
"observational selection, also called the enumeration of favorable circumstances, or as
the philosopher Francis Bacon described it, counting the hits and forgetting the misses");
see also BAZERMAN, supra note 16, at 35-36 (noting that "[m]ost of us seek confirmatory
evidence and exclude the search for disconfirming information from our decision
processes"); THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 180 (noting that "[p]eople have a strong
tendency to seek information that confirms what they already know").
118 SIR ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, SILVER BLAZE (1892), available at
http://www.bakerstreet221b.de/canon/4-memo.htm When queried about whether any
particular aspect of the horse's theft calls for additional study, Holmes points to the
"curious incident of the dog in the nighttime." Inspector Gregory replies that the dog did
nothing in the nighttime. Holmes responds, "That was the curious incident." Id.
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traits. 119 Lysenko and his followers looked only to Marxist ideology for
confirmation of their hypotheses rather than searching for scientific
experiments that might provide contradictory data, one of the great tools of
the scientific method. 1 20 Needless to say, the human tendency to over-rely on
confirming data has not diminished over time. 121
Negotiators can easily fall into the confirmation trap when they blindly
insist on their point of view while bargaining. In the midst of debate and
discussion, where little time is afforded for reflection and where conceding
intellectual points can be a sign of weakness, one can be particularly
susceptible to this bias. Compounding the confirmation bias is the trap of
self-fulfilling prophecies. If one enters a negotiation with an assumption
about his or her opponent's behavior, one is likely to find confirming
examples of this behavior even when evidence for it may be skimpy. This
can have either a positive or a negative effect. When one's opening
impression is favorable, 122 a "Pygmalion" effect will result,123 leading to
119See SAGAN, supra note 117, at 261-63 (describing Lysenko's reliance on
"philosophically 'correct' genetics, genetics that paid proper obeisance to communist
dialectical materialism" rather than on using experimental controls and examining "an
immense body of contradictory evidence").
120 Id. at 210-12 (arguing for the superiority of the scientific method as a tool for
acquiring knowledge). "Always ask whether the hypothesis can be, at least in principle,
falsified. Propositions that are untestable, unfalsifiable are not worth much." Id.
121 To pick a recent example, Professor Roy Baumeister has strongly challenged the
view held by counselors, social workers, and teachers all over the country that low self-
esteem leads to violent behavior. Despite extensive searching, he could find no empirical
data in support of this view. To the contrary, his experiments led him to the conclusion
that high self-esteem that is threatened by outside challenges or insults is more likely to
be a trigger of violence than low self-esteem. See Roy F. Baumeister, Violent Pride: Do
People Turn Violent Because of Self-Hate, or Self-Love?, 284 Sci. AM., Apr. 2001, at 96,
98 (noting that, despite numerous articles citing the "well-known fact" that low self-
esteem triggers violent behavior, he and his colleagues were unable to find "any book or
paper that offered a formal statement of that theory, let alone empirical evidence to
support. Everybody knew it, but nobody had ever proved it.").
122 See, e.g., Thomas W. Dougherty et al., Confirming First Impressions in the
Employment Interview: A Field Study of Interviewer Behavior, 79 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL.
659, 663-64 (1994) (noting that interviewees' positive first impressions led interviewers
to make positive "self-fulfilling prophecies" that led them to gather less information
about these applicants and to make efforts to "sell" the company to the interviewees).
123 See generally Nicole M. Kierein & Michael A. Gold, Pygmalion in Work
Organizations: A Meta-Analysis, 21 J. ORG. BEHAV. 913 (2000) (discussing a number of
empirical studies of the Pygmalion effect, a type of self-fulfilling prophecy). See also
ROBBINS, supra note 16, at 130 (stating that the terms "self-fulfilling prophecy or
Pygmalion effect have evolved to characterize the fact that people's expectations
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easy acceptance and approval124; if one's mindset is negative, then the
exchange will become unfavorable, often leading to unnecessarily conflict-
laden exchanges.125
B. Egocentric Interpretations of Fairness
All negotiators crave fairness in their negotiations. When confronted
with a settlement that improves their situation but does not meet their sense
of fairness, most negotiators will reject the settlement, even though it will
leave them worse off than if they accepted it. 126 Although this challenges
determine their behavior. In other words, if a manager expects big things from his people,
they're not likely to let him down. The result then is that the expectations become
reality."); Helen Rheem, Effective Leadership: The Pygmalion Effect, 73 HARV. Bus.
REV., May-June 1995, at 14, 14 (describing the Pygmalion effect, "a type of self-
fulfilling prophecy in which increasing a leader's expectations of subordinates'
performance actually improves that performance").
124 See ROBBINS, supra note 16, at 130.
125 See, e.g., Taxing News, 28 PSYCHOL. TODAY, May-June 1995, at 13, 13 (citing
research by Loyola University Professor Loretta Stalans that taxpayers' beliefs about tax
audits have a habit of becoming self-fulfilling prophecies, i.e., taxpayers who expect
unfair treatment fail to establish rapport with their auditors, leading to more negative
treatment than those who do establish rapport).
126 One of the most compelling demonstrations of this proposition is the so-called
"ultimatum game," in which negotiators seek to divide a sum of money. In this game, one
side first proposes to divide the money. The proposal need not provide that the division
be equal. If the other side accepts, each side gets whatever was proposed. If the other side
rejects, neither receives any money. Even though one arguably would always be better
off taking a pittance-as opposed to nothing (if there is no agreement)--research
suggests that negotiators will often scuttle any gain for either side if they view the other
side as taking unfair advantage of the split. The first use of the game was done by a group
of experimental psychologists. See Werner Glith et al., An Experimental Analysis of
Ultimatum Bargaining, 3 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 367, 383-84 (1982); see also SHELL,
supra note 1, at 61-63; Colin Camerer & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Ultimatums,
Dictators and Manners, 9 J. OF ECON. PERSP. 209, 210-11, 216-18 (1995) (noting that
people will not accept demeaning offers in ultimatum games even though the offers will
provide more financial benefits than no agreement). Professor Owen Jones argues that
"spiteful" behavior in the Ultimatum Game, although seemingly irrational to an
economist, is perfectly rational from the perspective of evolution:
Evolutionary analysis suggests an explanation [for "spite" in the Ultimatum
Game]. We know from game theory that condition-dependent (in this case,
retaliatory) spitefulness can be a feature of an evolutionary stable strategy for
reaping gains from cooperators, punishing defectors, and encouraging cooperative
outcomes. And research suggests there are biological underpinnings to a sense of
fairness. It is adaptive to identify cheaters, and to be identified as a non-sucker-
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conventional economic notions that stress rational profit-maximizing,
substantial empirical research strongly indicates that fairness concerns often
outweigh economic gain.127
The exquisite attention that most people devote to fairness faces at least
two major confounds that can stymie good decisionmaking and effective
negotiating. First, there are many situations in which what is fair is highly
debatable. Professor Thompson offers a compelling example of this: If three
people go out for dinner and one orders a particularly expensive bottle of
wine, an appetizer, and a pricey main course, his or her dinner companion
who ordered no wine and two inexpensive side dishes might well object to
simply splitting the bill. Both might be challenged by a third colleague who
is an impoverished graduate student, who insists that the first two cover the
cost of the bill because of their greater financial resources. 128 In such a case,
no obvious "fair" settlement might exist for the three, even though all profess
to support an equitable division.
Second, most people unwittingly perceive matters of fairness through
their own eyes. That is, we tend to filter what we see and what we think in
terms of our self-interest. This tendency produces what researchers describe
as a "self-serving" bias, 129 and dramatically affects our perceptions of what is
fair. 130 A study in 1979 by Professors David Messick and Keith Sentis
someone not easily exploited. Consequently, the predisposition to act spitefully
when being unfairly exploited by a stingy cooperator may be a time-shifted
rationality, underpinning seemingly irrational behavior in modem contexts.
Jones, supra note 10, at 1182-83; see also Karl Sigmund et al., The Economics of Fair
Play, 286 Sci. AM., Jan. 2002, at 83, 86-87 (noting that, in the Ultimatum Game,
"[i]ncurring costs to punish cheapskates can yield profits in the long run").
127 See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking:
Entitlements in the Market, 76 AM. EcoN. REV. 728; see also Sigmund et al., supra note
126, at 84 (stating that "the lesson from the Ultimatum Game and similar experiments is
that real people are a cross breed of H. economicus and H. emoticus, a complicated
hybrid species that can be ruled as much by emotion as by cold logic and selfishness").
128 See THOMPsON, supra note 1, at 54-55.
129 See, e.g., Babcock et al., supra note 7, at 1337 (citing various examples of self-
serving bias and noting that, "[e]ven when parties have the same information, they will
come to different conclusions about what a fair settlement would be and base their
predictions ... on their own views of what is fair"); Jolls et al., supra note 7, at 1502
(describing various self-serving biases); Sunstein, supra note 7, at 1182-83 (stating that
"[p]eople's judgments about fairness are self-serving" and noting that settling cases is
made difficult because "self-serving bias-a belief that one deserves more than other
people tend to think-affects both parties to a negotiation").
130 See, e.g., BAZERMAN, supra note 16, at 99 (noting that "assessments of what is
fair are often biased by self-interest"); Leigh Thompson & George Loewenstein,
Egocentric Interpretations of Fairness and Interpersonal Conflict, 51 ORG. BEHAV. &
717
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
demonstrates this effect. In that study, the professors asked subjects to
specify a fair rate of pay when they had worked 10 hours and another person
had worked 7 hours, or where they had worked 7 hours and the other person
had worked 10 hours. When the subjects were told that they had worked 10
hours and the other participants had worked 7 hours and had been paid $25,
the subjects claimed that they should be paid on average $35.24 for their 10
hours. When, however, the subjects were told that they had received $25 for
7 hours of work, they thought that their colleagues who had worked 10 hours
should earn only an average of $30.29-a $5 difference explainable only by
egocentric bias. 131 Clearly, the subjects' views of fairness changed according
to which role they assumed.
Similarly, in another study, participants were randomly assigned to roles
in a negotiation simulation involving a wage dispute. 132 Both groups were
given identical background information and asked to negotiate an agreement.
Prior to entering the negotiation, the groups were asked what they thought a
neutral third party would find to be a fair wage. Despite having identical
information, each group concluded that the third party would favor their side,
a clear illustration of interpreting data in an egocentric manner. 133
Why are negotiators so egocentric in making judgments about fairness?
Professor Thompson offers this explanation:
People want or prefer more than what they regard as fair (basic hedonism).
In short, our preferences are more primary, or immediate, than our social
concerns. People are more in touch with their own preferences than with the
concerns of others. We have immediate access to our preferences; fairness
is a secondary judgment. For this reason, fairness judgments are likely to be
tainted by preferences. Because preferences are primary and immediate,
they often color a person's evaluation of fairness in a self-serving fashion.
In a sense, our preferences act as a self-serving primer on our judgments of
fairness. 134
What makes egocentric judgments so hard to monitor or overcome is that
we tend to look at the world through our own distorting prisms. Even those
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 176, 182 (1992) (citing studies that demonstrate that, "when
faced with ambiguity, peoples' judgments will be biased in a manner that favors
themselves").
131 See David M. Messick & Keith P. Sentis, Fairness and Preference, 15 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 418, 422-34 (1979).
132 See generally Thompson & Loewenstein, supra note 130.
133 Id.
134 THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 55-56.
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who wish to live according to principles of generosity and fairness must
struggle with their inherent tendency to assess these principles in ways that
favor their own interests. As Professor Max Bazerman observes, "The
problem lies not in our desire to be unfair but in our inability to interpret
information in an unbiased manner." 135 Stepping outside of our narrow
perspective requires imagination and empathy, 136 instincts that are likely less
strong than our tendencies to think and feel egocentrically. 137
1. Imputations of Evil
Egocentric concerns lead us not only to think selfishly, but also to
attribute ulterior and sometimes evil motives to those who disagree with us.
If we have analyzed a situation and have concluded that equity demands a
resolution of an issue or dispute in our favor, we too often conclude that
those who do not see the matter as we do can only think as they do for bad
reasons. Although we can sometimes see different perspectives and say,
"reasonable minds can disagree," we all too often see malice or raw self-
interest as our opponents' motivator. After all, if we believe that "fairness"
dictates a particular outcome, then one who argues for a different approach
must be advocating an unfair result. When these feelings emerge, negotiated
settlements of disputes rapidly become difficult because the atmosphere
135 See BAZERMAN, supra note 16, at 100.
136 Empathy seems to be a critical component of ethical thought and fair behavior.
See, e.g., C. Daniel Batson, Empathy, Altruism, and Justice: Another Perspective on
Partiality, in CURRENT SOCIETAL CONCERNS ABOUT JUSTICE 49, 49-66 (Leo Montada &
Melvin J. Lemer eds., 1996); see also Sidney Callahan, The Role of Emotion in Ethical
Decisionmaking, HASTINGS CENTER REP., June-July 1988, at 9, 12 (arguing that
emotions, particularly empathy, are critically "important in moral and ethical
functioning," and that "[m]any moral revolutions have been initiated by empathy felt for
previously excluded groups: slaves, women, workers, children, the handicapped,
experimental subjects, patients in institutions... ").
137 Anyone who has watched a sports event with a friend who roots for the opposing
team should recall how often he or she disagrees with the friend about the fairness of the
referees' calls. Events like this vividly illustrate how powerful the egocentric impulse is.
See, e.g., Albert H. Hastorf & Hadley Cantril, They Saw a Game: A Case Study, 49 J.
ABNORMAL AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 129, 129-34 (1954) (citing a study in which football fans
from Princeton and Dartmouth viewed a film of a football game with each set of fans
asserting that the opposing football team played more unfairly and aggressively than their
favorite team).
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becomes charged with "score-settling" or "evil-eradicating,"' 138 and not with
reaching a reasonable accommodation or splitting the difference. 139
2. Reactive Devaluation
Yet another concern stemming from egocentric biases is what social
psychologists refer to as "reactive devaluation."' 140 Reactive devaluation
arises from' the tendency that negotiators have to see less value in
concessions made by opponents than those arising from more neutral parties.
In one revealing study, researchers asked subjects about whether an arms
control proposal favored the United States or the Soviet Union. In the group
that was told that Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev had developed the
proposal, 56% felt that it favored the Russians, 16% thought it favored the
U.S., and 16% concluded that it favored neither side. In contrast, when a
second group was told that President Ronald Reagan had crafted the
proposal, 45% felt that it favored both sides equally, 27% thought that the
138 This can provide the justification for aggressive behavior that one would
otherwise not pursue. See Gerald B. Wetlaufer, The Ethics of Lying in Negotiations, 75
IOWA L. REV. 1219, 1232, n.40 (1990) ("By concluding that our adversaries are
unworthy, we render defensible, even virtuous, the most viciously self-interested conduct
in which we might want to engage ... [and] we grant ourselves permission to do those
things that we may have wanted to do all along and for which we otherwise lacked
permission.").
139 See CRAVER, supra note 105, at 91 (warning that negotiators should "consider
the possibility that they are attributing unfounded meaning to what is actually being
conveyed. They may simply be reading more into their opponent's representations than is
warranted--or intended-and this phenomenon may the basis for their resulting
confusion."); FISHER & URY, supra note 1, at 25 ("It is all too easy to fall into the habit of
putting the worst interpretation on what the other side says or does. A suspicious
interpretation often follows naturally from one's existing perceptions. Moreover, it seems
the 'safe' thing to do, and it shows spectators how bad the other side really is."); Kenneth
W. Thomas, Conflict and Negotiation Processes in Organizations, in 3 HANDBOOK OF
INDUSTRIAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 651, 681 (Marvin D. Dunnette &
Leaetta M. Hough eds., 1992) (citing various studies demonstrating that there "appears to
be a strong tendency for a party to see the other as relatively competitive, while seeing
oneself as relatively uncompetitive and cooperative").
140 Classification becomes an issue in discussing this issue. I place it in the context
of egocentric bias, while Bazerman identifies it as an example of "fixed-pie" bias. See
BAZERMAN, supra note 16, at 129 ("The mythical fixed pie also leads us to 'reactively
devalue' any concession made simply because it is offered by an adversary."). Professors
Russell Korobkin and Chris Guthrie suggest that it might be "a version of spiteful
behavior, rather than a separate phenomenon." See Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 4, at
80, n.17.
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proposal benefited the Soviet Union, and 27% thought the proposal favored
the United States. 141
Egocentric bias helps explain reactive devaluation. If, as a result of
imputing ulterior or evil motives, one perceives his or her opponent to be
adopting unfair and unreasonable positions, then one is likely to view with
great suspicion any concessions or alternatives that one's opponent puts
forward. One will conclude either that the opponent has made no real
concession or that the opponent has ulterior, ignoble motives in making the
offer. Needless to say, reactive devaluation can make almost any negotiated
settlement difficult to achieve. 142 Reactive devaluation also leads to
perceptions that concessions that are actually offered are rated lower than
concessions that have been withheld, and that a compromise is rated less
highly after it has been put on the table by the other side than it was before
the other side offered it.143
C. Fundamental Attribution Error as an Egocentric Bias
Fundamental attribution error, "the tendency to jump the inferential gun
and to draw conclusions about the characters of others even when there are
plausible alternative explanations for their conduct," 144 encompasses matters
that go beyond egocentric concerns. For example, despite the often limited
control the president has over the nation's economy, he typically gets praise
141 See Constance A. Stillinger et al., The Reactive Devaluation Barrier to Conflict
Resolution, (unpublished manuscript, Stanford University), in BAZERMAN, supra note 16,
at 129; see also Bazerman et al., supra note 7, at 1284 (discussing the same study).
142 See Robert H. Mnookin, Why Negotiations Fail: An Exploration of Barriers to
the Resolution of Conflict, 8 OHIO STATE J. ON DisP. RESOL. 235, 247 (1993). Mnookin
notes that,
[w]hen one side unilaterally offers a concession that it believes the other side should
value and the other side reacts by devaluing the offer, this can obviously make
resolution difficult. The recipient of a unilateral concession is apt to believe that her
adversary has given up nothing of real value and may therefore resist any notion that
she should offer something of real value in exchange.
Id.
143 See Lee Ross & Constance Stillinger, Barriers to Conflict Resolution, 7 NEGOT.
J. 389, 394-95 (1991).
144 See ZivA KUNDA, SOCIAL COGNITION: MAKING SENSE OF PEOPLE 429 (1999)
(The fundamental attribution error arises when people "underestimate the extent to which
behavior is shaped by the constraints of the situation and overestimate the extent to which
it is shaped by people's underlying dispositions."). One of the ways that I counsel my
students to avoid this error is by insisting that they never attribute to malice that which
can be explained by incompetence.
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when it is good and condemnation when it is bad.145 Similarly, we commit
this error when we assign blame or praise to individuals when factors beyond
their control play an enormous part in their work product. 146
These examples, while illustrating attribution errors, do not involve
egocentric bias because those making the (mis)judgments typically have no
significant personal involvement in the situation described. Egocentric bias,
however, is often implicated in the fundamental attribution error. This occurs
when one attributes one's success to one's positive personal traits while
simultaneously pointing to external forces beyond his or her control to
explain failures. Accepting blame without attributing failure or fault to others
(or to external forces) surely must rank as one of mankind's least enjoyable
tasks-which means that we do not easily do it. Former President Richard
Nixon, by most accounts, seemed incapable of acknowledging that his
actions in the Watergate scandal warranted impeachment or his forced
resignation. 147 To the contrary, his explanation for the scandal pointed to
others for whom he had to assume responsibility (but apparently not the
blame). 148
Fundamental attribution errors can easily undermine negotiations.
Consider, for example, a dispute between a developer and an environmental
group. Environmental disputes, involving, as they often do, an array of
grievances touching extremely strong feelings on both sides and
characterized by technical complexities, legal posturing, and a general lack
of trust, can appear intractable. Available research indicates that a variety of
cognitive biases ranging from "fixed-pie" assumptions 149 to "endowment"
145 See, e.g., Bernard Roshco, Investor Illiteracy, 10 AM. PROSPECT, Mar.-Apr.
1999, at 69, 72 (stating that "[m]istaken attributions of responsibility determine elections;
the president gets undeserved credit-and blame-for the performance of the national
economy").
146 See, e.g., ROBBINS, supra note 16, at 126 (noting that the fundamental attribution
error "can explain why a sales manager is prone to attribute the poor performance of her
sales agents to laziness rather than to the innovative product line introduced by a
competitor").
147 See, e.g., BOB WOODWARD & CARL BERNSTEIN, THE FINAL DAYS 428 (1976)
(noting that, as late as Tuesday, August 6, 1974, two days before submitting his
resignation, Nixon insisted to his staff that "I've analyzed the best I can, the best memory
I can, buttressed by miles and miles of tape, and I have not found an impeachable
offense, and therefore, resignation is not an acceptable course.").
148 Id. at 77 ("Blaming Watergate and other campaign abuses on 'overzealous'
associates, Nixon said they had made 'mistakes' that I never approved of, mistakes that I
would never have tolerated, but mistakes for which I will have to take the
responsibility.").
149 See infra notes 227-33 and accompanying text for a discussion of this bias.
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effects' 50 will plague any negotiations between the parties. 15 1 As Professor
Thompson notes, fundamental attribution errors invariably play a major
confounding role because each side, when asked to name the cause of the
dispute, will attribute the negative aspects of the conflict to the dispositions
and evil motives of the other party.152
D. Illusion of Control
Closely related to the fundamental attribution error is what has been
described as the "illusion of control" bias, which arises when one
overestimates his or her ability to affect outcomes that are really determined
by factors outside of one's control. 153 Although the precise psychological
dynamic that causes this bias remains open to debate, there is little doubt that
people have a strong tendency to fall into this perception trap. 154 In fact, so
150 See infra notes 192-200 and accompanying text for a discussion of this bias.
151 See generally Bazerman et al., supra note 7 (discussing how at least six
systematic biases are particularly endemic to environmental disputes, including fixed-pie
bias, pseudo-sacredness, egocentrism, overconfidence, unrealistic optimism, and
endowment effects).
152 THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 240 (describing the negative attributions that each
will assign: "[D]evelopers regard environmentalists to be fanatic lunatics;
environmentalists regard developers to be sinister and greedy.").
153 See, e.g., KUNDA, supra note 144, at 65 (noting that "[o]ne of the central lessons
of social psychological research is that we tend to underestimate the power of situations
to influence behavior. We do not realize that seemingly subtle situational differences can
have dramatic impact on behavior and we tend to assume that behaviors are driven
predominantly by underlying personality dispositions.") (citations omitted); Birke & Fox,
supra note 7, at 16-17 (citing studies that demonstrate that people have a "tendency to
overestimate their ability to control outcomes that are determined by factors outside of
their control"); Susan M. Houghton et al., No Safety in Numbers: Persistence of Biases
and Their Effects on Team Risk Perception and Team Decision Making, 25 GROUP &
ORG. MGMT. 325 (2000) (noting that cognitive biases, such as the illusion of control,
affect team decisionmaking by lowering their perception of the risks associated with
decisions); Surinder S. Kahai et al., Active Involvement, Familiarity, Framing, and the
Illusion of Control During Decision Support System Use, 23 DECISION SUPPORT SYS.
133, 134 (1998) (defining illusion of control as an "unwarranted inflation of expectations
of success" and noting that this bias led to greater user satisfaction, better mood, and
lower preference for thinking more before making final decisions); Ellen J. Langer, The
Illusion of Control, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 311 (1975) (seminal study
identifying the illusion of control bias).
154 See Langer, supra note 153, at 323 ("Whether it is seen as a need for
competence, an instinct to master, a striving for superiority, or a striving for personal
causation, most social scientists agree that there is a motivation to master one's
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strong is this drive that even factors as small as touching a physical object
can give people a sense that they control events when they do not. For
example, in a study of securities analysts, individuals were divided into two
groups. Each was asked to pay $1 to participate in a game where, if they
picked the correct card out of a pack of 52 cards, they would win $100. The
first group was shown the card while the second group was allowed to see it
and touch it. Analysts who had only been shown the card asked for an
average of $1.89 in return for relinquishing their opportunity to win the $100,
but those who had touched the card demanded an average of $8.96 before
they would give up their opportunity to win the prize. 155 Interestingly, those
analysts with MBA degrees who had touched the card, despite their higher
education, demanded even more-an average of $11.19-for surrendering
their chance to win the $100.156 Similar studies illustrate the same dynamic:
participants in a lottery who choose their own tickets demand a substantially
higher price to relinquish them than those who have been assigned tickets. 157
Negotiators must obviously confront illusion of control issues every time
they bargain. They should be particularly aware of this tendency when
confronting matters that involve future events or that present high degrees of
risk. The inability to make precise determinations obviously presents a major
source of anxiety and concern. Rather than inflating one's predictive powers,
however, one would be far better off seeking ways to protect one's interests
against unforeseen contingencies, say, by incorporating provisions that
explicitly condition the terms of the deal according to future outcomes. 158
That is, rather than falling prey to an illusion of control, negotiators would
improve bargaining outcomes by actually taking steps to improve their
control of the situation. 159
environment, and a complete mastery would include the ability to 'beat the odds,' that is,
to control chance events.") (citations omitted).
155 See Handshake Creates Illusion of Control in Analysts, INVESTOR RELATIONS
Bus., July 24, 2000, at 14, 14, available at LEXIS, News Library, Invrel File.
156 Id. According to one observer, "[a]nalysts think they're much smarter than they
are." Id.
157 See Birke & Fox, supra note 7, at 17 (citing research by Professor Langer).
158 Bazerman & Gillespie argue that one of the best ways of dealing with future
uncertainty and high risk is to rely on "contingent" contracts, which provide different
terms according to future events. For example, parties to a movie contract could tie an
actor's pay to how well a film does at the box office. See Max H. Bazerman & James J.
Gillespie, Betting on the Future: The Virtues of Contingent Contracts, 77 HARV. Bus.
REv., Sept.-Oct., 1999, at 155, 156.
159 Responding to several studies suggesting that positive feelings associated with
illusions, such as a false sense of control, promote confidence and achievement, Professor
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E. Overconfidence
Radio listeners invariably chuckle when they hear Garrison Keiller's
monologue on the show, Prairie Home Companion, in which he reports on
the fictional city of Lake Woebegone, "where ... all the children are above
average." In the same vein, most people, when asked how they will do in an
upcoming negotiation, strongly predict that they will do better than average,
notwithstanding the mathematical impossibilities of beating the average. 160
Perhaps the clearest example of this is a study by Professors Max Bazerman
and Margaret Neale, in which they asked negotiators in a "final-offer"
arbitration exercise (i.e., in which an arbitrator, without the authority to "split
the difference," must select one side's final offer depending on which the
arbitrator feels is fairer) to estimate their likelihood of prevailing. Invariably,
the negotiators estimated a greater than 50% chance of having their offer
chosen, a clear mathematical impossibility.161
Bazerman acknowledges that they may occasionally prove beneficial (e.g., with health
issues where positive feelings may actually support the healing process), but strongly
cautions against placing too much emphasis on their positive aspects:
I... believe that the story told by this literature is very incomplete and dangerous in
most decision-making environments. People lose their money investing their life
savings in new businesses with little chance of success. People lose their jobs when
they falsely conclude that they are irreplaceable and make ultimatums to their
employers. I believe that it is not sustainable to continually fool yourself, or to fool
other people and maintain the belief that you are helping them. I believe that you
cannot continue these illusions without reducing the quality of decisions that you
make. In most cases, positive illusions provide a short-term benefit with larger long-
term costs. I see them as a form of emotional procrastination.
BAZERMAN, supra note 16, at 98.
160 See Bazerman et al., supra note 7, at 1289-90 (citing a study in which "68% of
the MBA students in a negotiation class predicted that their bargaining outcomes would
fall in the upper 25% of the class").
161 See Max H. Bazerman & Margaret A. Neale, Improving Negotiation
Effectiveness Under Final Offer Arbitration: The Role of Selection and Training, 67 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 543, 544 (1982).
Whereas only 50% of all final offers can be accepted, the average subject
estimated a much higher probability that his or her final offer would be accepted.
Assuming that the final offer represents a judgment about the amount of concession
necessary to win the arbitration, this finding is consistent with evidence that people
tend to be overconfident in their fallible judgments.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Birke & Fox, supra note 7, at 15 ("Egocentric biases are
reinforced by so-called 'positive illusions,' which include unrealistic optimism .... );
Jolls et al., supra note 7, at 1524 ("A common feature of human behavior is
overoptimism: People tend to think that bad events are far less likely to happen to them
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Similarly, despite extensive research demonstrating that most new
businesses fail within a few years, 162 generation after generation of
entrepreneurs has ignored this grim statistic and plunged into the market.
163
Research strongly suggests that these budding business people do so buoyed
by excessive optimism. 164 The same phenomenon undoubtedly fueled the
run-up of stock market prices in the 1990s. 165 Despite the benefit to society
from having so many eager entrepreneurs and investors willing to risk their
time and money, 166 one can see that many of these financial players have
little, if any, realistic chance of success, and that the emotional and financial
costs of overoptimistic judgments remain high.
What heightens some researchers' concerns about overconfidence is that
people tend to be most optimistic in circumstances in which they have the
least amount of information. For example, when test subjects are given
quizzes and asked to estimate the chances that they have answered the
questions correctly, they are more likely to estimate that they have done well
when they are questioned in areas with which they have no familiarity than
when given questions where they have significant knowledge. 167 In the latter
than to others. Thus, most people think that their probability of a bad outcome is far less
than others' probability, although of course this cannot be true for more than half the
population."); Kramer et al., supra note 7, at 111 (noting the existence of overconfidence
bias).
162 See Frequently Asked Questions, Office of Advocacy, Small Business
Administration, at http://appl.sba.gov/faqs/faqindex.cfm?arealD=24 (last visited Nov.
11, 2004) (study by SBA Office of Advocacy indicating that between 1989 and 1992,
only 39.5% of new business starts remained open after six years).
163 Id. (noting that roughly 600,000 new businesses started in 2000).
164 See, e.g., Colin Camerer & Dan Lovallo, Overconfidence and Excess Entry: An
Experimental Approach, 89 AM. ECON. REv. 306 (1999) (citing psychology studies
indicating that overconfidence among entrepreneurs leads to excessive business entry into
the market).
165 See Paul Krugman, Delusions of Prosperity, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2001, at 17
(noting that the economic downturn beginning in the year 2001 did not require a
restoration of business confidence because "excessive confidence may be part of the
problem. Instead of being the victims of self-fulfilling pessimism, we may be suffering
from self-defeating optimism.").
166 See Rachlinski, supra note 20, at 1211 (noting that, "[i]f every potential
restaurateur carefully weighed the well-known statistic that three out of every four new
restaurants fail, then it is hard to see where new restaurants would come from").
167 See BAZERMAN, supra note 16, at 33 (noting that "[t]he most well-established
finding in the overconfidence literature is the tendency of people to be most
overconfident of the correctness of their answers when asked to respond to questions of
moderate to extreme difficulty"); see also Philip G. Peters, Jr., Hindsight Bias and Tort
Liability: Avoiding Premature Conclusions, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1277, 1288 n.78 (1999)
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case, people typically demonstrate no overconfidence, and often some
underconfidence.168
Several studies suggest that, to the extent that an overconfidence bias
exists, it can be minimized. Subjects who are forced to state reasons why
their answers might be correct before stating the degree of confidence they
had in their answers dramatically reduced the degree of overconfidence they
had in estimating the accuracy of their answers. 169 Similarly, subjects who
are asked to state the weaknesses in their views or who include a "devil's
advocate" in their deliberations tend to reduce the degree of bias in their
deliberations. 170
Other researchers, however, are less convinced that over-optimism exists
to a degree that merits particular concern. 171  They question whether
(citing a similar study to the effect that "[t]he overconfidence bias causes people to place
more confidence in their answers than they should").
168 See Peters, supra note 167, at 1288; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Hazardous
Heuristics, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 751, 773-74 (2003) (citing a number of studies showing
that people are quite realistic in estimating risk and, in some cases, overly pessimistic
about estimating risk).
169 See Asher Koriat et al., Reasons for Confidence, 6 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.:
HUM. LEARNING & MEMORY 107, 113 (1980).
170 See Birke & Fox, supra note 7, at 19; see also infra notes 314-18 and
accompanying text.
171 See Sunstein, supra note 168, at 775-76. Citing recent data challenging the
existence of a serious problem of over-optimism, Sunstein argues that, "[i]f optimism
were widespread, we should probably see far more recklessness and failure than we
generally observe." Id. at 775. Accordingly, he concludes:
[Claims that people are generally realistic about estimating risks] raise real
doubts about the view that optimistic bias provides a good reason for paternalistic
interventions. To be sure, we know enough about optimistic bias to give serious
consideration to informational campaigns to ensure that people will not have an
inflated belief in their own immunity. In the context of smoking, statistical
knowledge of risks might be inadequate if people believe themselves relatively
immune. But in view of [recent studies showing the opposite], the idea of
paternalism is generally justified by optimistic bias must be regarded as an unproven
speculation. If people are not excessively optimistic when the consequences of error
are severe, if the bias is small or nonexistent when decisions are actually being
made, and if people overstate low-probability risks, there is no problem for the law
to correct.
Id. at 775-76; see also Rachlinski, supra note 20, at 1211 (noting that, because of the
conflicting evidence about the existence or potency of an optimism bias, scholars have
come to "no resolution" about it).
Along the same line, the author has noted more lack of confidence than over-
optimism among his MBA negotiation students. When asked to fill out a self-assessment
of their negotiation strengths and weaknesses that includes the question, "Do you
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"debiasing" techniques work effectively to address over-optimism 172 or that,
if effective, are terribly practical. 173
F. Self-Enhancement Bias
Given that people tend to be overconfident, it should come as no surprise
that they also think of themselves in a particularly positive light compared to
how they think of others. As Professors Richard Birke and Craig Fox put it:
[M]ost people think that they are more intelligent and fair minded than
average. Ninety-four percent of university professors believe that they do a
better job than their colleagues. More to the point, most negotiators believe
themselves to be more flexible, more purposeful, more fair, more
competent, more honest and more cooperative than their counterparts. 
174
This tendency to think well of oneself has been described as a "self-
enhancement" bias. 175 Passing moral judgment on this tendency misses the
point. Self-enhancement bias is something hard-wired within all of us; it is
not necessarily a moral failure of vain individuals-although it can be when
carried to extremes. While it may have survival value in terms of
evolution, 176 it also carries the potential to lead us astray in our
decisionmaking generally and in negotiation settings specifically. 177 For
consider yourself a good negotiator?" a consistent majority responds, "No." The best
explanation that one can muster to explain this is that students enter negotiations fully
aware of the weaknesses in their positions, but ignorant of those in their opponents.
Because they do not know the other side's shortcomings, they assume that the other side
must be stronger.
172 See Sunstein, supra note 168, at 774 (citing a study that explored "a variety of
apparently promising strategies to reduce optimism bias with respect to relative risk. The
punchline? None of these strategies worked.") (citation omitted).
173 Id. at 774 (citing a study that reduced excess optimism regarding health risks
through an approach in which people were given specific information about their own
standing on risk factors or about their peers' standing on risk factors, but noting that "it is
not easy to adapt this information to media campaigns designed to improve human
health").
174 Birke & Fox, supra note 7, at 17-18, and citations therein.
175 See, e.g., Kramer et al., supra note 7, at 112 (noting the "pervasive tendency for
individuals' judgments to be self-enhancing across a wide variety of social contexts").
176 Id. at 114 (citing studies showing that "[p]ositive mood has been found to
increase individuals' optimism and confidence about future outcomes").
177 Id. at 125 (noting that, while a positive "mood may improve actual performance,
it also fosters significant distortions of performance").
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example, one who believes himself or herself to be doing well in a
negotiation may actually be performing in a sub-optimal way because of
flawed thinking attributable to this bias. An automobile salesperson may well
exploit this bias by offering fulsome praise to an eager, naive purchaser about
how well the buyer negotiated an agreement when, in fact, the salesperson
has just taken extreme advantage of the customer.
G. Transparency Bias/"Curse of Knowledge "
One of the most insidious egocentric biases is also one of the most
subtle. When one is involved in a personal relationship, a romance, or a
negotiation, nothing undermines good feelings and the flow of
communication more than having one's "pure" motives questioned or
challenged. In fact, the more sincere one feels, the more selfless one believes
one's proposals to be, and the more sacrificing one's actions, the more
painful and infuriating it is to have the other person act dismissively towards
one's ideas. At such times, of course, one's immediate response is to assume
the very worst about one's counterpart. This may lead to anger,
estrangement, and hostile actions. 178
The problem in many of these difficult situations is that, despite one's
sincerity and selfless approach, the other side simply cannot read one's mind
or motives. Because no one can truly read minds, the possibilities for
misunderstanding and conflict remain ever present. Unfortunately, our
egocentric perspective blinds us to the possibility that others simply cannot
measure or judge our actions except by the overt signals that we send, which
may not be as clear to others as they are to us. 179 This inability to read each
other's minds and to assess each other's motives is what can be called a
178 1 see this constantly when reviewing student journals in my negotiation course.
Time and time again, students who have just completed a negotiation question the
sincerity and honesty of one another, insisting that they themselves had acted honorably.
Their opponents invariably see the negotiation in the exact opposite light.
179 Recognizing the distinction between one's overt signals and one's inner thoughts
is absolutely critical to the law. The law of contracts recognizes only those terms of an
agreement that are objectively manifested. Inner messages or internal meanings, however
strong, do not govern contracts. See RICHARD A. MANN & BARRY ROBERTS, BUSINESS
LAW AND THE REGULATION OF BUSINESS 185 (7th ed. 2002) ("To form a contract, the
agreement must be objectively manifested. The important thing is what the parties
indicate to one another by spoken or written words or by conduct. The law, therefore,
applies an objective standard and is concerned only with the assent, agreement, or
intention of a party as it reasonably appears from his words or actions.").
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"transparency" bias, i.e., each side believes that his or her thoughts, motives,
and feelings are transparent to the other side when that is not so.
Closely related to the transparency bias is what Professor Bazerman calls
the "curse of knowledge." As he explains it, notwithstanding the economic
models that suggest additional information is always valuable to real-life
decisionmakers, studies demonstrate the contrary.18 0  For example,
individuals who know the answer to a problem typically overestimate the
percentage of their peers who can solve it.1 81 This becomes a serious
problem when one sends an ambiguous message-which is clear to him or
her-to another only to discover that the receiver of the message fails to
understand it. People often become perplexed when the ambiguous message
is not "magically understood by the other party." 182
Negotiators can easily fall prey to the transparency bias, with the results
being, at a minimum, perplexing and sometimes disastrous. Some observers,
for example, believe the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor that triggered
America's entry into World War II stemmed, in part, from a fundamental
misunderstanding between the two countries about each other's intentions
and motives. 183 From hindsight, it is clear that each mistakenly thought its
position was clear to the other. Unfortunately, when one falls prey to this
bias, it is exceedingly difficult to undo.
V. "MIXED" AND MISCELLANEOUS BIASES
In addition to the heuristics and biases already discussed, there lies a set
of biases that seem less easily classified either as cognitive or egocentric. In
some cases, they seem to fit within both categories; in others, they seem to fit
within neither.
180 See BAZERMAN, supra note 16, at 38.
181 Id. (citing a study by R.S. Nickerson).
182 Id. (citing a working paper by B. Keysar, The Illusory Transparency of Intention:
Linguistic Perspective Taking in Text (1992).)
183 See JoHN TOLAND, THE RiSING SUN 166-70 (1971) (describing how Japan's
skepticism about U.S. sincerity misunderstood a message from the U.S. demanding that
Japan withdraw from China as a condition to restoring good relations between the two
countries). In fact, the U.S. never insisted that Japan withdraw from Manchuria, the
territory that Japan felt was crucial to its interests and needs. As Toland wrote: "A war
that need not have been fought was about to be fought because of mutual
misunderstanding, language difficulties, and mistranslations as well as Japanese
opportunism .... irrationality, honor, pride, and fear-and American racial prejudice,
distrust, ignorance of the Orient, rigidity, self-righteousness, honor, national pride and
fear." Id.
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A. Avoidance of Loss/Risk Aversion
Classic economics holds that people should treat equal risks equally, but
they do not. 184 To the contrary, study after study confirms that humans react
far more negatively to the risk of loss than to the potential for gain.' 85 This is
a well-known phenomenon called "risk aversion," i.e., the notion that "most
people will take a sure thing over a gamble, even where the gamble may have
a somewhat higher 'expected' payoff."'186
There seems to be a feeling of humiliation associated with losses that
makes them so unacceptable. This explains why gamblers, when losing
money, will often take enormous risks to break even rather than leave the
table with a loss187-thus the popularity of long shots on the last race of the
day. 188 Similarly, loss aversion explains why investors are two-and-a-half
times more likely to sell stocks that have increased in value than those with
price declines.189
The aversion to loss carries special importance in negotiations because
bargaining almost always involves trading gains and losses--opening up
184 See Sunstein, supra note 7, at 1179 (noting that, "[c]ontrary to economic theory,
people do not treat out-of-pocket costs and opportunity costs as if they were equivalent").
185 See, e.g., id.; see also Mnookin, supra note 142, at 244-45; Margaret A. Neale et
al., The Framing of Negotiations: Contextual Versus Task Frames, 39 ORG. BEHAV. AND
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 228, 229 (1987) (stating that "decision makers treat the
prospect of gains much differently than the prospect of losses"); Rachlinski, supra note
32, at 759 (noting that "[p]eople worry more about the regret that they would feel from
undertaking an affirmative act that they ultimately wish they had not undertaken than the
regret that they would feel from the failure to take an affirmative act that they ultimately
wish they had undertaken"); Sunstein, supra note 14, at 44 ("Kahneman and Tversky...
show that people usually hate losses from their current situation-in fact, they dislike
losses far more than they like equivalent gains.").
186 Mnookin, supra note 142, at 244.
187 Id. (noting that researchers have made a "remarkable discovery" about behavior
under uncertainty-"in order to avoid what would otherwise be a sure loss, many people
will gamble, even if the expected loss from the gamble is larger").
188 See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the
Psychology of Choice, 211 Sci. 453, 456 (1981) (noting how people, when faced with
loss, may take risks that they would ordinarily find unacceptable). Tversky and
Kahneman argue that this analysis is supported by the popularity of long shots on the last
race of the day. Id.
189 See Robert Barker, Why Not Lose Those Mutual Fund Losers?, Bus. WK., Oct.
23, 2000, at 170, 170 (noting that loss aversion "has been found repeatedly among people
investing in stocks, options, futures, even in homes. It's a basic human bias, one [Mr.
Spock from "Star Trek"] just wouldn't get.").
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numerous pitfalls leading to thwarted deals. 190 Loss aversion strongly
suggests that negotiators will be much less likely to strike deals that include
unavoidable losses than to include the promise of extra gains. Professor
Jeffrey Rachlinski notes, for example, that risk aversion can easily lead
defendants to fight lawsuits that they would be better off settling.19 1 In
addition, to avoid the losses, defendants often undertake long-shot strategies
that have little chance of succeeding.
B. Endowment Effect and Status Quo Bias
Closely related to loss aversion is what social psychologists call the
"endowment effect." That is, people demand more to give up an object than
they would be willing to pay to acquire it.192 For example, undergraduate
students in a law and economics course at Cornell University who received
Cornell coffee mugs demanded more than twice as much to give up a mug as
those who were given cash were willing to pay for them.193 Similarly,
subjects in a series of studies insisted on receiving a higher wage for doing
household and academic chores than the wage that they considered fair to
pay others for doing the same work. 19 4 Studies such as these challenge
190 See Mnookin, supra note 142, at 244. Mnookin points out:
Loss aversion can act as a cognitive barrier to the negotiated resolution of
conflict for a variety of reasons. For example, both sides may fight on in a dispute in
the hope that they may avoid any losses, even though the continuation of the dispute
involves a gamble in which the loss may end up being far greater. Loss aversion
may explain Lyndon Johnson's decision, in 1965, to commit additional troops to
Vietnam as an attempt to avoid the sure loss attendant to withdrawal, and as a
gamble that there might be some way in the future to avoid any loss at all.
Id. at 244-45.
191 Rachlinski, supra note 32, at 759 n.95.
192 See, e.g., Jolls et al., supra note 7, at 1484 (noting that the endowment effect is
"a manifestation of the broader phenomenon of 'loss aversion'-the idea that losses are
weighted more heavily than gains"); Rachlinski, supra note 32, at 758-59 (noting that the
endowment effect leads people to "get attached to the status quo and value things that
they own more than things they do not").
193 Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the
Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. EcoN. 1325 (1990) [hereinafter Kahneman, Experimental];
see also Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and
Status Quo Bias, J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 195-97 (1991) [hereinafter Kahneman,
Anomalies].
194 See generally Vera Hoorens et al., Time Is an Amazingly Variable Amount of
Money: Endowment and Ownership Effects in the Subjective Value of Working Time, 20
J. EcON. PSYCHOL. 383, 383 (1999).
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fundamental economics assumptions that people value things according to
some "intrinsic" value that they carry and raise challenges to negotiators who
seek to approach transactions from a rational perspective. 195 Of course, what
seems irrational today may be quite rational from an evolutionary
perspective. 196
The endowment effect reflects a preference for the status quo, a well-
known human trait that most people exhibit for, other things being equal,
leaving things as they are. 197 This reflects the common observation that
people would prefer to make sins of omission rather than commission. 198 For
example, our legal system operates on the assumption that it is better that
nine guilty men should go free rather than one innocent person should be
wrongfully convicted. 199 The dread that most people carry for undertaking an
action that proves wrong far outweighs their concern for wrongfully failing
to act. In the abstract, worrying about false positives more than false
negatives is no worse than the reverse. In real-life, however, there is no
guarantee that such attitudes produce favorable outcomes. It will always
depend on the situation. For example, parents who refuse to vaccinate their
195 See Jennifer Arlen, Comment, The Future of Behavioral Economic Analysis of
Law, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1765, 1771 (1998) (noting that the "endowment effect challenges
the fundamental assumption of economics that, absent wealth effects, an individual's
maximum willingness to pay for a good should equal his minimum sale price").
196 Professor Jones suggests that behavioral biology may well explain our
preference for holding on to what we have:
There is much written in behavioral biology documenting the widespread
phenomenon in territorial systems that residents of a territory almost invariably
defeat challengers. Although the literature does not refer to it in terms of
"endowment effects," observational and experimental evidence suggests that
defenders of territory routinely ascribe a higher value to what they have than they
ascribe to the same territory if they have to procure it from another. That is, they
fight harder to defend a territory than they do to reacquire it, once it has been
transferred to another. The adaptive value of a predisposition to hang on to what you
have, once you have managed to get it, may provide both an empirical and a
theoretical foundation for understanding and predicting the endowment effect in
humans.
Jones, supra note 10, at 1184-85.
197 See Arlen, supra note 195, at 1772 (noting "that people value the status quo for
its own sake implies that people's choices often are 'path dependent,' with the preferred
outcome depending on the initial choice").
198 See Blu Putnam, Sins of Omission and Commission, GLOBAL INVESTOR, Apr. 1,
2000, at 39, 39 (noting that risk managers and corporate planners "avoid sins of
commission at all costs, consequently they are constantly committing sins of omission").
199 One might argue that the medical profession shares a similar preference towards
inaction in the admonition of the Hippocratic Oath: "First, do no harm."
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children out of a fear of the vaccine's side effects demonstrably place their
children at greater risk than they do by vaccinating them.200 One can easily
see how this bias can produce unnecessary stubbornness and rigid thinking in
negotiators.
C. Cultural Biases
Researchers have long recognized that culture affects one's values and
beliefs. Americans, for example, tend to value freedom of religion and
speech, while other cultures recoil from the notion that people should be free
to say what they want or to follow any religious system that appeals to them.
Recent research suggests that culture's influence extends beyond these
patterns-evidently culture affects both whether 20' and how202 people
reason. According to this research, Americans favor logical approaches that
reject contradictions while Chinese prefer dialectical approaches that accept
contradictions. 20 3 For example, proverbs that embrace inconsistencies such
as "Too modest is half boastful" charm Chinese test subjects, while they tend
to irritate American participants. 20 4 Similarly, research suggests that
Americans will follow arguments to their logical conclusion irrespective of
the underlying reality, while Asian subjects will reject logic whenever it
contradicts their real-life experiences. 20 5
200 See Ilana Ritov & Jonathan Baron, Reluctance to Vaccinate: Omission Bias and
Ambiguity, 3 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 263, 263 (1990).
201 Professor Robbins observes:
Cultures... differ in terms of time orientation, the importance of rationality,
their belief in the ability of people to solve problems, and preference for collective
decision making. While rationality is valued in North America, that's not true
everywhere in the world. A North American manager might make an important
decision intuitively, but he or she knows that it's important to appear to proceed in a
rational fashion. This is because rationality is highly valued in the West. In countries
such as Iran, where rationality is not deified, efforts to appear rational are not
necessary.
ROBBINS, supra note 16, at 143.
202 See, e.g., Erica Goode, How Culture Molds Habits of Thought, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
8, 2000, at F1 (citing research suggesting that "people who grow up in different cultures
do not just think about different things: they think differently").
203 Id.
204 Id.
205 Id. For example, presented with the syllogism, "All animals with fur hibernate.
Rabbits have fur. Therefore, rabbits hibernate," Americans, according to researchers,
were more likely to accept the validity of the argument, separating its formal structure...
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Based on this research, one should not be surprised that culture affects
cognitive processes in negotiation settings. A recent study by Professors
Michele Gelfand and Sophia Christakopoulou seems to confirm this with
respect to fixed-pie biases206 in bargaining situations. 20 7 In this study,
American students negotiated with Greek students over workplace issues
such as work schedules, layoff procedures, and vacation time. According to
the authors, Americans approach such issues with a more individualistic
approach than their Greek counterparts, leading the Americans to claim more
value for themselves and to learn less about the priorities of their
opponents. 20 8 In contrast, the Greek students attended more to the needs of
their American counterparts, as evidenced in their greater judgment accuracy
of the Americans' interests, offers, and behaviors during the negotiation. 20 9
Thus, the Americans exhibited substantially more fixed-pie bias than the
Greeks. One of the results: The Greek students felt less satisfied with the
outcome of the negotiations. 2 10 Given this, one could see the likelihood of
possible negative feelings in future negotiations if this had been a real-life
setting.
The broad lesson to be learned from this and similar studies according to
the authors is the need for greater awareness of cultural differences:
The more general implication of this research is that the assumptions
underlying the dominant paradigm in negotiation need to be explicated and
examined for universality. In our view, it is likely that there are both
universal and culture-specific aspects of negotiation processes. In other
words, our analysis suggests that the larger cultural context in which
negotiators are embedded plays an important role in directing negotiators'
cognitions, restricting attention to particular aspects of the self and the
environment, and rendering certain judgments more susceptible to error.211
from its content." Asians, on the other hand, often rejected these arguments based on
their knowledge that rabbits do not, in fact, hibernate. Id.
206 A fixed-pie bias occurs when negotiators fail to accurately understand their
counterparts' interests. That is, negotiators approach bargaining situations with the
assumption that both sides value every aspect of the deal in precisely the same manner
with the same priority for each issue. For a discussion of this bias, see infra notes 225-31
and accompanying text.
207 See Michele J. Gelfand & Sophia Christakopoulou, Culture and Negotiator
Cognition: Judgment Accuracy and Negotiation Processes in Individualistic and
Collectivistic Cultures, 79 ORG. BEHAV. & HuM. DECISION PROCESSES 248, 248 (1999).
208 Id. at 263.
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 Id. at 263-64 (citation omitted).
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D. Excessive Commitment to a Previous Course ofAction/Escalation
of Conflict
Most negotiators have had the experience of attaching greater and greater
value to something the more they bargain over it, leading them to continue to
pursue the object even to the point of making extreme offers-far removed
from reality-for it. Professors Bazerman and Neale have dubbed this
phenomenon the "nonrational escalation of commitment," which they
describe as "the degree to which an individual escalates commitment to a
previously selected course of action to a point beyond that which rational
analysis would recommend." 212
Professors who teach negotiation courses often turn to a classroom game
to illustrate in a vivid manner how this human dynamic operates. The game,
called the "Dollar Auction," requires participants to bid on a dollar in a
straightforward manner, but with one twist: the winner gets the dollar, but the
second-highest bidder must pay his or her losing bid to the
professor/auctioneer.21 3 Almost without exception, after a flurry of offers
approaching one dollar, two bidders will be left, each realizing that if he or
she is outbid the winner will get the dollar and the loser will receive only the
embarrassment of having to pay the auctioneer. At this point, emotions
typically escalate--especially if there is a group of observers chuckling at the
two players' predicament and egging them on-and the bidding for the dollar
will reach three to five dollars or higher until at last one of the players,
visibly agitated, gives up.214 The "winner," realizing that he or she has
attained, at best, a pyrrhic victory, rarely looks much happier than the loser.
From a rational perspective, once it is clear that the bidders are merely
increasing the loss they will incur and that neither will gain a financial
advantage from further escalation, they should quit the contest. That,
however, almost never happens. Anger and a reluctance to "lose face"
overwhelm rational faculties during the auction, often to the extreme
financial benefit of the auctioneer. 215
212 Max Bazerman & Margaret Neale, Nonrational Escalation of Commitment in
Negotiation, 10 EUR. MGMT. J. 163, 164 (1992).
213 The game was invented by Martin Shubik, a former game theorist at RAND. See
Martin Shubik, The Dollar Auction Game: A Paradox in Noncooperative Behavior and
Escalation, 15 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 109, 109 (1971).
214 In some cases, the bidding has gotten out of hand. The author conducted one
negotiation in which the winning bid was $60 and two in which the high bid was $40.
215 Professor Bazerman reports that he auctions $20 bills rather than $1 bills,
resulting in his earning over $20,000 in a period of roughly nine years. In the spirit of
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The business world provides ample confirmation of the tendency to
escalate. Robert Campeau is considered by many as the best example of one
whose ego-driven ambitions exceeded his reason. The Campeau Corporation
completed a successful hostile takeover of Federated Department Stores in
1988 after engaging in a historic bidding war with Macy's. When the bidding
ended, Campeau paid $8.17 billion for the stock of a company with a pre-
acquisition market value of $2.93 billion. Campeau financed 97% of the
purchase price with debt. Less than two years later, Federated filed for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy and Campeau lost his job.2 16
That successful businesspeople so easily succumb to the temptation to
overbid, often jeopardizing millions of dollars, illustrates the strength of this
particular dynamic. What makes this such an irresistible drive? Bazerman
and Neale offer three critical causes for nonrational escalation. First, there is
biased perception and judgment--once one has committed to a basic
strategy, he or she is likely to look primarily for data that is consistent with
the initial decision.217 Second, impression management-most people worry
about the impression they make on others. Those who switch from a course
of action that they have undertaken often lose face 218 with and support from
the public and their constituencies. Rather than lose face or be perceived as a
good will and charity, he either uses the money to provide food and beverage to the class
or to support various charities. See BAZERMAN, supra note 16, at 71.
216 For a description of the bidding war, see Bazerman & Neale, supra note 212, at
163-64. This is a classic example of the winner's curse. See infra notes 248-52 and
accompanying text.
2 17 Id. at 166 (strongly advising negotiators to seek disconfirming data and
independent sources of information as ways of avoiding nonrational escalations).
218 Face-loss presents a non-trivial challenge to any decisionmaker. Countries have
gone to war and people have faced death rather than lose face. See, e.g., BERT R. BROWN,
Face-Saving and Face Restoration in Negotiation, in NEGOTIATIONS: SOCIAL-
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 275-99 (Daniel Druckman ed., 1977) (noting that, "[i]n
some instances, protecting against loss of face becomes so central an issue that it
'swamps' the importance of the tangible issues at stake and generates intense conflicts
that can impede progress toward agreement and increase substantially the costs of
conflict resolution"). Fisher and Ury write:
In the English language, "face-saving" carries a derogatory flavor. People say, "We
are doing that just to let them save face," implying that a little pretense has been
created to allow someone to go along without feeling badly. The tone implies
ridicule.
This is a grave misunderstanding of the role and importance of face-saving.
Face-saving reflects a person's need to reconcile the stand he takes in a negotiation
or an agreement with his principles and with his past words and deeds.
FISHER & URY, supra note 1, at 28.
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vacillating, indecisive manager, many leaders will refuse to admit to
themselves or others that they have made a mistake. Instead, they will
redouble their efforts in pursuing the original plan.219 The final cause is
competitive irrationality-the authors describe this situation as one in which
two parties engage in behavior that is clearly irrational in terms of the
expected outcomes to both sides, yet where it is hard to identify specific
irrational actions by either party.220 That is, each party feels that what he or
she is doing is rational, failing to recognize that the rise of competition
means that both parties will lose if the battle escalates. For example, in the
previously described Dollar Auction, participants typically seize on the
opportunity to obtain a dollar at a profit if no one else bids. Once a
competitor enters the picture, however, competitive juices will drive the
bidding to a dollar, driving away any possibility of profit. One then faces
both the loss of face and no profit. To avoid losing face and to reduce the
financial loss, bidders quickly escalate the bidding beyond the-value of the
dollar. Needless to say, both parties feel the same pressures and the bidding
typically escalates quickly. When the bidding is only for a dollar, matters
usually get resolved with a minimum of fuss. Unfortunately, when business
mergers are at stake, the losses to negotiators can be in the hundreds of
millions of dollars.
E. Sunk Cost Bias
One of the simplest biases to see, and yet one of the most difficult to
avoid, arises with respect to "sunk costs." Sunk costs are those that, once
expended, cannot be retrieved. In the abstract, most people understand that
one cannot justify future investments on the basis of previous expenditures,
however large. To the contrary, future investments must be justified on the
basis of future returns, not past expenditures. 221 For example, other things
219 Bazerman and Neale offer several suggestions for retaining the flexibility to
reverse bad decisions. First, managers must convey throughout their organizations that
saving face must never come at the expense of good decisions. Second, organizations
should constantly strive, through the dispensing of rewards, to make employees' values
consistent with those of the organization. Bazerman & Neale, supra note 212, at 167.
220 Id.
221 Sometimes, of course, enormous sunk costs cannot be avoided, even though they
do not lead to profitable ventures. For example, firms in the pharmaceutical industry
regularly expend millions of dollars developing drugs that, for one reason or another, will
not be approved for sale by the Food and Drug Administration. Similarly, petroleum
companies regularly drill "dry holes" that contain no significant oil reserves. The key is
whether they have the capability of stopping a venture once it is evident that it will prove
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being equal, a rational actor faced with two competing projects-one that
requires $50 in future investment versus one that requires $100-that
promise to return $1,000 in profit should choose the $50 option irrespective
of the costs that he or she has already incurred. Yet, it is highly likely that
one who has already sunk $200 in the more expensive alternative, even if it
promises to cost more in the future, will persist in pursuing that scheme.222
Sunk costs lead people astray for many of the same reasons that people
escalate their commitments to previously selected courses of action. Their
perceptions become biased towards seeking confirmatory data in support of
their original plan and their fear of appearing foolish drives them to stay the
course. So strong and instinctual is the "sunk cost" bias that it will invariably
defeat the "rational" behavior predicted by classical economics theory.223
Sunk costs present concerns when they lead people to pursue courses of
action that diminish their profits. Lives as well as profits can be lost when
sunk costs dominate one's thinking.224 Undoubtedly, the most extreme
unprofitable. This can be an extraordinarily complex decision although the basic principle
of "sunk costs" is fairly simple.
222 For detailed discussions of the "sunk cost" bias, see, for example, Gary Belsky,
Get Smart: Behavioral Economics Applies the Dismal Science to People Questions, 1
GALLUP MGMT. J. 25, 26-27 (2001) (describing the "sunk cost fallacy" as "the common
habit of justifying past decisions with present ones" and reporting on studies that
illustrate the phenomenon) and Daphne Main & Carolyn L. Lousteau, Don't Get
Trapped, 81 STRATEGIC FIN. 56, 56, 58 (1999) (pointing out how sunk costs can "trap"
financial managers in projects). See generally Hal R. Arkes & Peter Ayton, The Sunk
Cost and Concorde Effects: Are Humans Less Rational Than Lower Animals?, 125
PSYCHOL. BULL. 591, 591 (1999) (describing the "sunk cost" effect as "a maladaptive
economic behavior that is manifested in a greater tendency to continue an endeavor once
[a substantial] investment ... has been made [in it]").
223 Jolls et al., cite a clever study that dramatically illustrates this effect:
The traditional assumption about sunk costs. . generates invalid predictions.
Here is one: A theater patron who ignores sunk costs would not take into account the
cost of a prepaid season pass in deciding whether "to rouse himself... to go out" on
the evening of a particular performance; the decision would be made purely on the
basis of the benefits and costs from that moment forward. However, in a study of
theater patrons... [those] who received discounts were found to attend significantly
fewer performances than those who did not receive discounts, despite the fact that
(due to random assignment) the benefit-cost ratio that should have mattered-
benefits and costs going forward-was the same on average in the two groups ....
[A]gain, the standard [economics] prediction proved invalid.
Jolls et al., supra note 7, at 1482-83 (citations omitted).
224 One of the most tragic illustrations of this is the case of Dr. Alfred
Steinschneider, a pediatrician whose medical career rested, in large part, on his theory
that Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS) can occur repeatedly within families. Dr.
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examples of sunk costs driving further, often foolish, actions are those
connected with war. Leaders invoke the casualties of the past to justify
otherwise unjustifiable future sacrifices. Adolf Hitler, for example,
embittered by Germany's catastrophic losses in World War I, would largely
justify his aggressive war efforts in World War II to avenging these losses.225
On a less dramatic scale, negotiators need always be on guard against
sunk cost reasoning when they find that an adversary has goals and interests
that fail to overlap with their own. In cases where an opponent insists on an
agreement that is actually worse for the negotiator than if no deal is struck,
negotiators need to always keep the "no deal" option in mind. This is
especially so where negotiators have invested substantial time and energy in
past bargaining. 226
F. "Fixed-Pie" Bias
A comment by a congressman during the Cold War about the SALT
treaty dramatically illustrates the "fixed-pie" bias. He stated, "I have had a
philosophy for some time in regard to SALT, and it goes like this: the
Russians will not accept a SALT treaty that is not in their best interest, and it
seems to me that if it is in their best interests, it can't be in our best
interest. ' 227 As numerous researchers have pointed out, assuming that one's
interests directly conflict with one's opponents is both common-and often
wrong.228 Arguing, for example, that any agreement that makes one country
Steinschneider reached this conclusion based on a case in which he was personally
involved where a family allegedly lost five children to SIDS. Dr. Steinschneider
stubbornly held to this theory despite the lack of additional confirming data-even
despite the eventual conviction of the mother for murdering the five children. See
generally RICHARD FIRsTmAN & JAMIE TALAN, THE DEATH OF INNOCENTS (1997).
225 See JOHN KEEGAN, THE FIRST WORLD WAR 3 (1998) (quoting Hitler in 1922 as
saying, "It cannot be that two million Germans should have fallen in vain .... No, we do
not pardon, we demand-vengeance!").
226 Thus, the necessity for having a "walkaway point," the point at which rejecting a
deal constitutes a superior alternative to taking the other side's best offer. See, e.g., Adler
& Silverstein, supra note 110, at 65 (describing a variety of approaches to walkaway
points).
227 The comment was made by Congressman Floyd Spence (R-SC). See BAZERMAN,
supra note 16, at 129 (quoting the Congressman).
228 See, e.g., BAZERMAN, supra note 16, at 128-29 (calling for "[c]reative
agreements" that "lie outside the false assumption that the pie is fixed"); THOMPSON,
supra note 1, at 9 (noting that most negotiators-about 80 0/--"view negotiation as a
situation in which parties' interests are completely opposed"); Carroll et al., supra note 5,
at 354 (noting that bargainers often begin negotiations with the assumption that "the 'pie'
740
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strong necessarily must weaken its adversary is simplistic thinking at best,
and misguided at worst. For example, trade agreements that bolster the
economies of two countries will strengthen both without diminishing the
interests of either.229 Even in the realm of military agreements, one can make
the case that pursuing one's interests to the complete disregard of an
adversary's interests rarely results in one's long term gain. Few better
examples exist than the bitter legacy of World War I resulting from the
onerous settlement imposed on Germany by the victorious Allies in 1918.
Far from promoting the Allies' interests, this agreement ultimately led to the
horrors of World War Hl.230 In fact, numerous studies demonstrate that, other
things being equal, powerful parties often find reaching agreement with
weaker parties to be extremely difficult, reflecting the hazard of overreaching
in pursuing one's interests. 231
is fixed" and therefore "adopt a win-lose orientation"); Gelfand & Christakopoulou,
supra note 207, at 249 (describing the fixed-pie error as "a judgment bias in which
negotiators fail to accurately understand their counterparts' interests"); Pinkley et al.,
supra note 7, at 101 (noting that negotiators often incorrectly assume that "the issues of
greatest importance to them are also the issues of greatest importance to the other party").
229 In fact, according to columnist Tom Friedman, countries that view each other as
antagonists should work to promote prosperity for each other. Once both countries
achieve a certain level of well-being, the chances of conflict diminish dramatically.
Friedman describes this theory as the "Golden Arches Theory of Conflict Prevention,"
which briefly stated is as follows: "No two countries that both have McDonald's
restaurants have fought a war against each other since each got its McDonald's."
THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIvE TREE 195 (1999). As described by
Friedman: "[My theory] stipulated that when a country reached the level of economic
development where it had a middle class big enough to support a McDonald's network, it
became a McDonald's country. And people in McDonald's countries didn't like to fight
wars anymore, they preferred to wait in line for burgers." Id. at 196. Although occasional
exceptions have cropped up, Friedman's theory remains highly predictive. Id. at 252-53.
230 See KEEGAN, supra note 225, at 423-24 (arguing that "[t]he Second World War
was the continuation of the First, and indeed it is inexplicable except in terms of the
rancors and instabilities left by the earlier conflict .... [H]umiliated by a compulsory
disarmament that reduced its army to a tiny gendarmerie, dissolved its battlefleet
altogether and abolished its air force, and blackmailed by the continuation of starvation
through blockade into signing a humiliating peace treaty, republican Germany came to
nurture grievances stronger by far than those that had distorted its international relations
and domestic politics before 1914.").
231 See, e.g., JEFFREY Z. RUBIN & BERT R. BROWN, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
BARGAINING AND NEGOTIATION 199 (1975) (basing observations on a review of 27
studies on power symmetry, the authors conclude that "equal power among bargainers
tends to result in more effective bargaining than unequal power"). The studies
demonstrate that too often the party with greater power tends to behave manipulatively
and exploitatively, resulting in extreme submission by the weaker party. Id. at 221.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
One of the great sources of error behind the "fixed-pie" bias is the belief
that the issues most important to oneself are also the most important to one's
opponents. Even when the issue is money, one can too quickly leap to the
conclusion that this is all that matters to one's adversary when other issues
may have equal, or at least substantial, importance. For example, a consumer
negotiating to purchase a car, while obviously concerned about paying too
much, will likely be as concerned about the quality of the automobile, the
reliability of the dealer's service department, and the overall honesty of the
seller. Similarly, the dealer, while clearly concerned about maximizing its
profit, may also worry about the consumer's willingness to provide repeat
business, likelihood of complaining about minor defects, or flexibility as a
service customer. All of these factors will tend to mitigate and attenuate the
issue of price, although price will obviously be important. Assuming that
price, however, will be the only matter at issue tends to undermine the
overall quality of the agreement reached for the sale of the car. This becomes
increasingly critical the more that agreements pertain to long-term
relationships.232
The "fixed-pie" bias is particularly difficult to address because it tends to
persist even after negotiators are presented with accurate information about
their counterparts' interests. 233
G. Framing Bias
Sales people have long known that how one characterizes a deal may
well determine its acceptability to the other side. The more favorably one
"frames" the terms for a customer the more likely he or she is to reach an
agreement. Framing a deal is to be distinguished from "sweetening" the
terms of a deal. The latter concerns providing better terms, e.g., lowering the
price of an item; the former addresses how one paints a picture of the deal
without necessarily improving its terms. For example, clothiers will
Making a weaker party feel demeaned undermines the climate for agreement because, as
Professor Stephen McJohn notes, when weaker parties feel demeaned, they "may become
unable to agree to a transaction that gives them what they actually want, simply because
such agreement would cause loss of status." See Stephen M. McJohn, Default Rules in
Contract Law as Response to Status Competition in Negotiation, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REv.
39, 47 (1997).
232 See Carroll et al., supra note 5, at 354 (arguing that, "[a]s negotiators become
more experienced and sophisticated, they learn over time to relax the "fixed pie"
assumption in order to reach integrative solutions").
233 See Gelfand & Christakopoulou, supra note 207, at 251.
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invariably try to sell a customer the costly item first and then move to the less
expensive item. As Professor Cialdini explains:
Common sense might suggest the reverse: If a man has just spent a lot
of money to purchase a suit, he may be reluctant to spend very much on the
purchase of a sweater. But the clothiers know better .... Sell the suit first,
because when it comes time to look at sweaters, even expensive ones, their
prices will not seem as high in comparison. A man might balk at the idea of
spending $95 for a sweater, but if he has just bought a $495 suit, a $95
sweater does not seem excessive.234
Framing becomes even more critical when the issue becomes one of
losses avoided versus gains made. As previously noted, people are moved
more to avoid losses than to acquire gains-roughly speaking, they are twice
as unhappy with losses as they are happy with equivalent gains.235
Accordingly, how one views a transaction may very well determine whether
he or she is willing to enter into a deal. One who purchased a house for
$120,000 and who has listed it for $200,000 may well receive an offer of
$190,000 favorably or not depending on whether one views it as a $70,000
gain or a $10,000 loss. This will likely depend on the reference point that one
has in mind for what a fair offer for the house should be. This, in turn, may
be influenced by how effectively either or both sides "anchor" their first
offers. That is, when one has staked out an initial position, that may influence
the point around which negotiations revolve even when there is little market
justification for the anchor.236
234 See CIALDINI, supra note 12, at 13.
235 See Sunstein, supra note 7, at 1179 (noting that "[p]eople are especially averse to
losses. They are more displeased with losses than they are pleased with equivalent
gains-roughly speaking, twice as displeased. Contrary to economic theory, people do
not treat out-of-pocket costs and opportunity costs as if they were equivalent.").
236 See supra notes 102-14 and accompanying text; see also BAZERMAN, supra note
16, at 132. Bazerman notes the significance of positive anchors:
What determines whether a negotiator will have a positive or negative frame?
The answer lies in the selection of a perceptual anchor. Consider the anchors
available to a union negotiator in negotiating a wage: (1) last year's wage, (2)
management's initial offer, (3) the union's estimate of management's reservation
point, (4) the union's reservation point, or (5) your bargaining position that has been
publicly announced to your constituency. As the anchor moves from 1 to 5, what is a
modest gain in comparison to last year's wage is a loss in comparison to the publicly
specified goals, and the union negotiator moves from the positive frame to a
negative frame. In order to avoid the adverse effects of framing, negotiators should
always be aware of their frames and examine alternative frames.
Id.
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Knowing how frames affect the attractiveness of offers to negotiators can
help in bargaining situations. When one seeks to move the other side to make
concessions, one needs to point to the positive aspects of the deal that will
result and to avoid extensive discussion about how small the concession is to
reach agreement. What is small to one side will likely loom as a much larger
loss to the other. So, for example, rather than argue, "Look, Joe, I'm only
asking you to lower the price by $10,000 to $40,000," one might do better by
defining an effective anchor point and then pointing to the benefits that the
other side will realize from there: "Joe, I was only prepared to pay $30,000,
but you've convinced me to up my offer to $40,000 because you're a tough
bargainer and because your product is so good. '237
Sales present a particular challenge because sellers typically frame the
transaction as one in which they stand to gain from the transaction whereas
buyers often view sales as a situation in which they will give up, i.e., lose
something.238 Asking someone to absorb a psychological loss compared to
making a gain means, other things being equal, that buyers should be more
hesitant to enter into deals than sellers. This, in turn, should mean that sellers
will have to provide a premium in order to draw buyers into sales. In fact,
recent studies confirm that buyers tend to do better in negotiated deals than
sellers.239
H. Hindsight Bias
Of the many biases that people face in their daily lives, the one they most
immediately know and recognize is hindsight bias. Hindsight bias occurs
when people make or would have made a particular prediction about an
event. If, in the meantime, they discover the correct judgment, their memory
of their own judgment changes to accord with the new information. Revising
one's past estimate typically occurs unconsciously. One does not necessarily
alter the past knowingly; rather, one revises his or her recollection toward the
237 See id. Bazerman, in particular, suggests this as a strategy; "The framing effect
suggests that in order to induce concessionary behavior in an opponent, a negotiator
should always create anchors that lead the opposition to a positive frame and negotiate in
terms of what the other side has to gain." Id.
238 See Neale et al., supra note 185, at 231 (noting that this seems "especially likely
if a product or service of indeterminate value is being exchanged for something of quite
determinate value-for instance, money").
239 Id.; see also BAZERMAN, supra note 16, at 132 (noting that a "curious, consistent,
and robust finding is that buyers tend to outperform sellers in symmetric negotiation
experiments").
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new reference point because it looms so strongly in one's mind.240 Although
the hindsight tendency arises in part simply because people like to think of
themselves as perceptive and prescient thinkers, basic cognitive processes
probably explain why it is so powerful and ubiquitous.24' That is, because the
actual outcome appears so likely from hindsight, one assumes that one saw it
all along.
Unfortunately, real-life decisionmakers and negotiators must take action
ex ante, based on available information and without the benefit of hindsight.
This presents serious problems when they are judged by their colleagues,
managers, or the courts, each of whom assesses their actions ex post without
necessarily being able to put themselves in the decisionmakers' shoes. This
then gives rise to unduly critical assessments of the difficult decisions that
people must make. 242 For example, physicians asked to assess the
probabilities of alternative diagnoses, given a set of symptoms, offer
significantly different estimates depending on what they are told the ultimate
diagnosis turned out to be.243 Similarly, studies suggest that juries apply
240 See generally Ed Bukszar & Terry Connolly, Hindsight Bias and Strategic
Choice: Some Problems in Learning from Experience, 31 ACAD. MGMT. J. 628 (1988);
Dagmar Stahlberg et al., We Knew It All Along: Hindsight Bias in Groups, 63 ORG.
BEHAV. & HuM. DECISION PROCESSES 46 (1995).
241 As Professor Peters explains it
Cognitive processes are believed to be the most powerful sources of hindsight
bias. Individuals who are given outcome information are believed to assimilate it
with the limited information that they already know to build a coherent story. When
they are given information about a bad outcome, they "rewrite the story" so that the
beginning and middle provide a causal explanation for what they now know to be
the end. Thus, they build a story from back to front. Thereafter, they view the actual
outcome as natural and find it difficult to see how alternative outcomes could have
occurred.
Peters, supra note 167, at 1286.
242 Id. at 1287 (noting that hindsight bias "makes the outcome seem more
predictable than it actually was and can produce unfair judgments about the culpability of
the conduct that gave rise to the outcome"); see also BAZERMAN, supra note 16, at 38
("Claiming that what has happened was predictable based on foresight knowledge puts us
in the position of using hindsight to criticize another's foresight judgment. However, the
hindsight bias reduces our ability to learn from the past and to evaluate objectively the
decisions of ourselves and others.").
243 See Hal R. Arkes et al., Eliminating the Hindsight Bias, 73 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL.
305, 306 tbl. 1 (1988).
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hindsight bias in negligence cases, likely leading to more findings of
negligence than may, in fact, actually occur. 244
Identifying our proclivity towards hindsight bias is one thing. Doing
something about it is quite another. Various researchers have despaired over
its seeming intractability, 245 due no doubt to its evolutionary hard-wiring. 246
However, some strategies for offsetting, or "debiasing," have been tried, with
various degrees of success. While merely alerting people to the existence of
the hindsight bias does not seem to produce a positive effect,247 asking test
subjects to contemplate alternative outcomes and assign probabilities to the
different outcomes seems to reduce the bias.248 Similarly, forcing people to
244 See, e.g., Jolls et al., supra note 7, at 1523 and citations therein (noting that
"[h]indsight bias will lead juries making negligence determinations to find defendants
liable more frequently than if cost-benefit analyses were done correctly-that is, on an ex
ante basis. Thus, plaintiffs will win cases they deserve to lose."). Professor Lempert,
however, although conceding the possibility of a hindsight bias, also argues that:
[H]indsight can be helpful. Indeed, when it comes to risk management, it is a
mistake to talk about a hindsight bias since ex post risk estimates are likely to be
more accurate than ex ante estimates. For example, estimates of the risk of
launching the Challenger space shuttle in cold weather were probably far more
accurate after it exploded than they were before the tragic event. Once an event
thought to be extremely rare happens, unless one has very good data to the contrary,
one should revise upwards estimates of the likelihood the event would happen.
Certainly, from a risk management standpoint the costs of failing to take precautions
against the event should be similarly raised.
Richard Lempert, Juries, Hindsight, and Punitive Damage Awards: Failures of a Social
Science Case for Change, 48 DEPAuL L. REv. 867, 874 (1999) (emphasis added).
245 See, e.g., BAZERMAN, supra note 16, at 168 (citing research on the hindsight bias
showing that "even when biases are explicitly described to participants and they are
asked to avoid the bias, the bias remains"); Reid Hastie & W. Kip Viscusi, What Juries
Can't Do Well: The Jury's Performance as a Risk Manager, 40 ARIZ. L. REv. 901, 916
(1998) (concluding that "[n]o general remedies are known for hindsight effects"); Kim A.
Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Ex Post 5 Ex Ante: Determining Liability in Hindsight, 19
LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 89, 99-102 (1995) (finding that a judge's caution to jurors about
hindsight dangers had no apparent effect).
246 See Hastie & Viscusi, supra note 245, at 914-15 (arguing that putting aside
hindsight biases is difficult because "it is likely that our capacities to make judgments
under uncertainty were designed by evolutionary selection to operate in a forward-
looking, predictive fashion").
247 Kamin & Rachlinski, supra note 245, at 89.
248 Peters, supra note 167, at 1287-88.
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contemplate alternative outcomes and to explain how they could have come
about also seems to work.249
I. "Winner's Curse"
Observers of auctions in which numerous parties are involved point out
an interesting phenomenon. Virtually everyone who submits a winning bid
ends up paying too much.250 One of the simplest illustrations of this
phenomenon is when researchers fill a jar with $8 worth of coins and then
solicit sealed bids from classes of students. Invariably, the winning bid
exceeds the value of the coins although the class, when asked separately to
estimate the value of the coins, underestimates their value.25' Unfortunately,
this phenomenon is not limited to classroom auctions. It also applies to
virtually anything that is placed in an auction. For example, when the federal
government auctioned off broadcast spectrum rights to the public, the
government received almost $23 billion in revenue, with virtually all
observers noting that most of the bidders overpaid. Yet, this occurred in
auction after auction.252
Why does the winner's curse occur so often and easily? Simply put, one
who knows that others are bidding for an item realizes that in order to win he
or she must bid aggressively. Where there are a large number of bidders,
someone almost always overestimates the true value of the item and
overbids.253 Those who bid rationally usually end up with losing bids.
Combating the winner's curse presents serious challenges. The soundest way
249 Id. at 1289 ("To summarize, most of the studies indicate that forcing subjects to
think concretely about all possible outcomes reduces the hindsight bias markedly. This
activity primes cognitive processes that would otherwise not be stimulated and, thus,
'new causal skids are greased."').
250 See, e.g., Peter Coy, Going, Going, Gone ... Sucker!, Bus. WK., Mar, 20, 2000,
at 124, 124-125 (describing how the winner's curse afflicts "newbies" on online
electronic auctions). See generally Peter Foreman & J. Keith Mumighan, Learning to
Avoid the Winner's Curse, 67 ORG. BEHAV. & HuM. DECISION PROCESSES 170 (1996)
(noting that the winner's curse is pervasive and highly resistant to learning); Richard
Thaler, The Winner's Curse, 29 ACROSS THE BOARD 30 (1992).
251 See Thaler, supra note 250, at 31 (demonstrating that, in one series of
experiments, the winning bids averaged $10.01, whereas the class estimate of the coins'
value averaged $5.13).
252 See Stephen Maloney, Winners' Curse: Why Spectrum Bidders Overpaid, 135
PUB. UTILITIES FORTNIGHTLY, Oct. 15, 1997, at 31, 31-32.
253 See Thaler, supra note 250, at 31 (noting that the "winner of the auction is likely
to be a loser").
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to do so is to gather as much information about what is up for bid and to stick
with one's estimate, especially when the bidding exceeds one's beginning
estimate.254
VI. THE POSSIBILITIES FOR REMEDIATION
If, as the author and others believe, heuristics and the other negotiation
biases are firmly lodged within the human psyche, 255 one must ask whether
there. are steps that can be taken to avoid their pitfalls while preserving their
benefits. There is no simple answer to this question, because the various
heuristics and biases present different challenges. Certainly, some seem more
susceptible to identification and correction than others.256 But, overall, a few
caveats are in order.
First, although there seems little doubt that negotiation and decision
biases exist, advancing remedies for dealing with them requires a reasonably
clear understanding of how they arise and the settings within which they
flourish. Unfortunately, most research into cognitive biases has been done on
captive or paid student volunteers in artificial settings somewhat unrelated to
the real world,257 capturing perhaps the existence of the biases but missing
254 See BAZERMAN, supra note 16, at 139 (advising that, to protect oneself, one
needs "to develop or borrow professional expertise to balance the inequity of information
[between the seller and the bidding buyer]"); Coy, supra note 250, at 124 (advising that
the "soundest way to dodge winner's curse is to gather more information about the true
value of what's being sold").
255 A particularly disturbing example can be found in the tragic death of a highly-
renowned negotiation scholar, Jeffrey Z. Rubin. Despite his scholarly insights into how
people will escalate their commitment to a previously-decided course of action even to
unreasonable extremes, Dr. Rubin perished in a climbing accident because he insisted on
continuing even though his partner turned back in the face of extreme weather. See
BAZERMAN, supra note 16, at 70; see also Birke and Fox, supra note 7, at 19 (observing
that "egocentric biases may be very difficult to eliminate"); Carroll et al., supra note 5, at
353 (indicating that "substantial evidence exists to demonstrate that... judgmental
deficiencies affect expert negotiators as well as naive subjects"); Thompson & Kim,
supra note 7, at 3 (noting how, even when negotiators have a specific bias, such as the
fixed-pie perception, they still fall prey to it).
256 See infra notes 276-337 and accompanying text.
257 See, e.g., BAZERMAN, supra note 16, at 165 (noting that many of the biases
examined in his book "have been tested on student samples, with participants who were
not being rewarded for accurate performance and who were making decisions in task
domains with which they were unfamiliar"); Richard E. Redding, How Common-Sense
Psychology Can Inform Law and Psycholegal Research, 5 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE
107, 125 (1998) (noting that "it is still the case that much psycholegal research uses
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their full contours and critical subtleties.258 It may, for example, be useful to
know that individuals in an experimental setting exhibit overconfidence and
excessive optimism when predicting the results of a negotiation.259 Whether
this trait arises to the same extent in real-life negotiations where actual
money, power, prestige, and status are involved is generally unknown.
260
Intuitively, one might conclude that insecurity and lack of confidence seem
as likely as overconfidence. 261
Second, even if one overlooks the limits of the quality of research into
decision biases, one finds few useful studies into methods for remedying
artificial laboratory tasks and situations, with volunteers or a convenient sample of
college students who may not have the same characteristics as the general population").
258 Mitchell voices particular concern about the failure of researchers to note the
extreme variability in laboratory research results depending on a host of often ignored
factors:
Even inside the relatively controlled environment of the laboratory, we see
considerable variation in cognitive performance among individuals depending on
their cognitive abilities, educational background, and affective state. As
experimental conditions change to incorporate greater social context, such as
accountability constraints and financial incentives, we see further variation in
performance. These qualifying statements may not be very popular as legal decision
theory tries to flex its explanatory and predictive muscles and increase its sphere of
influence, but failing to take these empirical boundary conditions into account leaves
legal decision theory in no better an empirical position than the economic models of
rational legal behavior that the legal decision theorists criticize.
Mitchell, supra note 6, at 137-38; see also Redding, supra note 257, at 125 (observing
that, "[c]ompared to problems constructed in the laboratory, real-world problems exist in
a far larger and more complex context involving complicated interactions between
variables, contexts, and tasks that are difficult to isolate, quantify, and control");
Koehler, supra note 89, at 2 (challenging a widely held view about biased
decisionmaking and arguing that researchers' understanding of the phenomenon is
"unlikely to increase substantially from examining the results of additional laboratory
experiments that search for performance errors .... Instead, a more ecologically valid
program of research must be pursued. Such a program would examine base rate usage in
a variety of real world domains .... ).
259 See, e.g., Bazerman et al., supra note 7, at 1288-89 (noting that "[i]ndividuals
tend to believe that they are correct-and overestimate the correct probability of their
accuracy," and citing numerous studies about how negotiators tend to enter into
negotiations in an overconfident state).
260 See, e.g., Leigh Thompson & Reid Hastie, Social Perception in Negotiation, 47
ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 98, 100 (1990) (noting that the general
conclusion of laboratory studies is "that negotiators make systematic judgment errors
which lead to inefficient bargaining behavior and outcomes. However, the existence of
these judgment errors is largely speculative; they have not been directly measured.").
261 See supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text.
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these biases.262 One commentator theorizes that this is because psychologists
have been so focused on refuting the "rational choice" theories of economics
that they have spent little time developing and refining their decision bias
theories.263 Although the lack of empirical studies leads one to offer tips for
avoiding negotiation bias cautiously, I believe that the substantial literature
on effective negotiation, much of it empirically based, provides a foundation
for providing useful advice. 264 For example, the almost-universal focus of
negotiation scholars on the need for (and methods of) careful preparation
undoubtedly offers an extremely relevant and rich source of advice for
avoiding decision biases. 265
Third, ostensibly irrational responses may not always reflect poor
thinking. To the contrary, they may show analytical subtleties that, while not
purely rational, may be quite sound. For example, research shows that people
who are told that, of 400 patients who undergo a certain operation, 350 are
alive after five years, will be much more willing to undergo the operation
than people who are told that of 400 patients who undergo the operation, 50
are dead after five years.266 Professor Cass Sunstein challenges the automatic
assumption that the different reactions demonstrate inherent irrationality.
According to him, "this effect may reflect not confusion about expected
value, but instead the social meaning of the statement; when a person says
that a certain number will die, he may be signaling something about the
nature of the option, and the signal may be different from the
262 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
263 See Rachlinski, supra note 20, at 1175 (suggesting that "[t]he field has done
more to identify and support the prevalence of deviations from rational choice theory
(and on 'converting' economists) than to develop and test its own models. This focus has
impaired the field to some extent, leading to the impression that it is a collection of errors
that seem to sprout up, as one recent paper put it, like 'weeds in a vacant lot."').
264 Social psychologists and other empirically-based researchers have studied
negotiation issues for many decades and have offered numerous suggestions for effective
bargaining. Among the names that come to mind from the field: Max Bazerman, Daniel
Kahneman, Aaron Tversky, Leigh Thompson, and Margaret Neale. Their research has
formed the basis for texts that provide excellent negotiation advice. One of the best
examples of this is the book by Professor Richard Shell, BARGAINING FOR ADVANTAGE:
NEGOTIATION STRATEGIES FOR REASONABLE PEOPLE, supra note 1. Professor Shell offers
clear, useful advice derived from an exhaustive review of the empirical literature. To
underscore the point, he devotes 24 pages in his book to a list of the studies upon which
he relied.
265 See infra notes 290-308 and accompanying text. If biases arise from the lack of
careful thought, effective planning methods logically offer effective counterpoints.
266 See Donald A. Redelmeier et al., Understanding Patients' Decisions: Cognitive
and Emotional Perspectives, 270 JAMA 72, 73 (1993).
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(mathematically equivalent) statement that a certain number will live." 267 In
other words, good decisions may not always be logical. In fact, applying pure
logic may lead to less useful decisions than those that include emotional
elements as well.268
Fourth, biases in real-life do not operate in isolation. Some biases seem
to offset each other, leading to the conclusion that simple fixes may increase,
rather than decrease, errors. For example, Professor Philip Peters notes that
biases favoring defendants in courtroom trials may well balance (or even
cancel) the biases that favor plaintiffs.269 Similarly, Professor Rachlinski
suggests that political players who use cognitive biases to promote their
political agendas are quite likely to face opponents who do the same thing in
the opposite direction.270 Whether there is a proportional offset is not clear,
267 See Sunstein, supra note 7, at .1179 n. 16.
268 Professor George Williams cites research showing that:
[T]he human reasoning process may lead to conclusions that are useful and
intuitively correct, even though they must be considered erroneous in formal logic.
This will be reliably true when the logically correct solution is less likely to be
useful. For instance, it does not follow logically that playing Russian roulette will
harm you. So the avoidance of such a game is not logically justified. Needless to
say, it is advisable in a practical sense. People are much better at solving problems
with the emotional content provided by certain kinds of human interactions. A
problem of guarding against unfair exploitation in social interactions, such as an
officemate's pretending to be sick to avoid some unpleasant duty, may be more
easily and rapidly solved than what is formally the same problem without the
emotional baggage of unfairness.
WILLIAMS, supra note 24, at 162-63. Williams argues that "[r]easoning, to be favored by
selection, must lead to useful conclusions that help us survive and reproduce. It need not
lead to formally correct solutions to logical problems." Id. at 162.
269 See Peters, supra note 167, at 1278 (arguing for caution in deriving policy
judgments for the judicial system from the existence of biases by pointing out that
"attributes that favor defendants include juror distrust of plaintiffs' motives, the obstacles
that victims face in bringing their claims to court, and the presence of cognitive biases
that favor defendants, such as anchoring and defensive attribution. These advantages may
already offset any benefit conferred upon plaintiffs by hindsight bias."). Similarly, studies
suggest that certain biases may carry "mirror" images of themselves, producing pressures
in directly opposing directions on decisionmakers. See, e.g., Rachlinski, supra note 32, at
746 (citing studies indicating "that people understate the dangers posed by hazards that
have a low probability of occurring, while other studies indicate that people overstate the
dangers posed by such hazards").
270 See Rachlinski, supra note 20, at 1205. Rachlinski notes that, in some instances,
[plolitical actors take advantage of the availability heuristic to create public pressure
in support of their preferred policy goals. These "availability entrepreneurs" work to
keep sensational stories designed to influence public perception and opinion in the
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but the fact that conflicting biases play a role in decisionmaking means that
eliminating one decision error while leaving its countervailing bias
untouched will make things worse, not better. How often this "balance of
bias" phenomenon occurs is unclear, but it presents a concern. 271
Fifth, simplistic attempts to mandate dramatic policy shifts to counter
perceived decision biases appear unlikely to succeed, and may produce
unforeseen adverse consequences. To illustrate; one hotly debated area in the
law revolves around punitive damage awards in tort cases. Professors Reid
Hastie and W. Kip Viscusi invoke decisionmaking bias research to justify
new rules. They argue for a system in which judges rather than juries decide
punitive damages because "[juries] overreact to risks associated with new
technologies; to risks that represent increases from accustomed, status quo
risk levels.. . outside of their personal control; and to risks associated with
highly publicized events." 272 However, they have been strongly challenged
by Professor Richard Lempert, who notes that "novel" risks may well
necessitate "special care" on the part of producers, justifying the wisdom of
juries--"[a] jury which shares values firmly embedded in the political system
is not, on this account, an irrational actor." 273
news media. If this argument is correct, then cognitive biases cancel each other out
in the marketplace of ideas because groups can find vivid, sensational stories that
will have an exaggerated effect on the political process.
Id.
271 Id. at 1211 (expressing doubt about whether an optimism bias presents a net
social liability). Professor Rachlinski observes that
[t]he social costs of... three out of four [business] failures are surely high and
commensurate with the costs of foolish bank loans and speculative dot-com startups,
but it is hard to know whether these costs are outweighed by the benefits of a
determined optimism that pervades most business ventures. Because of this
uncertain balance, scholars who have considered the problem come to no resolution.
Id.
272 See Hastie & Viscusi, supra note 245, at 912.
273 See Lempert, supra note 244, at 890. According to Lempert:
The authors also suggest ... that people overreact to risks associated with new
technologies, to risks that increases [sic] status quo risk levels, and to risks
associated with highly publicized events. With respect to the first two, it seems
difficult to know whether people overreact because when we have little experience
with a risk, it is hard to know what the appropriate reaction is. A jury which expects
special care when risks are novel is not acting improperly, for a similar perspective
operates in various regulatory arenas, as in, for example the special requirements,
arguably not justified on efficiency grounds, that new drugs must meet before they
are marketed. A jury which shares values firmly embedded in the political system is
not, on this account, an irrational actor ....
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What makes this debate relevant to the current inquiry is Hastie and
Viscusi's conflation of a heated policy dispute with the scientific correction
of human reasoning errors. The former involves choosing values, assessing
evidence, and making painful tradeoffs. The latter, although not entirely
excluding these decision elements, focuses more on the neutral application of
tried-and-tested scientific techniques. As Lempert correctly points out,
however, excluding juries from assessing punitive damages cannot be
resolved simply by noting that juries might use hindsight reasoning. 274 In
fact, recent studies seem to contradict Hastie and Viscusi's assumption that
judges would reach different results from juries, leading one to conclude that
prudence dictates cautious reform, even when real cognitive problems have
been identified.275
Finally, and a point especially important for negotiators, one should
consider that purely "rational" approaches to decisionmaking can lead to
severe blunders equal to, if not occasionally greater than, errors associated
with less rational approaches. For example, in 1994, Intel Corp. undertook a
classic engineering response when confronted with evidence that its new
Pentium computer chip contained a circuit flaw that produced errors in
certain mathematical calculations. After careful analysis, Intel's managers
concluded that the odds of error were so small for consumers other than
scientists and mathematicians that they could not justify replacing them for
most computers. In a purely empirical, technical sense, this conclusion was
probably a correct one. Unfortunately, the company did not reckon with the
consumer reaction to this "rational" decision. In fact, Intel immediately met
heated objections from its customers protesting the unfairness of the
company's decision despite, a lack of documentation that the flawed chip had
harmed them. Facing a firestorm of protest, the company quickly reversed its
Whether juries overestimate the ex ante risks associated with highly publicized
events is hard to say. It is, despite the authors' suggestion, not at all clear that juries
in the asbestos cases have overestimated the risks that the companies mining and
using asbestos would have perceived had they tried responsibly to gather
information on the safety of their product.
Id. at 890-91.
274 Id.
275 See William Glaberson, A Study's Verdict: Jury Awards Are Not Out of Control,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2001, at A9 (noting that, despite criticism of juries in awarding
punitive damages, "a comprehensive study of nearly 9,000 trials across the country has
found that judges award punitive damages about as often as juries and generally in about
the same proportions"); see also Mitchell, supra note 6, at 91 (arguing that "broad
condemnations of [juries'] inductive, or statistical, reasoning performance are
misleading" in view of empirical studies demonstrating that people are better reasoners
than critics allege).
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decision and issued a formal apology.276 In this case, as in numerous
negotiation settings, a course of action founded exclusively on rational
analysis without attention to feelings of fairness can result in disaster.
Notwithstanding these caveats, I believe it is possible to improve one's
negotiating skills and to lessen the negative impact of the inevitable biases
that plague us when we bargain with other people. In this case, "lessen" is
the critical word, because our very humanity guarantees that we can never
completely overcome all biases in decisionmaking and bargaining.
A. Focus on Critical Thinking Skills
Knowing that people often stray from rational models in decisionmaking
and negotiating underscores the importance of understanding rational models
of thought and analysis. To that end, philosophers and scientists have spent
millennia developing critical thinking techniques that reduce analytic errors
and emotional departures from rationality.277 Although none of the
techniques is foolproof, they provide extremely useful approaches for
avoiding-or halting-error in analysis. Among the key principles in critical
thinking are the ability to define key issues, to recognize fundamental
assumptions, to analyze evidence, to draw appropriate inferences, and to
understand logical consequences. 278
276 See, e.g., Elizabeth Corcoran, Intel to Replace Chips; Firm Reverses Itself on
Pentium Policy, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 1994, at Al.
2 77 See generally ARTHUR K. BIERMAN & ROBIN N. ASSALI, THE CRITICAL THINKING
HANDBOOK (1996); STEPHEN D. BROOKFIELD, DEVELOPING CRITICAL THINKERS:
CHALLENGING ADULTS TO EXPLORE ALTERNATIVE WAYS OF THINKING AND ACTING
(1987); M. NEIL BROWNE & STUART M. KEELEY, ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTIONS: A
GUIDE TO CRITICAL THINKING (1990); EDWARD DE BONO, SIX THINKING HATS (1985);
THOMAS GILOVICH, How WE KNOW WHAT ISN'T So: THE FALLIBILITY OF HUMAN
REASON IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1993).
278 See, e.g., Paul Brest & Linda Krieger, On Teaching Professional Judgment, 69
WASH. L. REv. 527, 539 (1994) (offering a decisionmaking model with the following
components: (1) defining the problem, (2) identifying the underlying objectives and
assigning priorities, (3) generating alternative solutions, (4) assessing the alternatives in
terms of the underlying objectives, (5) selecting the optimal course of action, and (6)
implementing and monitoring the decision); Kevin Celuch & Mark Slama, Teaching
Critical Thinking Skills for the 21st Century: An Advertising Principles Case, 74 J. ED.
FOR BUS. 134, 135 (1999) (noting that "the practice of critical thinking is associated with
the following elements of reasoning: purpose of the thinking, key issues or question being
considered, assumptions, point of view, evidence, concepts and ideas, inferences or
interpretations, and implications or consequences"); Jeff Gold et al., The Role of
Argument Analysis and Story Telling in Facilitating Critical Thinking, 33 MGMT.
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Critical thinking principles are closely tied to analyzing evidence through
the scientific method. One of the most clever applications of the scientific
method is from the late Carl Sagan, a renowned astronomer who developed a
"baloney detection kit"279 designed to reduce illogical thinking. 280 Among
the tools in this kit:
• Wherever possible there must be independent confirmation of the
"facts."
• Encourage substantive debate on the evidence by knowledgeable
proponents of all points of view.
• Arguments from authority carry little weight-"authorities" have
made mistakes in the past. They will do so again in the future.
* Spin more than one hypothesis. If there's something to be
explained, think of all the different ways in which it could be
explained....
* Try not to get overly attached to a hypothesis just because it's
yours....
" Quantify. If whatever it is you're explaining has some measure,
some numerical quantity attached to it, you'll be much better able
to discriminate among competing hypotheses....
" If there's a chain of argument, every link in the chain must work
(including the premise)-not just most of them.
" Occam's Razor. This convenient rule-of-thumb urges us when
faced with two hypotheses that explain the data equally well to
choose the simpler.
LEARNING 371, 373 (2002). Gold et al. argue that the most significant elements of critical
thinking are:
1. The critique of rhetoric-being able to evaluate the validity or credibility of
arguments and/or a general skepticism towards statements and knowledge. For many
the ability to evaluate arguments is one of the most important elements of critical
thinking, as it is considered to underlie all other forms of critique ....
2. The critique of tradition-being skeptical of conventional wisdom, "common
sense," long standing practices and traditional ways of doing things.
3. The critique of authority-being skeptical of one dominant view and being
open to a plurality of views.
4. The critique of knowledge-recognizing that knowledge is never value free
and its subjective and contextualized nature.
Gold et al., supra, at 373 (citations omitted).
279 See SAGAN, supra note 117, at 210.
280 Id.
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* Always ask whether the hypothesis can be, at least in principle,
falsified. Propositions that are untestable, unfalsifiable are not
worth much. 28 1
Sagan and other scientists' advice arises from their commitment to the
scientific method, perhaps the most significant tool developed by mankind
for advancing verifiable knowledge. 282 Briefly stated, the scientific method
requires (1) the observation and description of a phenomenon, (2) a
hypothesis that explains the phenomenon, (3) a prediction of future events
based on the hypothesis, and (4) the performance of a test to determine the
validity of the prediction.283 Because the scientific method can never
indisputably prove anything, one who relies on it always maintains the
knowledge derived from the method in a tentative fashion, ever willing to
modify one's views based on newly developed information. Although this
can be a source of frustration to those who seek life's ultimate verities,
negotiators who follow the scientific method are much less likely to fall prey
to decision biases and logic traps. 284
B. "Know Thyself': The Need for Self-Awareness
Negotiating effectively without falling into psychological traps or
stumbling across various decision biases requires, at a minimum, knowing
oneself well. Successful negotiation requires effective goal-setting, emotional
control, persistence, prudent risk-taking, and a variety of other measures that
support rational decisionmaking. Those who lack insight into themselves-
their thinking processes and emotional states-stand at a distinct
disadvantage when it comes to appropriate analysis. Self-awareness provides
281 Id. at 210-11. The last point is crucial. No one can disprove the hypothesis that
invisible, undetectable Martians live among us, but Sagan's thesis directs us not to take
such hypotheses seriously.
282 For an expanded exposition of the scientific method, see generally RENE
DESCARTES, DISCOURSE ON THE METHOD AND MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY 1637
(1996); RICHARD P. FEYNMAN, THE MEANING OF IT ALL: THOUGHTS OF A CITIZEN-
SCIENTIST (1998); RICHARD P. FEYNMAN, THE PLEASURE OF FINDING THINGS OUT (1999);
and NIGEL SANITT, SCIENCE AS A QUESTIONING PROCESS (1996).
283 See supra note 282.
284 See Phil Mole, Fallacies and Frustrations: Why Skeptics Dread Conversations
with True Believers, 28 SKEPTICAL INQUIRER, Jan.-Feb. 2004, at 30 (decrying the general
lack of critical thinking skills necessary to craft good arguments).
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an indispensable guide for exercising self-control and for analyzing situations
rationally. 285
One useful definition of self-awareness is the ability to monitor one's
own thoughts and emotions, with the resultant likelihood of being able to
understand and control them.286 Self-awareness and self-control are
commonly associated with "emotional intelligence," a characteristic
increasingly considered as important for success in life as pure IQ.287
Negotiators who lack self-awareness seem most at risk for falling into
perceptual biases and decision traps. Those who cannot sense when they
have abandoned rational approaches seem likely prey to irrational
approaches. Developing greater self-awareness requires introspection
coupled with dispassionate analysis-the ability to assess oneself impartially
and neutrally. Although few individuals can look at themselves in a
completely objective manner, it is possible to improve one's ability to do so.
One of the most effective strategies is to pause to assess one's immediate
reaction-one's feelings and thoughts-to proposals or arguments that one's
opponent in a negotiation has advanced. One should then try to see the point
from the other side's perspective. Doing so removes one from the immediacy
of any heuristics that might cloud one's judgment. The point is that heuristics
operate in a rapid, shorthand fashion to assist quick decisions. In today's
world, however, many decisions do not require immediate responses, so a
pause may well permit greater self-exploration and more well-informed
decisions.
285 See, e.g., LEWICKI ET AL., supra note 2, at 21 (stating that "your personal
qualities and attitudes will be called into play during negotiations, so it is important to
assess these traits ahead of time"); NIERENBERG, supra note 1, at 46 (arguing "that
[effective negotiation preparation] requires, first of all, intimate knowledge of your self');
PIENAAR & SPOELSTRA, supra note 113, at 161 (noting that "Sun Tzu... stated the
following many years before the birth of Christ: 'Know your enemy, know yourself, and
you can fight a hundred battles without disaster.... .' In negotiation, these prophetic
statements should be taken to heart. Negotiators should evaluate their own strengths and
weaknesses."); THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 4 (stating that "effective negotiators are self-
aware"); Celuch & Salam, supra note 278, at 135 (stating that "a key feature of the
process of learning to be a competent thinker is the ability to self-assess and continually
improve one's thinking").
286 See DANIEL GOLEMAN, EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE 47 (1995) ("Self-awareness is
not an attention that gets carried away by emotions, overreacting and amplifying what is
perceived. Rather, it is a neutral mode that maintains self-reflectiveness even amidst
turbulent emotions .... This awareness of emotions is the fundamental emotional
competence on which others, such as emotional self-control build.").
287 Id. at 45.
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C. Prepare Carefully
Although decision biases and illogical thinking can sometimes
undermine even carefully developed negotiation plans, one finds it difficult
to imagine succeeding in overcoming these traps without careful preparation.
This is borne by the unanimous advice of experts in the field, both academic
and practitioner. All strongly advocate careful planning and preparation in
negotiation. 288 Preparation necessarily means more than just learning the
facts about the issues likely to arise in the negotiation discussions, although
that is critically important. It also includes understanding and anticipating the
arguments that one's opponent will advance in support of his or her cause.2
89
The clearer that one is about one's interests and goals (and those of one's
opponent), the less likely one is to be sidetracked by irrational thinking or
psychological traps.
288 See, e.g., KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 47 ("[P]reparation is the key to most of the
important negotiations you undertake. It underlies everything you do as a negotiator. It is
often the difference between a good deal and an average deal, and, as often, no deal at
all."); SCHOONMAKER, supra note 3, at 27 ("Good preparation can mean the difference
between success and failure .. "); THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 9 ("The most important
aspect of negotiation occurs before negotiators ever sit down at the bargaining table.
Preparation is the key to effective negotiation.'); URY, supra note 2, at 16 ("Most
negotiations are won or lost even before the talking begins, depending on the quality of
the preparation."); Terry Anderson, Step Into My Parlor: A Survey of Strategies and
Techniques for Effective Negotiation, 35 Bus. HORIZONS, May-June 1992, at 71, 75
("Although it is the least glamorous aspect of the negotiating process, [preparation] is the
most important.").
289 See, e.g., URY, supra note 2, at 19 (arguing that "[t]he single most important skill
in negotiation is the ability to put yourself in the other side's shoes. If you are trying to
change their thinking, you need to begin by understanding what their thinking is"). He
continues: "How can you learn about the other side's interests? Try the simple exercise of
imagining from their point of view what they seem to care most about." Id. Management
consultant John Rapp calls this "perspective taking," i.e., looking at the world through an
opponent's eyes. John Rapp, Perspective Taking, 14 ExEcuTivE EXCELLENCE 18, 18
(1997). He describes a conversation that illustrates its use:
I once asked sports "super-agent" Leigh Steinberg, "What skill makes a
competent negotiator into a great one?" "That's simple," he said, "to find out how
the world looks to the person across the table from me." Steinberg employs one
person whose only job is to write "opposition briefs," detailing the opponents' best
positions, and then suggesting "counters."
Id.
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1. Determining Goals and Interests
Determining one's goals in a negotiation would appear to be a simple
task, but it is not. In part, this is because people's personal desires often
conflict to some degree. For example, one's goal of spending more time with
his or her family might run headlong into an equally strong wish for
promotion or a higher salary. Similarly, taxpayers notoriously demand more
service from government at the same time they vote down bond issues or
vote against politicians viewed as big spenders. This conflict requires, at a
minimum, establishing and sorting priorities.
Determining goals also presents difficulties, because attaining them
depends not just on what one wants, but on what the other side is willing to
give. Thus, one's desire to pay a bargain price for a used Mercedes might
meet strong resistance from the car's owner, especially if he or she has
determined that the used car market values the car at a much higher price
than the offer. In other words, having a goal serves no useful purpose for a
negotiator unless there is a willingness on someone's part to satisfy that goal.
Even before announcing a specific position, one needs first to identify
the underlying interest behind the position. As Roger Fisher and William Ury
insightfully observe, reaching an agreement requires identifying and sharing
interests before moving to specific steps to meet those needs.290 Identifying
interests is probably where psychological traps and decision biases arise most
frequently, because they involve feelings, impulses, and emotions.291 When
addressing needs and desires, there are clearly limits to rational assessments
of what are inherently non-rational-as opposed to irrational-decision
factors. After all, how does one logically assess a strong preference for blue
cabinets or for Bob Dylan albums? What can be done, however, is to
improve one's decisionmaking with respect to identifying and pursuing these
preferences. On this point, Professor John Hammond and his colleagues
argue that people often take too narrow a focus in identifying objectives,
"omitting important considerations that become apparent only after they have
290 FISHER & URY, supra note 1, at 41 (describing the difference between
"positions" and "interests" as follows: "[D]esires and concerns are interests. Interests
motivate people; they are the silent movers behind the hubbub of positions. Your position
is something you have decided upon. Your interests are what caused you to so decide.");
see also URY, supra note 2, at 17 ("[T]he distinction is critical: Your position is the
concrete things you say you want-the dollars and cents, the terms and conditions. Your
interests are the intangible motivations that lead you to take that position.").
291 Ury describes interests as arising from "your needs, desires, concerns, [and]
fears ..... URY, supra note 2, at 17.
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made a decision." 292 They suggest a five-step process for properly
identifying objectives:
1. Write down all the concerns you hope to address through
your decision. 293
2. Convert your concerns into succinct objectives.294
3. Separate ends from means to establish your fundamental
objectives. 295
4. Clarify what you mean by each objective. 296
5. Test your objectives to see if they capture your interests.297
In other words, one who seeks to identify his or her objectives needs to
think of as many objectives as possible and compare them to each other as
thoroughly as possible. Identifying one's own interests is only part of the
planning process. One also needs to assess, as well as can be done, the likely
goals and interests of one's opponent.298 Determining what one's opponent
seeks enables a negotiator to develop ways to satisfy an opponent's interests
in the most effective and least costly manner possible.
2. Seek Information Through Questions
In order to prepare properly for a negotiation, one must gather as much
relevant information as possible. Although the Internet offers an expanded
292 JOHN HAMMOND ET AL., SMART CHOICES: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO MAKING
BETTER DECISIONS 34-35 (1999) (suggesting that these missteps occur in large part
because "people spend too little time and effort on the task of specifying objectives").
293 Id. Decisionmakers should "thrash about as much as necessary." Id. To do this,
one should employ techniques such as: (1) compose a wish list; (2) think about the worst
possible outcome; (3) consider the decision's possible impact on others; (4) ask people
who have faced similar situations what they considered when making their decision; (5)
consider a great--even if unfeasible-alternative; (6) consider a terrible alternative; (7)
think about how you would explain your decision to someone else; and (8) when
involved in a group decision, have each member follow the above suggestions
individually and then compare notes. Id. at 36.
294 Id. ("The clearest and most easily communicated form for objectives is a short
phrase consisting of a verb and object, such as 'Minimize costs,' 'Mitigate environmental
damage,' and so on.").
295 Id. at 38.
296 Id. at 40.
297 Id. at 41. ("Having clarified each of your objectives, it's time to test them. Use
your list to evaluate several potential alternatives, asking yourself if you would be
comfortable living with the resulting choices.").
298 See supra note 289 and accompanying text.
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source of data, which should be exploited as aggressively as possible, 299 full
data collection invariably requires asking the other side questions and
preparing to be asked questions in return. Excellent negotiators thoroughly
prepare for information exchanges with their opponents-identifying the
information they seek, assembling the data they are willing to disclose, and
developing responses to resist revealing matters they wish to keep
confidential. The more information one gathers, the less likely he or she is to
be sidetracked or misled by various psychological traps. 300
3. Develop a BA TNA
Negotiation biases can propel bargainers to accept deals that are sub-
optimal or, in the extreme, worse than no deal. Auto dealers know, for
example, that prospective buyers who have invested time and effort to travel
to a dealership will often settle for less than favorable terms simply to avoid
having to drive to another lot to get a better deal. 30 1 Perhaps the greatest
temptation is to fall prey to "sunk cost" thinking in which one justifies
299 The Internet provides negotiators and their opponents the opportunity to gain
access to information about the other side, which obviously presents benefits and
disadvantages. See generally JOHN J. MCGONAGLE & CAROLYN M. VELLA, THE INTERNET
AGE OF COMPETITIVE INTELLIGENCE (1999) (describing how to gather intelligence about
competitors and how to deflect their intelligence-gathering attempts).
300 See Bazerman et al., supra note 7, at 1281. Having documented numerous
negotiation biases in environmental negotiations due to the parties' strongly held beliefs
and extreme distrust of one another, they note the great benefit of information exchange
in producing exemplary agreements:
Would greater information exchange allow developers and environmentalists to
generate wiser environmental agreements? Experimental negotiation research
responds with a resounding "yes." In virtually every study, greater information
exchange is positively related to improved negotiation performance. This is
consistent with our intuitive sense that better informed negotiators and decision
makers produce better negotiations and decisions.
Id. (citations omitted).
301 See, e.g., Smart Maneuvers: How to Get the Right Car-Buying Information So
You Can Take Control of the Deal, CONSUMER REP., Apr. 2001, at 24. Consumer Reports
strongly advises prospective purchasers always to be ready to move to another dealership:
Be prepared to take a walk. Avoid pinning your hopes on only one car or only
one dealer. If you do, you may not get the best deal. Keep your options open as long
as you can. In our survey [of savvy consumers who read CR], 63 percent of the
respondents said they visited more than one dealer to buy their latest car. And 41
percent said they'd visit more dealers and get more bids the next time they buy a car.
Id.
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accepting a deal simply because one has invested so much time and money in
seeking it.302
One of the best ways of avoiding this psychological trap is to have a
reasonable sense of what type of deal one will accept and what type of deal
one will reject. To do that, one needs, as part of the planning process, to
determine one's "walkaway point," i.e., the point at which rejecting a deal
constitutes a superior alternative to taking the other side's best offer.
Virtually all negotiation experts advise this, although they often use different
terms such as "Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA),"303
"Minimum Settlement Point (MSP)," 304 or "Resistance Point (RP). ''30 5
Whichever term one chooses,306 the critical point in the concept is avoiding
sunk cost thinking that otherwise would impel accepting a poor deal on the
assumption that it is preferable to no deal.
D. Keep Negotiation Biases in Mind
Self-awareness can play an enormously beneficial part in decisionmaking
and negotiating. Professor John Hammond and his colleagues argue:
[t]he best protection against all psychological traps is awareness.
Forewarned is forearmed. Even if you can't eradicate the distortions
ingrained in the way your mind works, you can build tests and disciplines
into your decision-making process that can uncover and counter errors in
thinking before they become errors in judgment. 307
Knowing that, at times, one has a proclivity to deviate from a rational
decisionmaking approach can help enormously in adjusting one's thinking
302 See supra notes 221-26 and accompanying text.
303 See, e.g., URY, supra note 2, at 21-22 (stating that "[y]our BATNA is your
walkaway alternative. It's your best course of action for satisfying your interests without
the other's agreement").
304 See SCHOONMAKER, supra note 3, at 103 ("Your MSP is your bottom line, the
worst deal you can live with. You goal should usually be the best deal you can get.").
305 See CRAVER, supra note 105, at 63 (defining "resistance point" as "minimum
terms you would accept given your alternatives to a negotiated settlement").
306 Although the term BATNA is undoubtedly the most widely used, the author uses
it reluctantly because it seems to conflate two concepts that he prefers to keep separate.
One is the notion of "walkaway point," i.e., the point at which no deal is better than the
proposed deal. The other is "fall-back position," i.e., what one plans to do instead of the
rejected deal. Although the concepts logically go together, they are distinct
considerations.
307 See, e.g., HAMMOND ET AL., supra note 292, at 214-15.
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and action to avoid the unwise approach. Just as prior experiences inform our
future actions, empirical information affects how we make decisions and
undertake negotiations. To return to a renowned example, one should
remember the Dollar Auction, the bidding game that effectively "entraps"
participants in an auction into bidding amounts far in excess of the value of a
single dollar bill.30 8 Why, one asks, would someone play a game in which he
or she is almost always guaranteed a loss? The answer is that the participants
typically cannot foresee the complex psychological drives-greed, fear of
losing face, urge to win, and desire to exact revenge-that kick in to impel
highly irrational behavior. 309 Provided with critical information about the
specific pitfalls of the Dollar Auction or with general information about the
psychological pitfalls, however, few people will fall prey to this enticing
game3 l---or other, similar traps.311
The notion that awareness of biases can lead to successful strategies for
avoiding psychological traps extends to other realms of human behavior,
such as runaway emotions. 312 For example, one who knows that he or she
has a hair-trigger temper that sabotages negotiations can take steps to identify
308 See supra notes 213-15 and accompanying text.
309 See Jeffrey Z. Rubin, Psychological Traps, in NEGOTIATION: READINGS,
EXERCISES & CASES, supra note 1, at 160, 164 (citing research on the Dollar Auction that
identifies these and other motivators). According to Rubin, greed entices bidders to enter
the auction, but once they see that coming in second will produce only a humiliating loss
and no gain, they begin escalating the bids. Id. According to Rubin:
People who remain in the auction past the $1 bid... typically stick with it to
the bitter end--until they have exhausted their resources or their adversary has quit.
Interpersonal motives come to the fore when the bid exceeds the objective value of
the prize. Even though both players know they are sure to lose, each may go out of
his or her way to punish the other, making sure that the other person loses even
more, and each may become increasingly concerned about looking foolish by
yielding to the adversary's aggression.
Id. at 165.
310 The author can attest to this from first-hand experience. Once, in front of a class
of roughly 60 students, I was unable to find a single person willing to bid even a penny
for the dollar. "Forget it," one student wryly announced. "We just got fleeced by our
finance professor."
311 See Rubin, supra note 309, at 167 (noting that "[o]ur studies also show that
being forewarned about one kind of trap, moreover, can put people on guard against other
kinds of traps").
312 See, e.g., GOLEMAN, supra note 286, at 48 (describing how self-awareness
provides the basis for managing emotional outbursts--"when [people with good self-
awareness] get into a bad mood, they don't ruminate and obsess about it, and are able to
get out of it sooner. In short, their mindfulness helps them manage their emotions.").
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personal warning signals and cues that unleash tantrums. Armed with this
knowledge, the person can often apply effective behavioral modification
techniques to minimize or avoid the lost temper.313
Although a powerful technique for combating psychological traps, self-
awareness, by itself, does not always guard against foolish actions. Indeed,
one would find it surprising that emotional pathways and thought patterns
hard-wired by millennia of evolution could invariably be offset simply by the
awareness that we are programmed to act in certain ways. Knowing that an
egocentric bias disposes us to interpret events in a manner that unduly favors
our interests does not necessarily provide an effective antidote to this bias.314
Similarly, knowing that we often rearrange events from hindsight to make
ourselves look wiser or more prescient than we actually were at the time
typically fails to reduce this all-too-human tendency. 315 In fact, many of the
decision biases produce pressure to act in ways that we genuinely wish to
avoid. So powerful is the principle of reciprocity, for example, that it leads us
to invite a neighbor or co-worker to dinner in response to an invitation to
dine at his or her house-even when we dislike the person whom we
invite.316
Wary negotiators should not abandon hope upon hearing that decision
biases can operate despite our knowledge and awareness of their existence.
Recent studies applying more sophisticated and powerful approaches have
shown a greater ability to neutralize and offset our biases.317
313 See, e.g., Norman E. Rosenthal, THE EMOTIONAL REVOLUTION: HOW THE NEW
SCIENCE OF FEELINGS CAN TRANSFORM YOUR LIFE 228-38 (2002) (describing a ten-point
program for anger management: Step 1: Recognize that your anger is a problem; Step 2:
Monitor your anger level; Step 3: Look for a pattern; Step 4: Take a time-out; Step 5:
Challenge perceptions and thoughts that fuel your anger; Step 6: Dig deeper to
understand the roots of your anger; Step 7: Change the messages you give yourself; Step
8: Use exposure and relaxation; Step 9: Use humor; Step 10: Listen to your Limbic
news-and act appropriately).
314 See, e.g., Birke & Fox, supra note 7, at 19 (noting that "[r]esearch suggests that
egocentric biases may be very difficult to eliminate").
315 See, e.g., Peters, supra note 167, at 1285 (noting that early efforts to eliminate
the hindsight bias by warning subjects about the bias and encouraging them to be more
aware failed to reduce or eliminate it "because the biasing process is largely subconscious
and automatic").
316 See CIALDINI, supra note 12, at 21 (observing that the principle of reciprocity
"possesses awesome strength, often producing a 'yes' response to a request that, except
for an existing feeling of indebtedness, would surely have been refused").
317 See infra notes 318-37 and accompanying text.
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E. Use "Devil's Advocate" Techniques
In the Middle Ages, candidates for sainthood would be represented
before the papal court by two spokesmen, the "advocatus dei," who would
make the strongest case for canonization, and the "advocatus diaboli," who
would present all conceivable arguments against the proposed action.318 In
modem parlance, a devil's advocate is one who raises arguments against a
proposed course of action to help determine whether it is sound.
Devil's advocacy can reduce bias in negotiation, especially in the
planning phase and in dealing with egocentric biases. 319 Given that
negotiators are overly inclined to view the merits of a claim in ways that
unconsciously tilt toward themselves, forcing them to confront the legitimate
claims of the other side goes a long way to balancing the default setting in
favor of themselves. Playing devil's advocate against egocentric bias is
particularly important given its seeming intractability. 320 Moreover, given the
difficulty in dealing with difficult negotiators' biases, playing devil's
advocate with oneself may be insufficient. What may help more than a solo
venture in deviltry is including a trusted employee or colleague to play the
skeptical role as vigorously as possible. 321 In such cases, the essential
element is for the devil's advocate to be as blunt and honest as possible in
order to offset the natural bias in one's favor. As Birke & Fox note,
companies involved in high stakes litigation take the need for objective
information so seriously that they may hire a test jury to hear the case and
render a mock judgment to gain a disinterested perspective. 322
F. "Hide the Answer"
In cases where wishful thinking or hindsight bias might lead one to
"fudge" data to confirm a preconceived idea, scientists have devised an
318 WILLIAM MORRIS & MARY MORRIS, MORRIS DICTIONARY OF WORD AND PHRASE
ORIGINS 176 (1988).
319 See infra note 320 and accompanying text.
320 See Birke & Fox, supra note 7, at 19 (noting research suggesting that "egocentric
biases may be very difficult to eliminate").
321 Politicians preparing for debates often use this technique, employing trusted
advisors to play the role of their opponents in mock debate sessions. Such sessions help
expose poor information and ineffective arguments. See, e.g., DAVID A. STOCKMAN, THE
TRIUMPH OF POLITICS: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE REAGAN REVOLUTION 48-50 (1986)
(describing his role in preparing candidate Reagan for a presidential debate).
322 Birke & Fox, supra note 7, at 19 (noting that many experts recommend the use
of test juries to play the role of devil's advocate).
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approach that "hid[es] the answer" in ways that force extreme intellectual
honesty. 323 What the scientists do is program their computers to add
unknown numbers called "offsets" to their data to make the outcome of their
analyses blind. Only when an experiment is over do the researchers open
their "metaphorical" sealed envelopes and discover the value of the offset.324
The benefit of this approach is that scientists never fall prey to the temptation
to make adjustments or "corrections" in their data during the experiment to
correspond to what they believe the results should be.325
In some circumstances, negotiators might benefit from variations on this
technique. For example, one using an agent to make a purchase, such as in a
real estate transaction, might withhold from the agent the actual price at
which the principal would make a deal. This would avoid any tendency on
the agent's part to stop pressing for concessions once the price fell within the
range of acceptability for the principal.
G. General Legal Tools. Apply Reasoning From the Law of Evidence
Given the many centuries in which the law has pondered questions
regarding the admissibility of evidence to show the truth, relevance, and
materiality of litigants' cases, it would be surprising, indeed, if some of the
rules of evidence did not offer a number of helpful ways of avoiding decision
bias.326 In particular, negotiators with a legal background would do well to
keep in mind a number of critical legal principles, such as:
323 See James Glanz, New Tactic in Physics: Hiding the Answer, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
8, 2000, at F1 (describing the new technique as a way to help scientists "overcome their
problems with particle 'discoveries' that turn out to be wishful thinking and with
conflicting results that take decades to resolve").
324 Id.
325 Id. (noting that "[h]uman bias has a long, unhappy history in scientific
research"). Scientists who have reviewed some of the greatest discoveries in history, such
as Gregor Mendel's data on heritable traits or Sir Arthur Eddington's measurements of
the deflection of starlight over the edge of the sun, have discovered substantial "fudging"
of the data to produce results consistent with their intuition rather than honestly reporting
the results. Id.
326 The law of evidence is primarily designed to help decisionmakers arrive at as
close an approximation to the truth as is possible to fallible human beings. See, e.g., PAuL
F. ROTHSTEIN, EVIDENCE IN A NUTSHELL: STATE AND FEDERAL RULES 1 (2d ed. 1970)
(noting that the rules of evidence provide "useful insights into how minds come to accept
propositions of fact as true"); CHESTER H. SMITH, EVIDENCE FOR LAW SCHOOL AND BAR
EXAMINATIONS 1 (Howard M. Rossen & Wilton S. Sogg eds., rev. ed. 1970) ("The
primary purpose for rules of evidence is to arrive at the truth.").
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* Weight of Evidence: When one is involved in a negotiation, one
would do well to decide how much weight to accord propositions
advanced by one's opponents. Lawyers are well qualified to assess
burdens of proof such as "preponderance of the evidence," 327 "clear
and convincing evidence," 328 and "beyond a reasonable doubt. 329
Although these terms do not have precise contours, they carry the
clear implication that different propositions require different degrees
of proof. Depending on the circumstance, one would do well on
occasion to hold an opponent's statements to a particularly high
standard of proof.330
* Burden of Proof: The person advancing a proposition typically has
the burden of proving it.331
* Relevancy: Evidence is relevant when it renders a fact in dispute
more probable than it would be without the evidence. 332
* Nature of Evidence: Other things being equal, evidence arising from
one's personal experience is more credible than that related by
another.
Negotiators would do well in bargaining by keeping in the back of their
minds the notion that propositions they wish to advance or arguments made
to them by their opponents should be tested against the principles for
provenance contained in the rules of evidence. Given the restrictive nature
and occasional irrationality of the rules of evidence, one would be foolish to
apply them in any mechanical fashion to arguments advanced in negotiation
327 See CHARLEs T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 677 (1954)
(noting that "proof which leads the jury to find that the existence of the contested fact is
more probable than its non-existence").
328 Id. at 679 (This is a more demanding standard of proof. No precise formulation
has been universally agreed to other than "the truth of the contention is 'highly
probable."').
329 Id. at 682 (Applied in criminal cases, it requires the highest degree of certainty.
A jury must acquit "if they have a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt of the crime
charged ... ").
330 The weight of evidence should bear some relation to the importance of the
proposition being advanced. In the case of extraterrestrials, for example, the late
astronomer, Carl Sagan, used to say, "Extraordinary claims require extraordinary proof."
Positive Atheism's Big List of Carl Sagan Quotations, at
http://www.positiveatheism.org/hist/quotes/sagan.hm (last visited Apr. 4, 2005).
331 McCORMICK, supra note 327, at 636 (noting that the burden of proof is "usually
cast first upon the party who has pleaded the existence of the fact...
332 See id. at 317.
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settings.333 Nonetheless, keeping in mind the likelihood of a judge admitting
the evidence that one's opponent offers or that one intends to use to convince
the other side may well provide a kind of disinterested scrutiny that helps one
avoid decision bias.
H. Specific Legal Tools: Contingent Contracts, Settlement Escrow,
and Final Offer Arbitration
Depending on the circumstances, some specific legal tools can reduce
negotiation and decision biases, especially those related to over-optimism,
anchoring and egocentrism. They do so by offsetting the biases of the
opposing parties or by forcing the parties to view issues in a more objective
fashion.
1. Contingent Contracts
Assume, for example, that a star professional athlete believes that he or
she deserves a dramatic increase in pay after a particularly successful season.
The team's owner, on the other hand, worries about the precedent of a large
pay increase, and about the star's staying power over the next season or
seasons. Each side may well exert considerable leverage over the other. The
athlete, if eligible for free agent status or if willing to endure a season
without playing, may demand an extremely large increase in pay given the
short professional career of most athletes. The owner, on the other hand, may
believe that no other team will value the athlete's talent as highly as the
athlete does and may be able to foreclose the athlete's departure from the
owner's team (if the athlete is not eligible for free agent status).
One of the biggest confounds in the professional athlete's contract
negotiation is that, although the parties might be able to reach an agreement
about how to price a specific performance by the athlete, they do not know in
advance how the athlete will perform during the next season. Each side,
responding both to the tendency towards over-optimism and towards viewing
333 Rules that bar highly credible evidence from juries because of its inflammatory
or prejudicial nature ought to be analyzed for its probative value notwithstanding the
law's inclination to bar it from admission before a jury. For example, evidence relating to
a person's general "character" is typically limited in trials for fear that juries will read
more into the evidence than is warranted by the facts. See id. at 86 (noting that the
tendency is to use character evidence "more and more sparingly"). On the other hand,
negotiators on the verge of entering into an agreement with an opponent would likely
want as many details of a person's character as possible.
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the situation from its egocentric perspective, might enter the negotiation with
wildly different assumptions about the future performance of the athlete.
One solution advanced by Professors Bazerman and Gillespie is for the
parties to craft a contingent contract, 334 i.e., one where the amount of pay
varies according to the athlete's actual performance. 335 For example, if the
athlete scores a certain number of goals, leads the team to a championship, or
draws a certain level of attendance, his or her pay might be increased. The
benefit of such an approach is that negotiators "bet on the future rather than
argue about it."'336 Rather than seeking to convince the athlete that he or she
is not as good as the athlete believes, the team owner can say "If you can do
what you think you can, I'm delighted to pay you for that achievement, but
you have to perform up to your predictions in order to be paid that amount."
If, on the other hand, the owner is being unreasonably pessimistic about
the athlete's potential, a contingency that rewards the athlete for a specific
performance effectively reduces any biased thinking that the owner might
carry regarding the athlete's chances during the next season. 337
2. Settlement Escrow Offers
Deciding whether or not to make the first offer in a negotiation is a
challenge to bargainers. Most negotiation experts counsel caution in doing so
because of numerous perceived pitfalls: demonstrating ignorance, 338 seeking
334 One might also describe such an agreement as a "conditional" contract. Calamari
and Perillo describe a condition as "an act or event, other than a lapse of time, which,
unless the condition is excused, must occur before a duty to perform a contractual
promise arises .... JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTACTS
397 (4th ed. 1998). The examples described in this section are clearly conditions
precedent. Id.
335 See Bazerman & Gillespie, supra note 158, at 156 (describing a contingent
contract as one in which the "terms are not finalized until the uncertain event in
question-the contingency-actually takes place").
336 Id.
3 3 7 Id. at 157.
By their nature the biases are difficult to root out-they're embedded in the way the
human mind works. Contingent contracts offer a different approach to solving the
bias problem. By enabling each side to bet on its bias, the contracts remove the
biases as sources of contention and ultimately have the effect of canceling the
altogether.
Id.
338 Professor Shell cites the case of novelist Raymond Chandler, who negotiated
with a Hollywood director and producer, demanded $150 per week, and warned that he
might require two to three weeks to produce a script. The Hollywood officials reacted
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unduly modest agreements, 339 or, conversely, demanding insultingly large
amounts. 340 As a result, many experts advise astute negotiators not to make
the first offer.34' Notwithstanding these views, recent research suggests,
however, that making first offers can markedly improve one's outcome
through the strategic use of anchoring.342 So powerful is the anchoring effect
at times that "[e]ven when people know that a particular anchor should not
influence their judgments, they are often incapable of resisting its
influence." 343
One who appreciates the power of anchoring may still wish to avoid
making the first offer in a given negotiation because he or she remains
mindful of the pitfalls of doing so.344 One who finds himself or herself in that
position should consider a technique developed by professors Robert Gertner
and Geoffrey Miller called settlement escrows as an alternative approach.345
Under this approach, parties in litigation who find themselves at an impasse
about which of them is to make the first offer can turn to an "escrow
agent" 346 to receive each side's offer in confidence. The escrow agent then
with amusement at Chandler's naivetd, knowing that they were prepared to pay five times
as much and that most movie scripts took months, not weeks, to write. See SHELL, supra
note 1, at 158.
339 Brian Epstein, manager of the Beatles, committed this error. When negotiating
for the group's financial share of their first movie, A Hard Day's Night, he led with what
he considered an aggressive demand of 7.5% of the movie's profits. The producers, who
had been prepared to pay up to 25%, readily agreed. Id. at 158.
340 One who does this may go so far outside the other side's range of acceptable
offers that the opponent simply terminates the negotiation, assuming that agreement is
impossible.
341 See, e.g., CRAVER, supra note 105, at 57 (noting that most negotiators prefer to
have their adversaries articulate their opening positions first); DAWSON, supra note 105,
at 125 (advising that negotiators should "get the other side to state a position first");
SCHOONMAKER, supra note 3, at 74 (advising negotiators to "[t]ry to get the [other side]
to make the first offer"); SHELL, supra note 1, at 157 (noting that, while he disagrees,
many experts "say you should never open").
342 See supra notes 102-14 and accompanying text for a discussion of anchoring.
343 See Adam D. Galinsky, Should You Make the First Offer?, 7 NEGOT., July 2004,
at 3, 3 and studies cited therein.
344 See supra notes 338--40 and accompanying text.
345 Robert H. Gertner & Geoffrey P. Miller, Settlement Escrows, 24 J. LEGAL STUD.
87 (1995).
346 Gertner and Miller suggest that the clerk of the court could easily and cheaply
fill this function, but any mutually acceptable person could suffice. Id. at 88. In fact, one
can go to the Internet to get a computer program to play the role. See Mark Howland,
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examines the two offers to determine whether they cross, i.e., whether the
buyer's offer exceeds the seller's bid. If the two prices do not cross, the
agent-without revealing either side's offer-informs the parties that there is
no overlap between the offers. The parties are then free to continue
bargaining or to withdraw from the negotiation. Each has learned that his or
her offer was unacceptable to the other party, but neither has been
"anchored" by the other347 nor has either given away information easily
exploited by the other.
If the escrow agent determines that the two offers overlap, the agent then
notifies the parties of the overlap. In most cases, the agent will assign
agreement at the midpoint between the two numbers. For example, if the
seller puts in a price of $120 to sell a widget and the buyer inputs a figure of
$160, the midpoint deal will be struck at $140.348
Settlement escrow allows the parties to put forward their "bottom line"
offers in ways that more back-and-forth negotiation does not. In settlement
escrow, one generally either makes a deal at a point that one believes to be
fair or makes no deal without revealing any vital information. 349
One might ask what would prevent a party from putting an extremely
aggressive offer in the settlement escrow process to test whether the other
party really understands the proper valuation of the deal, and then moving to
a more modest claim if there is no overlap in the parties' positions. The
simple answer is that settlement escrows typically run only one exchange of
offers. If one does not put a reasonable offer out, one likely loses the ability
to use the process to make a deal. Of course, it is always possible for the
parties to agree to run another exchange of offers, but providing the
Settlement Escrows: A Negotiation Tool, at
http://mayet.som.yale.edu/coopetition/java/bidask.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2005).
347 See Gemter & Miller, supra note 345, at 96-97 (citing studies of the anchoring
effect that demonstrate "more aggressive initial offers tended to correlate with better
success on the merits... ").
348 See Howland, supra note 346.
349 A web site devoted to settlement escrow describes the benefit as follows:
Settlement escrows allow people to negotiate from behind a veil. Ordinarily,
when you make a demand, you reveal your hand. Settlement escrows preserve the
fog. You can say what you really need without giving away much information.
When the parties in a negotiation feel safe enough to make reasonable demands,
they're much more likely to reach an agreement. There's a much better chance that
whenever there's a mutually beneficial deal to be made, it will be made.
Id.
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possibility of multiple offers substantially diminishes the possibility of
agreement in the early stages of negotiation. 350
3. Final Offer Arbitration
Another tool that might help in avoiding negotiator bias is final offer
arbitration (FOA). The specific bias that FOA can address is over-optimism,
i.e., the egocentric tendency on the part of negotiators to assume that their
point of view is likely to prevail in a bargaining session.351 Final Offer
Arbitration was first suggested in 1966 by Professor Carl M. Stevens as a
way of discouraging parties involved in arbitration proceedings from taking
extreme positions.352 In conventional arbitration, the arbitrator has the choice
of splitting the difference between the parties, thereby creating incentives for
the parties to propose settlements at the extreme end of the spectrum with the
hope that splitting the difference will give them an advantage in the final
award. 353 Professor Stevens' response was to propose Final Offer Arbitration
to chill this effect.
Essentially, FOA operates by requiring the arbitrator to select one of the
two submitted offers without compromising between them. 354 A moment's
reflection reveals why this approach forces the parties to be more realistic in
350 See Gertner & Miller, supra note 345, at 115. As the authors state:
From a theoretical viewpoint, the most interesting implementation issue may be
how often offers into the settlement escrow can be revised. If the litigants do not
learn new information in the pretrial stages, the answer is easy. There should be a
single opportunity to make escrow offers, and if the offers do not cross, there is no
opportunity to try again. One way to think about this is to assume, to the contrary,
that there is an opportunity for each side to revise its offer, should there be no
settlement in the first escrow. Now, the incentives to make a reasonable offer in the
first settlement escrow are much weaker. A litigant may reason that it can make an
aggressive offer in the first escrow, in the hopes that it may be settled anyway, and
only make a reasonable offer in the second round.
Id.
351 See supra notes 160-73 and accompanying text.
352 Carl M. Stevens, Is Compulsory Arbitration Compatible with Bargaining?, 5
INDUs. REL. 38, 42 (1966).
353 See, e.g., Daniel R. Marburger, Arbitrator Compromise in Final Offer
Arbitration: Evidence from Major League Baseball, 42 ECON. INQ. 60, 60 (2004) (noting
that "[c]ritics have argued that [in conventional arbitration] arbitrators split the difference
between the offers to enhance their chances of being rehired in future cases. This gives
each bargainer an incentive to submit an extreme offer to increase its expected gains from
arbitration.").
354 Id.
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their submissions. Given the arbitrator's lack of authority to split the
difference, the arbitrator is forced to select the offer that he or she believes to
be the more reasonable. Parties who take an unreasonable or extreme
position will inevitably be the loser in the submissions to the arbitrator.
Any negotiator who submits to an FOA procedure will quickly learn the
hazards of over-optimism in bargaining. Faced with the need to forecast
which offer an arbitrator will likely choose, the prudent negotiator will do his
or her best to look at the dispute through the eyes of the arbitrator, not
through the rosy prism of his or her egocentric perspective. Major League
Baseball adopted FOA in 1973 and has used it successfully ever since.355
FOA has also been used in other labor settings. 356
One can posit the use of FOA in a negotiation setting where he or she is
convinced that the other side either has deliberately (and cynically) adopted
an extreme position or has proffered an offer steeped in over-optimism. One
way to break an impasse over terms that one deems to be too extreme is to
propose that either party submit the dispute to FOA. Such a proposal sends a
strong signal that one is completely secure in his or her offer and believes
that the other side either is bluffing or naive. In either instance, such a
proposal might well force the other side to take a cold, hard look at their
position. Even if the other side rejects the proposal, one likely will have put
them on the defensive and may well pressure them to move from their
position.
VII. CONCLUSION
Having analyzed the possible pitfalls negotiators face in decisionmaking,
one might be tempted toward pessimism regarding the possibilities for
optimizing his or her performance in bargaining. It certainly seems true that
virtually any deal one negotiates, if subject to extensive hindsight analysis,
might seem sub-optimal in one or more particulars. Reviewing past decisions
is certainly a worthwhile endeavor if it improves future decisions. On the
other hand, one needs to avoid "paralysis by analysis" pessimism. 357
355 Paul D. Staudohar, Baseball Negotiations: A New Agreement, 125 MONTHLY
LAB. REv., Dec. 2002, at 15, 16.
356 See, e.g., Final Offer Arbitration, Canadian Transportation Agency, available at
http://www.cta-otc.gc.ca/rail-ferro/arbitration/foae.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2005).
357 George Washington put it best, "We ought not to look back unless it is to derive
useful lessons from past errors, and for the purpose of profiting by dear-bought
experience." World of Quotes.corn: Historic Quotes and Proverbs Archive, available at
http://www.worldofquotes.com/author/George-Washington/l/index.html (last visited
Apr. 18, 2005).
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A more optimistic perspective is to understand that humans, as fallible
beings, are programmed to process copious amounts of data and make quick
decisions that balance speed against in-depth analysis. On balance, humans
tend to do a creditable job. This article has explored several approaches that
will tend to improve one's decisions. None will produce perfection, but,
within human constraints, they seem likely to help avoid the worst types of
errors.
